not be practicable to distinguish with more precision between the legitimate advocacy of a particular policy and attempts to enforce it by ruining men in their business. But there is no question that many of the things brought to light in "Wright v. Hennessey" could not safely be tolerated. Suppose that every group of persons with supposed interests in common wrote letters and generally behaved towards all who seemed to be in their way as the National Association of Operative Plasterers did through Mr. Hennessey; suppose that every tradesman sought to obtain custom by taking organized means to ruin his neighbors who dealt elsewhere; that merchants trusted less to supply and demand than to threats of retaliation, and every trade circular wound up with a notice that, unless the particular wine, coals, silk, cotton, were ordered of the sender within twenty-four hours he would do his best to ruin the man whose custom was solicited. Suppose that each of these groups acted in this spirit, and that in consequence contracts were freely broken and men in large numbers were dismissed. Could society subsist with this bellum omnium contra omnes ? The evidence in Wright's case was that the plaintiff's business had fallen off 50 per cent. in consequence of the action of Hennessey. There would be such a loss all round if everybody acted in his spirit and sent out wholesale messages of war to the knife. Mr. Hennessey writes as if the operative plasterers were an ancient caste and he and his friends full-blown Brahmins who will not brook Mr. Wright's pariahs touching things meant for sacred hands. It is astonishing how old abuses reappear under new names. For some centuries trade corporations all over Europe exercised various forms of monopoly. Strangers were not allowed to ply their trades within a city until they had become "free" of it. A long period of apprenticeship was an essential condition to the practising of most professions and industries. Each town, and indeed each industry, were ruled by by-laws framed with absolute disregard of the interests of the whole community, and with the exclusive object of benefiting the little combinations in possession of the field. It was this "sort of slavery," to use Adam Smith's phrase, which the great economist sought to destroy. Wherever these irksome restrictions have existed they have been hurtful to trade, and their removal in England proved the beginning of an era of prosperity. Let Mr. Hennessey and other energetic organizing secretaries have their way, and we should soon see a system of industrial castes and corporate tyranny as oppressive as that exposed in the Wealth of Nations. It is satisfactory to know that for the present, at all events, the mandate of "the organized plasterers of London" is not above the law of the realm and in the long run it will be better even for the " organized plasterers" that this is so. Abstracts of Recent Decisions. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS RESTRAINING BOND ISSUE. Where a bill in equity to restrain a proposed issue and sale of municipal bonds shows no other valid reason why such issue and sale should be estopped, except that the proceeds of the sale of such bonds will go into, and be expended by, improper hands, it is error to enjoin the issue and sale of such bonds, or to go further with an injunction, in such a case, than to restrain the delivery of such bonds when issued, to unauthorized hands, and to prohibit the proceeds thereof from going into the hands of, and being expended by, unauthorized persons. (City of Tampa v. Salomonson [Fla.], 17 South. Rep. 581.) WILLS.-ESTATE DEVISED.-Under a devise "to my adopted daughter, H, to have and to hold for And after and during the term of her natural life. the death of H I give and devise the reversion or remainder to her lawful issue, to have and to hold the same in common to them, their heirs and assigns, forever. And, in case the said H should die without leaving lawful issue, then the aforesaid real estate shall revert to my estate, aud I give and devise the same to my heirs under the interstate laws."-H takes a fee; the words "lawful issue" meaning lineal descendants, and having prima facie, the force of words of limitation, and the words "in common" not being such superadded words of limitation or distributive modification as will make the words "lawful issue" words of purchase. (Grimes v. Shirk, Penn., 32 Alt. Rep. 113.) WILL.-VESTED REMAINDERS.-Testator devised his estate to trustees, a portion of the income being payable to his wife, who was authorized, during the trust, to dispose of one-third of the personal property by will, and the remainder of the income to be paid in equal proportions to a daughter and three sons; and provided that if the daughter or either of two sons should die, leaving issue, the issue should take the parent's share; but power of disposition was not given to any child. The trust was to end on a fixed date, and the property was then to be paid to testator's legal representatives: Held, that the remainders did not vest on testator's death, so that, on the death of the daughter before the termination of the trust, her surviving husband became entitled to the income previously payable to her, or to any part of the principal of the estate. │(Eager v Whitney, Mass., 40 N. E. Rep. 1046.) Correspondence. NEW YORK, 8 July, 1895. