LONG AND SHORT HAUL-Continued.
Intermediate Clause-Continued.
Complainant's construction of tariffs whereby rates claimed to be
applicable under an intermediate clause from Kansas City, Kans.-Mo.,
and St. Joseph, Mo., to destinations east of the Mississippi River,
composed of the factor to west-bank points plus proportional rates
beyond, were higher than the through combination rates based on
east-bank points, from origins to which Kansas City and St. Joseph
were claimed to be intermediate, resulted in an absurd interpretation
and in violations of the long-and-short-haul clause which it is the
purpose of the intermediate rule to avoid. Hertz Leather Co. v.
Baltimore & O. R. Co., 702 (707).
Since it is well known that it is not a carrier's practice to provide rates
by intermediate rules from or to large cities or on traffic moving in
considerable volume, it was reasonably certain that proportional rates
from Kansas City, Kans.-Mo., and St. Joseph, Mo., would not have
been provided by means of an intermediate clause in the tariffs in
view of the size of the cities and the tonnage of fresh meats and
packing-house products moving therefrom. Id. (707-708).
Rates under an intermediate rule providing rates to destinations to
which specific rates were not provided, situated between two points
to which rates were provided, were not applicable to Roxana, Ill., the
terminus of a 2-mile spur track, even though it was shown in the
geographical list between two main-line points and carriers chose to
disregard the haul over the spur to the junction with the main line
in computing distance rates to or from that point, for in the absence
of a specific tariff provision that it was to be regarded as intermediate,
the geographical situation governed. Geographically it was not inter-
mediate. Id. (708-709).
Combination rate on cottonseed from Matagorda, Miss., to Alexandria,
La., found applicable. While a lower group rate applied to unnamed
intermediate points on a direct line, Matagorda was on a branch line
and the group did not include any points on the branch line to which
Matagorda was intermediate on traffic to Alexandria. Southern Agr.
Service v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., 747.
Traffic from Claremont Terminal, Jersey City, N. J., was not entitled
to the benefit of the rate from Newark, N. J., to Brooklyn, N. Y.,
under an intermediate rule providing that a shipment from any point
of origin not named located between any two origin points named
was entitled to the rate from the next more distant point named,
since Newark was the only named point of origin on traffic to Brooklyn
and it would therefore he impossible for Claremont Terminal to be
between two named origin points. Valentine & Co. v. Lehigh Valley
R. Co., 781 (782).
While points on team tracks within switching limits have been con-
sidered intermediate points in connection with traffic to destinations
beyond, even though shipments may not have passed through such
points, this principle could not be applied to points within the cor-
porate but not the switching limits of a municipality, where such
points were located on branch lines and line-haul rates applied be-
tween them and other points, and it would have been impossible to
move traffic through them except over unnatural routes involving a
back haul. Id. (782-783).
LONG AND SHORT HAUL-Continued.
Burlington, Iowa, Lincoln, Nebr., St. Paul, Minn., and Suffolk, Va.:
Gordon Candy Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 563 (569–570).
Clarement Terminal, Jersey City, N. J.: Valentine & Co. v. Lehigh
Valley R. Co., 781 (782).
Commerce, Ga.: Globe Superior Corp. v. Southern Ry. Co., 456 (458).
East Liberty, Pa.: Federated Metals Corp. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 197.
Emerson and Wayne, Nebr.: Obermoller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,
430 (431).
Flora, Ind.: Peabody Lumber Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 56 (57).
Florida points in zones 1 and 2: Southern Pine Asso. v. Aberdeen &
Rockfish R. Co., 171 (174).
Fort Wayne, Ind.: Perrine-Armstrong Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 53.
Gambier and Hunt, Ohio: Perrine-Armstrong Co. v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 745.
Hartford, Conn.: Concord Chamber of Commerce v. Boston & M. R.,
427 (428).
Illinois, Missouri, and points in other States: Sumter Packing Co. v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 137 (144).
Jacksonville, Fla.: Class Rates to Jacksonville, Fla., 215.
Kokomo, Ind.: Kokomo Steel & Wire Co. v. Michigan Central R. Co.,
368.
Lapel, Ind.: Carroll-Graham Bottle Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.,
Lee, Fla.: South Georgia Traffic Bureau v. Atlanta, B. & C., R. Co.,
472.
Liberal, Kans.: Hutchinson Produce Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,
Little Falls, Minn.: Watab Paper Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 37
(39).
Lynchburg, Va.: Smith Agency v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 464.
McKees Rocks, Pa.: Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Director General, 623
(627).
