and all human teftimony is fallible, for this plain reafon, be saufe all men are fallible. And though Mr. S. in defence of his beloved tradition, is pleased to say, that human tetimony in fome cafes is infallible; yet I think no man before him was ever fo hardy, as to maintain, that the teftimony of fallible men is infallible. I grant it to be in many cafes certain; that is, fuch as a confiderate man may prudently rely and proceed upon, and hath no just caufe to doubt of: and fuch as none but an obftinate man or a fool can deny. And that thus the learned men of his own church define certainty, Mr. S. (if he would but vouchsafe to read fuch books) might have learned from Melchior Canus; who, Speaking of the firmness of human teftimony in fome cafes, (which yet he did not believe to be infallible) defines it thus: 46 Thofe things are certain among men, which can66 not be denied without obftinacy and folly." I know Mr.S. is pleafed to fay, that certainty and infallibility are all one; and he is the first man that I know of that ever faid it. And yet perhaps fome body may have been before him in it; or I remember Tully fays, that "there is nothing fo foolish, "but fome philofopher or other has faid it." I am fure Mr.S.'s own philofopher, Mr. White, contradicts him in this moft clearly, in his preface to Rushworth's dialogues where, explicating the term moral certainty, he tells us, that "fome underflood by it fuch a certainty as makes the cause "always work the fame effect, though it take not away the "abfolute poffibility of working otherwife;" and this, prefently after he tells us," ought abfolutely to be reckoned in "the degree of true certainty, and the authors confidered as miftaken in undervaluing it." So that, according to Mr. White, true certainty may confift with a poffibility of the contrary; and confequently Mr. S. is miftaken, in thinking certainty and infallibility to be all one. Nay, I do not find any two of them agreeing among themselves about the notions of infallibility and certainty. Mr. White fays, that what Jome call moral certainty, is true certainty, though it do not take away a poffibility of the contrary. Mr. S. afferts the direct contrary, that moral certainty is only probability, because it does not take away the poffibility of the contrary.

*De loc. theol. lib. 11. c. 4. Certa apud homines ea funt, quæ negari fine pervicacia & ftultitia non poffunt.

ть

The Guide in controverfies, p. 135. differs from them both, and makes moral, certain, and infallible, all one. I defire that they would agree thefe matters among themselves,. before they quarrel with us about them.

In brief, then, though moral certainty be fometimes taken for a high degree of probability, which can only produce a doubtful affent; yet it is alfo frequently used for a firm and undoubted affent to a thing upon fuch grounds as are fit fully to fatisfy a prudent man; and in this fenfe I have always ufed this term. But now infallibility is an abfolute fecurity of the understanding from all poffibility of mistake in what it believes. And there are but two ways for the understanding to be thus fecured; either by the perfection of its own nature, or by fupernatural affiftance. But no human understanding being abfolutely fecured from possibility of miftake by the perfection of its own nature, (which I think all mankind except Mr. S. have hitherto granted), it follows, that no man can be infallible in any thing, but by fupernatu ral affiftance. Nor did ever the church of Rome pretend to infallibility upon any other account, as every one knows that hath been converfant in the writings of their learned men. And Mr. Crefy, in his anfwer to Dr. Pierce, p. 88.89. hath not the face to contend for any other infallibility but this, that "the immutable God can actually preferve a mu"table creature from actual mutation." But I can by no means agree with him in what immediately follows, concerning the omnifcience of a creature; that "God, who is ab"folutely omnifcient, can teach a rational creature all "truths neceffary or expedient to be known; fo that though

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a man may have much ignorance, yet he may be in a fort "omnifcient within a determinate fphere." Omnifcient within a determinate fphere, is an infinite within a finite fphere; and is not that a very pretty fort of knowing all things, which may confift with an ignorance of many things? Of all the controvertifts I have met with, except Mr. S. Mr. Crefy is the happiest at thefe fmart and ingenious kind of reafonings.