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: DEAR SIR.- The Executive Council of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law is glad to announce that it has arranged for the next conference to be held at Brussels, in the Palais des Académies, from the 1st to the 4th of October, when the president of the Association, Sir Richard E. Webster, K. L. M. G. Q. C. M. P. is expected to preside, and the Bourgmestre and Eschevins of the city of Brussels will kindly entertain the Association. "But this rule must be modified in this country, where estates are small, and the policy of our laws is to distribute them with each generation, where dower is one of the positive institutions of the estate, founded in policy, and the provision for the widow is a part of the law of distribution, and the aim of the statute is not subsistence alone, but provision commensurate with the estate. Thus, a husband died in the possession of land which was not improved and was wholly valueless for agricultural purposes or lumbering. Its principal value, and practically its sole value, was in deposits of iron ore contained in it. And it was held that the widow was entitled to dower rights in the royalties realized The council will welcome to membership in the from the lease by the guardian of minor heirs of the Association any of the American judges and lead-mineral lands which were undeveloped at the time ing jurists of the United States. FRED. JAS. TOMKINS, M. A., D. C. L., Member of the Council, Secretary of the Reception Committee, at the Guildhall, London. P. S.- Application for membership can be made to Mr. Alexander, 33 Chancery lane, London; or to Mr. Scott, at the time of the conference in Brussels. F. J. T. RIGHT OF LIFE TENANT TO OPEN MINES. NEW YORK, August 12, 1895. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In the Students' Helper for July there appeared an article by Darius H. Pingrey, an article in which there occurred a statement to the effect that unopened mines could be developed by a life tenant. This was so extraordinary a proposition that I wrote to the editor of the Helper for Mr. Pingrey's authorities, there being no references to authorities in the article. In reply I was referred to section 370 of Pingrey on Real Property. That section I find to be as follows (with citations as given): "The widow is dowable in mines which had been opened at the death of the husband, and it is generally held that she cannot open new mines even upon the lands set apart to her as dower; that is to say, a widow is not dowable of mineral deposits where there is no opened mine.1 'Lenfers v. Henke, 73 Ill. 405; Hendricks v. McBeth, 61 Mich. 473; Kreer v. Stotenhur, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 641; Gaines v. Mining Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 603; Crouch v. Puryear, 1 Rand. (Va.) 258; Clift v. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17; 9 S. W. 198; Findlay v. Smith, 6 Munf. (Va.) 134; Sayers v. Harkinson, 110 Penn. St. 473; 11 id. 308; Irwin v. Covode, 24 Penn. St. of her husband's death, and solely valuable for the minerals afterwards discovered therein. This is the correct doctrine in this country.? The English authorities should not be followed. They define dower as a provision which the law makes for a widow out of the lands or tenements of husband and for her support and the nurture of her children.3 "The rules applicable in England, where landed estates are large and diversified, where the laws of inheritance are exclusive, where the theory of dower is substance merely, and where there is a strong disposition to free estates from even that charge, should not obtain in the United States. So a widow should not be excluded from her dower interest in mineral lands which, at the death of her husband, are unimproved and unproductive, and are chiefly and solely valuable for the minerals contained in them. This doctrine is in accordance with the interpretation of the statutes of the States providing for dower, though it is opposed to the English rule. But the mere possessory right given by the United States Statutes to the location of a mining claim is not such an estate that dower can be predicated thereon by State legislation as against the United States and its grantees.+ "On examination of the late Michigan case cited (In re Seager's Estate, 92 Mich. 186) I find that the whole body of Mr. Pingrey's text is adopted almost without a change of language from the judge's opinion, and he even cites all the authorities that are cited by the judge in support of the general doctrine, except Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cow. 450; Washb. on Real Prop. 166; Bishop on Married Women, § 246; and Scribner on Dower (2d ed.), 200-6; and he even copies the mistake of the 162; Neel v. Neel, 19 Penn. St. 323; Moore v. Rol-judge in citing Clift v. