INTERVENTION.

The fact that the complaint was amended at the hearing can not prejudice
the right of the intervener to any relief from violations of the act which
the commission might find to exist, as the intervening petition is to all
intents and purposes a separate complaint. Idaho v. Oregon S. L. R. Co.,
501 (509-510).

The issue was not unduly broadened by a petition of intervention seeking
reparation and reasonable rates for the future to the same extent that they
should be granted to points named in the complaint to a point not named
therein but contiguous to and taking the same rate as one of the assailed
points. Gordon Candy Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 563 (564).
INTRASTATE RATES. See STATE AND INTERSTATE.

INVESTIGATIONS.

On further hearing in the investigation of rail-water terminal facilities,
the scope of which was broadened in 93 I. C. C. 609 to include ports at
north Atlantic as well as south Atlantic and Gulf ports, such facilities
were not shown to be insufficient or inadequate to accommodate the
export, import, coastwise, and intercoastal traffic, but were found reason-
ably adequate to meet the normal traffic needs, and charges on such traffic,
insufficient in themselves but adequate when taken in connection with
line-haul rates, were not shown to be so low as to impose a burden on
other traffic. Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (670–
671, 689, 692).

ISOLATED SHIPMENT. See SPORADIC MOVEMENT.

As the withdrawal at the hearing of all rates except those on eggs made it
unnecessary for the defendants to defend rates on the other articles named
in the complaint or on eggs in mixed carloads with such articles, findir gs
were necessarily confined to straight carload shipments of eggs. Lemmon
Grocery & Produce Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 1 (1-2).
The consideration of evidence as to points not named in the complaint to
support a finding of undue prejudice would have unduly broadened the
issues. El Campo Rice Milling Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 63 64).
Following the commission's practice of looking to the substance of a com-
plaint rather than to its form so that complaints need not be technically
pleaded, a complaint which in substance stated that the complainant was
charged a certain rate and that if the shipments "moved in accordance
with routing on bill of lading," complainant "would have only had to pay
a rate" other than that charged, was broad enough to cover an attack
upon both the applicability of the rate and the misrouting and complain-
ant's memorandum of fact and argument put defendant on notice as to
the issues it was called on to meet. Standard Hardwood Lumber Co r.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 100 (101).

Rates not assailed in the complaint but included in the evidence by an affi
davit, were not considered. Amber Furniture Co. v. Cleveland, C., C. &

St. L. Ry. Co., 311.

A new issue would have been injected, and the purpose of the commission's
investigation as to the reasonableness of wharfage, handling, and other
accessorial services, destroyed, by including the cost of switching at the
ports with the port costs in transferring shipments between the rail ends
and ship side and the determination of the issue of separating the line-
haul rates, including switching, from the charges for transfer between the
rail ends and ship side would have been prevented. Wharfage Charges
at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (675).

ISSUE-Continued.

Although the question of classification ratings was not formally placed in
issue by the complaint, the disparity in classification ratings on similar
commodities, existing at the time complaint was filed, was the primary
cause of the complaint and therefore the matter of classification was
effectively before the commission for determination. Fisher Supply Co.

v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co., 711 (715).

Where the complaint specifically alleged a violation of section 6 only, and
the evidentiary matter contained therein dealt solely with the applica-
bility of the rate assailed, consideration of any violation of law was limited
to that section, and all other issues, including unreasonableness, were
excluded, since, although complaints need not be technically pleaded,
the commission may not read into them issues which they plainly do not
present. Southern Agr. Service v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., 747 (748).
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY. See LIABILITY.
JOINT RATES. See THROUGH ROUTES AND JOINT RATES.

JURISDICTION.

Although the commission's jurisdiction under section 1 of the act covering
traffic from a territory such as the Philippine Islands to destinations in a
State, did not, in the absence of an arrangement for a continuous through
movement, extend to transportation over a water carrier from the Philip-
pine Islands to Galveston, Tex., it did extend to traffic from that origin to
Dallas, Tex., in so far as the transportation took place within the State of
Texas. Dennery v. Houston & Texas Central R. Co., 164 (165).
The essential character of commerce had to be considered in determining
whether commerce was interstate or intrastate and the mere billing, or
the place at which title passed to shipments to Dallas, Tex., of imported
desiccated coconut purchased f. o. b. Galveston, Tex., was not determina-
tive nor did the temporary storage at the port of entry, permitted by tariff
authority, divest the traffic of its foreign character or prevent its being
considered through traffic. The movement from Galveston was merely
a stop in the transportation to Dallas from India according to the original
and continuing intent of the parties, and the commission clearly had
jurisdiction over the haul from Galveston. Id. (168).
Where complainant had title to the cargoes of coal and coke imported from
Germany while they were in foreign commerce and its intention ab initio
was to transport the shipments to its New Jersey yards, the rail movement
from Weehawken, N. J., to its yards at East Orange, N. J., was part of a
transportation service which began in Germany, was subject to the act,
and was within the commission's jurisdiction. Feigenspan v. Erie R. Co.,
176 (177-178).