New Roads and Glynn, La.: Calamari Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 366
(367).
Oklahoma points on the St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.: Routing and
Transit on Cotton, 762 (763).
Paw Paw, Mich.: Ciresi Fruit Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 233
(234).
Republic, Mo.: Erb Co. v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 195.
South Dakota points: Rules for Combination Rates on Livestock, 629
(631).
Southern Territory: Globe Superior Corp. v. Southern Ry. Co., 456
(457).
Sumter, S. C.: Sumter Packing Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 137
(142).
Toledo, Ohio.: Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Mississippi Warrior
Service, 401.
Trenton, N. J.: Federated Metals Corp. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 242
(244, 246).
Winfield, Wichita, and Emporia, Kans.: Sumter Packing Co. v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 137 (142).
LONG AND SHORT HAUL-Continued.
Rule 77 of Tariff Circular 18-A:
Shipments of brass ingots from East Liberty, Pa., Shadyside Station,
to Baltimore, Md., assessed the rate applicable from Detroit, Mich.,
to Baltimore, which was published subject to rule 77 of Tariff Circular
18-A or intermediate clauses, were undercharged, since the junction
point at which shipments were delivered by the Pennsylvania to the
Baltimore & Ohio was not among those listed in the tariff, delivery
at one of which was prerequisite to the application of the rates
charged. Federated Metals Corp. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 197.
Even though the commodity rate from Lawton, Mich., to St. Paul,
Minn., subject to rule 77 of Tariff Circular 18-A, higher than the rate
from Paw Paw, Mich., an intermediate point, was on an improper
basis due to tariff errors and the departure was protected by a fourth-
section order, as the tariff made no reference to that order the publica-
tion of the rule was a holding out by the carriers interested of a
promise to apply those rates from the intermediate points and failure
to do so was unreasonable. Reparation awarded. Ciresi Fruit Co.
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 233 (234-235).
Rule 77 of Tariff Circular 18-A removes the necessity of publishing
commodity rates from intermediate points from which shipments
may never be made, and has no application where commodity rates
apply from the intermediate point. Federated Metals Corp. v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., 242 (244).
Where a specific commodity rate was published from the intermediate
point, rule 77 of Tariff Circular 18-A, under which a lower rate ap-
plied from the more distant point, was without effect. National Bag
Mfg. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 447 (448).
Rates on raw peanuts, in shell and shelled, from Georgia points to Council
Bluffs, Iowa, and from Alabama and Florida points to Omaha and
Lincoln, Nebr., which were intermediate to St. Paul, Minn., found
unreasonable in the past to the extent that the factors beyond Cairo,
Ill., exceeded that factor of the St. Paul rate beyond Cairo which was
published subject to rule 77 of Tariff Circular 18-A, and unreasonable
for the future to the extent that they exceeded the rate prescribed.
Reparation awarded and reasonable rate for the future prescribed,
but with the understanding that it should not exceed a proportional
rate to St. Paul made subject to rule 77 and applicable via these
points. Gordon Candy Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 562
(565-568).
The publication of a rate to St. Paul, Minn., lower than to intermediate
points, but subject to rule 77 of Tariff Circular 18-A, was a substantial
compliance with the requirements of section 4, but it was equiv-
alent to an admission that the higher rates to the intermediate points
were unreasonable. Id. (567).
Failure of carriers to publish and apply from Plymouth and Paoli, Ind..
to Ohio River crossings, on shipments of fruit and vegetable baskets
to southeastern destinations, the rates applicable from Chicago, Ill.,
and Michigan City, Ind., published subject to rule 77 of Tariff
Circulars 18-A and 20, found unreasonable for the period beginning
two years prior to filing complaint to the date when those rates were
made inapplicable by tariff amendment. Reparation awarded and
finding in 140 I. C. C. 351 modified. Edgerton Mfg. Co. v. Aberdeen
& Rockfish R. Co., 578.
LONG AND SHORT HAUL-Continued.
Rule 77 of Tariff Circular 18-A-Continued.
In the absence of routing restrictions, a point on a route not unduly
circuitous was intermediate within the meaning of rule 77, even though
there was a direct route to the destinations over which it would not
have been intermediate. Id. (579).
Filing a special-docket application for authority to refund under rule 77
of Tariff Circulars 18-A and 20, subsequent to a finding in the original
report, would not have been an admission by the carrier of the unrea-
sonableness of the rate therein found not unreasonable by the commis-
sion as the complainant was entitled to the lower rate under the tariff.
Id. (580).