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17, twice. lins, 45 Me. 493; Reed v. Reed, 16 N. J. Eq. 248; Billings v. Taylor, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 460; Bishop on Married Women, § 264; 1 Scribner on Dower (2d ed.), 200-6. The case of Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 859, is authority only on the point contained in the sentence last given. A close examination of the Michigan case, it is thought, does not warrant the position taken that a life tenant may develope unopened mines. This was a case where the guardian of infant heirs had opened mines on lands valuable only for the minerals contained therein, and the court held that the widow was entitled to dower in the proceeds of the mines thus opened. The court say on page 197 of the report: "In the present case the grant is by operation of the statute giving the use of all the lands of which the husband was seized. The grant must he held to include the use of the lands, irrespective of whether mines were opened upon them before or after the husband's death. The question here is not the impairment of one mode of enjoyment or source of profit to reach another. There is but one mode of enjoyment of the land in question, but one source of revenue or profit. The land is susceptible of but one use. The widow is therefor entitled to onethird of the amount in the hands of the petitioner." This is thought to be unnecessary to the decision of the case in hand and for that reason purely dictum. I find that the same point is discussed by another work on real property just out, and a contrary conclusion arrived at. I refer to Kerr on Real Property, recently announced by Banks & Bro. In section 583, Mr. Kerr says: Where mines, quarries, claypits, gravel-pits, and the like, have been opened on the premises and worked by a former owner of the fee, the tenant for life may continue to work them 5 without restriction" or limitation, for the reason that such mines have been made part of the profits of the land. If a mine or quarry has been worked for commercial profit, that must order 5 Billings v. Taylor, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 460; s. c. 20 Am. Dec. 533; Executors of Reed v. Reed, 16 N. J. Eq. (1 C. E. Gr.) 248; Rockwell v. Morgan, 13 N. J. L. (2 Beas.) 384, 389; Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 460, 474; Lynn's App., 31 Penn. St. 44; Neel v. Neel, 19 Penn. St. 323, 324. * Under a statute providing that the tenant for life | shall have "reasonable and necessary use and enjoyment" of the land, the right to work mines, quarries, etc., will not be limited or restrained. Westmorland Coal Cos. Appeal, 85 Penn. St. 344; Kier v. Pattersen, 41 Penn. St. 357; Irwin v. Covode, 24 Penn. St. 162. narily be decisive of the right of the life tenant to continue working, but, on the other hand, it has been said that if mines have been worked or used for some definite purpose, that alone would not give the life tenant a right to continue the working."9 In section 584, Mr. Kerr says: "The life tenant, where he has a right to mine, in order to more advantageously pursue such work, may open new pits and sink new shafts. But the opening of mines and the opening of new pits and shafts must be conducted and done on the tract of land already worked, and not upon a different tract of land and in a place where the mine or vein has never been opened or worked, " because a tenant for life has no right to open new mines, the opening of new mines forfeiting the estate where such tenant is liable for waste.12 The American cases, however, have greatly modified the law of waste, so as to adopt it to the conveniences and requirements of a new and growing country, in order to encourage tenants for life to make a reasonable use of wild and undeveloped lands. 13 What I would like to know is whether the American cases have modified the doctrine of waste to adapt it to the conveniences and requirements of a new and growing country" to such an extent as to justify the position taken by Mr. Pingrey in his work on Real Property? It does not seem to the writer that they have. After a diligent search I have not been able to find a case that supports the Michigan court in the dictum quoted, and upon which Mr. Pingrey is content to announce the novel doctrine. I trust that some one well-read in real estate case law will furnish the wanting authority, for I have a great deal depending upon being able to find an authority that can be safely relied upon to support Mr. Pingrey's position, which the Michigan case certainly does not do. HARRY M. HANSON. Elias v. Snowden Slate Quarries Co., L. R. 4 App. Cas. 454, 465. 10 Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining Co., 32 N. J. Eq. (5 Stew.) 86; Crouch v. Puryear 1 Rand. (Va.) 258; s. c. 10 Am. Dec. 528. 