The commission having jurisdiction over that portion of transportation
taking place within the United States has the power to determine whether
a joint rate between a point in the United States and a point in an adjacent
foreign country has been unreasonable and unduly prejudicial in the past.
Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 236 (237).

If store-door delivery service results in undue preference or prejudice and the
carrier does not remove it voluntarily, it may be compelled to do so.
Rules Covering Freight at Bennettsville, S. C., 277 (279).

The question of the establishment at Faulkton, S. Dak., of a freight-car
interchange track between interstate carriers was heard by the South
Dakota Board of Railroad Commissioners, but the complaint was dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction. Commercial Club of Faulkton v. C., M.,
St. P. & P. R. Co., 350.

JURISDICTION-Continued.

As the request was not for the provision of special equipment required by
shipper but for the acceptance of a special kind of car furnished by the
shipper, such a car would be offered as an instrument rather than an
article of commerce. Under such circumstances and in the absence of
any allegation of unjust discrimination or undue prejudice the commission
was without power under the act to require acceptance for transportation
of a shipment in the shipper's private car. Furnas Ice Cream Co. v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 617.

The commission had no jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of charges
for installing a switch connection at Rutherfordton, N. C., because section
1 (9) of the act authorizes the determination of reasonable compensation
only when, the carrier having failed or refused to install and operate any
such switch connection, the commission requires it to do so, and does not
authorize the determination of what a reasonable charge would be for a
switch connection already installed and in operation. Ziegler Bros. .
Southern Ry. Co., 660.

There is no law to require municipal organizations that are not common
carriers under the act to observe published rates and charges, except
where the municipal organization is employed by the rail carrier to per-
form the service, regardless of how the rates or charges are collected.
Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (685).

The commission's activities are limited by the terms of the act. Id. (689).
The commission has jurisdiction to establsih proportional rail rates applicable
on water-borne traffic, but the law does not authorize it to establish them
except where the existing rates are found unlawful. Luckenbach S. S.
Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 752 (758).

It is difficult to see how the rates and charges of two competing carriers can
be justly and fairly regulated unless the regulating tribunal has full and
complete jurisdiction over both carriers. Id. (759).

A carrier complaining of undue prejudice under section 3 of the act must be
one which comes under the jurisdiction of the commission and to which the
provisions of the act apply. Id. (759).

The commission was without jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness d
charges for feed furnished livestock held for fattening at Montgomery, I
because its jurisdiction is derived only from the obligation imposed on th
carrier by statute to provide transportation at reasonable rates, including
such services in connection with the handling of property transported s
might reasonably be requested, and the service involved was not of the
character that the carrier could be required by law to perform. Thomps:
v. Chicago. B. & Q. R. Co., 775.

Although the duty of a carrier includes within the term "transportation"
as defined in section 1 of the act the performance of a variety of service
separable from its services as a carrier, it does not follow than any a::
all services performed by a common carrier engaged in interstate commer
in connection with property transported are subject to the provisions of the
act. Many services are performed by a carrier it its capacity as a ba
for hire and are only incidental to "transportation" which, by reasons:
construction, is limited to such services as a carrier is required by law:
provide upon reasonable request. Id. (777-778).
The fact that charges for services performed in connection with propert
transported are published in a tariff on file with the commission can t
confer jurisdiction upon the commission to determine their lawfulnes
where such jurisdiction has not been granted by act of Congress. Id. (775

LEASES AND GRANTS.

A provision in the lease of the carrier's warehouse for routing over the
lessor's line, when the rates did not exceed those over other lines, amounted
to an acknowledgment that the consideration for the making of the lease
was in part the exchange of traffic by the shipper for the right to occupy
the land. As the traffic was part consideration for the lease, the transac-
tion amounted to a concession to the shipper-lessee and was in violation
of the Elkins Act and sections 2 and 6 of the interstate commerce act.
Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (691).

Every effort should be made by the carriers to obtain, when leasing land
to shippers, terms no less favorable than would be obtained, under similar
conditions and restrictions of use, were the land owned independently
of the railroad. Id. (692).

LEGAL RATES.

Where lower charges resulted on shipment of cement, plaster board, and
plaster in mixed carloads, by treating each shipment as two separate
carloads, and applying the carload rate and minimum on the cement,
plaster, and dunnage, and the carload rate and minimum on the plaster
board, where the latter rate produced lower charges then the less-than-
carload rate, charges so computed were applicable under rule 10 of the
classification and shipments assessed the higher joint rate were over-
charged. Refund of overcharges directed. Texas Cement Plaster Co.
v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co. of Tex., 181.