Even if carrier had routed shipments over the Illinois Central from
St. Louis, Mo., to Evansville, Ind., lower combination rates over
that line, based on Paducah, Ky., would not have applied under rule
77 of Tariff Circular 18-A, because, although Paducah is intermediate
to Kevil and Krebs, Ky., to which points joint rates via St. Louis
applied, such rates did not specifically refer to rule 77, as required,
although many rates in the tariff did so; nor was it shown that a
single shipment involved moved from any point from which joint
rates to Krebs and Kevil applied. Southwestern Broom Mfg. Co. v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Co., 724 (727–728).
Since Claremont Terminal was within the corporate but not the switch-
ing limits of Jersey City, N. J., and it would have been physically
impossible to have moved traffic via Claremont Terminal from
Newark, N. J., to Brooklyn, N. Y., except over an unnatural route
and with a retracing movement, the rate from Newark, which was
subject to rule 77 of Tariff Circular 18-A, did not apply on traffic from
Claremont Terminal, notwithstanding the fact that points within the
lighterage limits of New York Harbor have been considered as a
unit within the meaning of the fourth section. Valentine & Co. v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., 781 (782-783).
LONG ARTICLES. See MULTIPLE-CAR SHIPMENTS.
Loss and damage claims on vitrified-clay sewer pipe are relatively heavy
compared with those of the general run of traffic. Cancellation of Com-
modity Rates on Sewer Pipe, 514 (521).
The fact a that water competitive basis had been so long maintained by the
carriers as to be looked upon by the commission as the reasonable normal
level to much of the Southeast did not alter the fact of its having been
originally established on a depressed level, and a substantial difference
between the Southeast and the Mississippi Valley was recognized when the
commission differentiated between the general level from Albany, Ga.,
and that from Vicksburg, Miss., in 85 I. C. C. 270. Adams-Bank Lumber
Co. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., 280 (288–289).
The all-rail rate on canned salmon from Pacific-coast territory to the South-
east was purposely made lower than a normal rate in an attempt to win
back a portion of the traffic formerly moving over the transcontinental
all-rail routes, the bulk of which now moves via the Panama Canal.
Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 752 (755-756).
A depressed competitive rate is no measure of reasonableness. Valentine &
Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 781 (783).
Wood pulp is a comparatively low-grade commodity. Ajax Paper Mills v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 357 (358).
Raw Materials and Finished Products: There is little, if any, similarity
between completely manufactured folding or collapsible fruit and vegetable
crates and crate materials. Owosso Mfg. Co. v. Asherton & Gulf Ry. Co.,
219 (222).
MARKET COMPETITION. See COMPETITION.
MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM RATES.
Rates prescribed by the commission in 85 I. C. C. 270, from Vicksburg,
Miss., as the basis for revision of rates from points in the South to eastern
trunk-line territory in connection with fourth-section applications, were
reasonable maximum rates. The commission would hardly have pre-
scribed rates in excess of a maximum reasonable basis merely that they
might apply to intermediate points, in many instances for considerably
shorter hauls, as it would not be justified in violating section 1 of the
act to satisfy the requirements of section 4. Adams-Bank Lumber Co. v.
Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., 280 (289).
In the absence of other evidence, the fact that commodity rates between
San Francisco, Calif., and points in Idaho are higher than those between
Portland, Oreg., and the same Idaho points does not prove the unreason-
ableness of all of the former rates, since such a situation may result from
the existence of rates to and from Portland which are below a maximum
reasonable basis. Idaho v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 501 (509).
Since clean rice was rated fifth class in western classification and the fifth-
class rate prescribed in the southwestern revision was 40 per cent of first
class, the rate assailed, which equalled 31 per cent of the first-class rates
prescribed in that revision, did not reflect more than maximum reason-
ableness. Lake Charles Harbor & Term Dist. v. Brimstone R. & C. Co.,
720 (723).
The ratio between the class rates to one point in each of two groups may not
be applied as the proper measure of the group rate to one of the points in
question, because such a procedure does not determine to which point the
rate is reasonable and should be chosen as the basis for application of
the ratio. Watab Paper Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 335 (337).
Divisions may not be taken as the proper measure of local rates, for the reason
that the factors to be taken into consideration in determining just and
equitable divisions of joint rates are essentially different from the factors
ordinarily considered in the determination of particular rates.
bach S. S. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 752 (758-759).
MILEAGE RATES. See DISTANCE RATES.
The classification exception did not specify a minimum weight, but as
both factors of the combination were subject to rule 34 the applicable
minimum was determinable in accordance therewith. Star Drilling
Machine Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 169.
|