11 Westmorland Coal Cos. Appeal, 85 Penn. St. 344. 12 Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining Co., 33 N. J. Eq. (6 Stew.) 603; Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 460, 474; Viner v. Vaughan, 2 Beav. 466; Whitfield v. Bewit, 2 Pr. Wms. 242. 13 Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining Co., 33 N. J. Eq. (6 Stew.) 603; Ballantine v. Poyner, 2 * Crouch v. Puryear, 1 Rand. (Va.) 258; s. c., 10 Hayw. (N. C.) 110; Irwin v. Covode, 24 Penn. St. Am. Dec. 528. 162; Neel v. Neel, 19 Penn. St. 323; Hastings v. 8 Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining Co., 32 Crunkleton, 3 Yeats (Pa.) 261; Findley v. Smith, 6 N. J. Eq. (5 Stew.) 86. Munf. (Va.) 134; s. c., 8 Am. Dec. 733. New Books and New Editions. SMITH ON CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 2d EDITION, BY P. C. DUGAN, ESQ., OF THE ALBANY BAR. The second edition of this work was made necessary by the decisions rendered since the last edition and by the many changes in the statute law. The frequency in these days of conditional sale of property to secure payment has largely increased the interest in this branch of the law. The edition begins with the chapter on the "In strument." The subsequent chapters are on the filing and refiling of chattel mortgages, the validity of chattel mortgages, the disposition and sale of the mortgaged property, assignment of mortgages of ships and vessels, and the supplement contains chapters on the same subjects except that Chapter VI, which deals with contracts on conditional sale of personal property. The well-known ability and learning of the editor of the second edition makes the second appearance of this work, perhaps, more important than the first edition, and the general care which was used in the preparation of the second edition makes the work up to date in all respects. Published by Matthew Bender, 511 and 513 Broadway, Albany, N. Y. JEWETT'S MANUAL FOR ELECTION OFFICERS AND VOTERS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, BY F. G. JEWETT, OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OFFICE THIRD EDITION. The changes in the election laws made by the last Legislature made the appearance of this work a necessity and practically a useful remedy and the method of handling the subject in the past has been repeated in the third edition. The scope of the work in this edition has been greatly enlarged and the work most clearly show the laws of the State in general with the special elections laws in relation to the cities of New York and Brooklyn. The changes in the Senate and Assembly districts in number and in territory also made the publication of this work a practical benefit to lawyers as well as to officers of elections and perhaps of political organizations, and the directions for voting contained in the work will be found of great aid to the instructors of voters at the coming election. The work is complete in every respect and contains a full practical index. The maps showing the senatorial and assembly districts will be of considerable value to those who use such a work. Published by Matthew Bender, 511 & 513 Broadway, Albany, N. Y. THE EXCISE AND HOTEL LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, BY ROBERT C. CUMMING AND FRANK B. GILBERT, OF THE STATUTORY REVISION COм MISSION. This is a treatises of 253 pages on this important subject. The work begins with the statutory con struction law with the amendments of the Legislature of 1895. Chapter 2 deals with the Excise Law, which is excellently annotated with citations at the end of every section, and shows clearly the amendments made by the last Legislature and with the new sections. Chapter 3 deals with special acts relative to Excise Commissioners and Excise moneys, and gives a special law relating to powers and pledges for liquor sold, and the Civil Damage Act and is followed by a chapter on the Public Officer's Law. Chapter 6 deals with Code Provisions, while Chapter 7 is on local statutes relating to excise, with a special act relating to the State and counties. Chapter 8 deals with United States statutes relating to wholesale and retail liquor dealers, and Chapter 9 is in relation to rights and liabilities to innkeepers. After this comes the chapter with forms on this subject, and an excellent index completes the volume. Published by Matthew Bender, 511 & 513 Broadway, Albany, N. Y. COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS. BY SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON. Vol. 4. We have already carefully reviewed the first three volums of this excellent and tremendous work, and have also published a most careful and learned review of the books already published by John F. Dillon, of New York city. It seems almost unnecessary to repeat the encomiums of praise which have already been accorded to this publication except, perhaps, to note that the same excellence of literary and scientific