Shipments billed as scrap iron and saddle trees, found on inspection to be
composed of saddle trees, saddlery hardware, wooden and paper patterns,
and certain iron forms, the exact nature of which was not determined,
found to be undercharged as the aggregate of applicable charges on the
articles other than iron forms was greater than that charged on the entire
shipment. Undercharges found barred by the statute of limitations.
Flor Co. v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 208.

Owosso Mfg.

Where the tariff specifically stated that the lumber rates would not apply on
folding and collapsible fruit and vegetables packages, those commodities
could not take the lumber rates provided on boxes or crates, k. d., in
bundles, regardless of whether or not they could be considered knocked
down when prepared for shipment. Commodity rates applicable to
folding fruit and vegetables crates were properly assessed.
Co. v. Asherton & Gulf Ry. Co., 219 (220).
Combination rates assessed on shipments from Duff and Knoxville, Tenn.,
to Cowansville and St. Hyacinthe, Quebec, Canada, found inapplicable
and reparation awarded against carriers operating within the United
States to the basis of the combination rates as reduced by the so-called
combination rule. Reparation awarded. Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Louis-
ville & N. R. Co., 236.

Iowa, was diverted
Therefore, the local

A shipment of coal from Carbon, W. Va., to Sutherland,
under second reconsignment order at Clinton, Iowa.
rates to and from the latter point in addition to the applicable reconsign-
ment charge were applicable under tariff rules which permitted but one
diversion under a joint rate and provided that if a second reconsignment
was made the shipment would be treated as a reshipment from the point
of reforwarding and assessed at the tariff rate therefrom, plus the diversion
charge. Platt & Brahm Coal Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. C., 340.

LEGAL RATES-Continued.

The first-class any-quantity rating and rate under item 9 of the classification,
on "Gums: Synthetic Gums or Resins * * *," was applicable on
Bakelite (synthetic) gum, even though the commodity index of a supple-
ment which canceled and reproduced item 10, which provided fourth-
class ratings on gum compounds, erroneously referred to that item for
ratings on both commodities, since the supplement did not cancel item
9 in the classification, which remained continuously in effect throughout
the period that the erroneous index was in use. Bakelite Corp. v. Boston
& Albany R., 581.

Although no allegation of a violation of section 6 of the act was made in the
complaint, the commission had jurisdiction to determine whether or not
the charges assailed were applicable, since the evidence was directed
entirely to that question. Southern Flour & Grain Co. v. Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry., 641.
Commodity rate charged on cottonseed-hull shavings from Little Rock,
Ark., to Melrose Park, Ill., found inapplicable during the period in which
rates on cottonseed hulls were erroneously omitted from a tariff which
provided a method of basing cottonseed-hull shavings rates on the cotton-
seed-hull rates. In the absence of cross references, there was no authority
for using two tariffs in conjunction to determine the rate on the shavings,
and the commission was unable to determine from the record the legally
applicable rate. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Alton & Southern R. Co., 657.
Since it was not shown what portion, if any, of shipments of used wrought-
iron pipe came within the description of articles taking the scrap-iron rate,
which required that the articles be reduced to fragments, scraps, or pieces
so as to render them useless for any purpose but remelting, charges based
on 50 per cent scrap iron and 50 per cent pipe, reached by agreement
between complainant and the Western Weighing & Inspection Bureau
after inspection, were found to be properly assessed even though complain-
ant discovered subsequently that but 15 per cent was usable as pipe.
Shreveport Chamber of Commerce v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 737.
LESS THAN CARLOADS.

In General. Density is an element to be considered in fixing rates, particu-
larly on less-than-carload traffic, since it is not usually practicable to load
a car containing miscellaneous less-than-carload shipments as compactly
as a carload shipment of a single commodity. American Newspaper
Publishers Asso. v. Bangor & A. R. Co., 729 (731–732).

Commodities:

Beverage cooling and dispensing outfits: Southern Traffic & Audit
Asso. v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 361.

Cores, paper-winding, returned: American Newspaper Publishers Asso.
v. Bangor & A. R. Co., 729.

Feed, animal or poultry: Rose v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 155.

Fruits and vegetables, in metal cans in boxes or barrels: Sumter
Packing Co. v Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 137.

Paper, wrapping, waxed, printed, in rolls, uncrated: White Cross
Bakery v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 425.

Planters, corn and potato: Potato Implement Co. v. Ann Arbor R.
Co., 477.

Localities: Bennettsville, S. C.: Rules Covering Freight at Bennettsville,
S. C., 277.