research and knowledge is evinced as in the former three volumes we have seen. Vol. 4 begins with chapter 86, on the rights of membership, and continues with the rights to inspect books and papers, other rights and remedies, remedies of shareholders in equity, injunctions in aid of such remedies, and when such remedies extend to winding up and when not, further as to the release of parties to such actions, pleadings in such actions, varies matters of practice in such actions. Title 8 treats of ministerial officers and changes, and power of the president and other officers of the corporation, the cashier of a bank, the teller and other officers. Title 9 deals with formal execution of corporate contracts, and deals with negotiable instruments, parol contracts and implied contracts. Title 10 is about notices, estoppel ratification, while title 11 contains chapters on franchises, privileges and exemptions. Title 12 deals with corporate powers and the doctrine of ultra vires, and has chapters on corporate powers in gene ral, interpretation of charters, financial powers, while chapter 126 deals with powers relating to negotiable papers. The enormity of the work and the manner in which it deals with this large and increasing branch of law makes the work equal to any of the standard commentaries of this or any other era. The true value of the work will have its lasting effect on the law and lawyer of this and future generations. Published by Bancroft Whitney Co., San Francisco, Cal. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, AUGUST 24, 1895. Current Topics. [All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.] "I T must be remembered that the majority of companies are honestly formed for carrying on a legitimate, though it may be a speculative enterprise or business, and the business is conducted with honesty and reasonable ability and judgment." Such is part of the report of the committee appointed to make recommendations and changes in the English Companies Acts, and if all corporations were formed honestly and conducted without any endeavor to take advantage of the public there would be little necessity to have any of the present relations, regulations and restrictions in the corporation laws of this State. There is little doubt, as Judge Dillon suggests in his letter published in these columns, that many of the present severe provisions of the corporation laws of this State should be modified to the end that a larger number of business interests may be induced to begin their legal life and existence under our State laws. How far we can loosen the restrictions which we now have is a difficult matter to determine, but the changes should at least attain the results which Judge Dillon suggests. After all, when we realize the practical results of the provisions of the New York Statutes in regard to corporate companies, we must appreciate that the seemingly severe prohibitions and restrictions which we have referred to, are partly only imaginative and that is only necessary to resort to subterfuges to evade laws which are shibboleths of regulations rather than actualities. Corporations are formed under the laws of other States and carry on business here with enormous capital stock much of which only represents the dreams of the incorporators. Are these restrictions in our statutes in many cases the result of the work of overanxious patriots in the legislature who were not properly persuaded that their views and fears were wrong? Are these practical benefits proVOL. 52 No. 8. The first clause, which makes the certificate of incorporation conclusive for all purposes, is of more importance than is generally known. For many years it was thought that associations could be formed into companies at common law, and then registered under Part VII of the Companies Act 1862. As this course involved a considerable saving of stamp duty, it was largely adopted down to 1890 when the board. of trade refused any longer to allow it, a ruling which was upheld in the Court of Appeal in Ex parte Johnston (1891), 2 Q. B. 598. This case shows that such an association is one which cannot be registered, and accordingly the certificate of incorporation, which only deals with the forms and details of registration (see National Debenture Corporation [1891], 2 Ch. at 517), is no protection to the great number of companies already registered in this manner, and if the question were raised it would probably be held that they are unincorporated bodies, and that the shareholders' liability is unlimited. The clauses of the bill which, however, arrest most attention are those which deal with the prospectus and the first allotment. No one will dispute the advantage of compelling fuller disclosure of preliminary contracts, of the profits of vendors, of the amount of promoters' remuneration, and preliminary expenses; but the result of a failure to make proper disclosure is dealt with in an unsatisfactory manner. The matters to be disclosed are in some cases of |