As to the other particular, of the fenfe of books, it is likewife plainly impoffible that any thing should be delivered in fuch clear and certain words as are abfolutely incapable of any other fenfe; and yet, notwithstanding this, the meaning of them may be fo plain, as that any unprejudiced and

b 2

reasonable

reasonable man may certainly understand them. How many definitions and axioms, &c. are there in Euclid, in the fenfe of which men are univerfally agreed, and think themselves undoubtedly certain of it? and yet the words in which they are expreffed, may poffibly bear another fenfe. The fame may be faid concerning the doctrines and precepts of the holy fcriptures and one great reafon why men do not fo generally agree in the fenfe of these as of the other, is, because the interefts, and lufts, and paffions of men are more concerned in the one than the other. But whatever uncer-tainty there may be in the fenfe of any text of fcripture, oral tradition is fo far from affording us any help in this cafe, that it is a thousand times more uncertain, and lefs to be trufted to; efpecially if we may take that to be the traditionary fenfe of texts of fcripture, which we meet with in the decretals of their Popes, and the acts of fome of their councils; than which never was any thing in the whole world more abfurd and ridiculous: and whence may we expect to have the infallible traditional fenfe of fcripture, if not from the heads and reprefentatives of their church?

This may abundantly fuffice for the vindication of that paffage which Mr. S. makes fuch a rude clamour about, as if I had therein denied the truth and certainty of all religions but durft never trust the reader with a view of those words of mine upon which he pretended to ground this calumny. But the world understands well enough, that all this was but a fhift of Mr. S.'s, for the fatisfaction of his own party, and a pitiful art to avoid the vindication of Sure footing, a talk he had no mind to undertake.

And yet the main defign of this book, which he calls Faith vindicated, &c. is to prove that which I do not believe any man living ever denied, viz. That what is true is not poffible to be falfe: which though it be one of the plainest truths in the world, yet he proves it fo foolishly, as would make any man (if it were not evident of itself) to doubt of it. He proves it from logick, and nature, and metaphyficks, and ethicks, &c. I wonder he did not do it likewife from arithmetick and geometry, the principles whereof, he tells us, (Sure footing, p. 93.), are concerned in demonftrating "the certainty of oral tradition." He might also have proceeded to aftrology, and palmistry, and chymistry, and have fhewn how each of thefe lend their affiftance to the evi

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dencing

dencing of this truth. For that could not have been more ridiculous, than his argument (Faith vindic. p. 6. 7. sc.) from the nature of fubject, and predicate, and copula in faith-propofitions; becaufe, forfooth, whoever affirms any propofition of faith to be true, affirms it impoffible to be falfe. Very true. But would any man argue, that what is true is impoffible to be falfe, from the nature of fubject, predicate, and copula? for be the propofition true or falfe, thefe are of the fame nature in both; that is, they are subject, predicate, and copula.

But that the reader may have a taste of his clear ftyle, and way of reafoning, I fhall for his fatisfaction tranfcribe Mr. S.'s whole argument from the nature of the predicate. His words are thefe, p. 9. 10. 11. 12. Our argument "from the copula is particularly ftrengthened from the na"ture of the predicate in the propofitions we speak of; I "mean, in fuch fpeeches as affirm fuch and fuch points of "faith to be true. For true means 'existent in propofitions

which exprefs only the An elt of a thing, as most points "of faith do; which Speak abstractedly, and tell not wherein the nature of the fubject it speaks of confifts, or "the Quid eft. So that most of the propofitions Chriftians are bound to profefs, are fully expreffed thus: A Trini"ty is exiftent, &c. And the like may be faid of thofe

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points which belong to a thing or action past; as, Crea❝tion was, &c. For exiftent is the predicate in these two, "only affixed to another difference of time; and it is equal"ly impoffible fuch fubjects should neither have been nor 46 not have been, or have been and have not been at 66 once; as it is that a thing should neither be nor not be "at prefent, or both be and not be at prefent. Regard"ing then fedfaftly the nature of our predicate [exiftent], we fhall find that it expreffes the utmost actuality of a 46 thing; and as taken in the pofture it bears in thofe pro66 pofitions, that actually exercifed, that is, the utmost a"tuality in its most actual ftate; that is, as abfolutely "excluding all manner or leaft degree of potentiality, and "confequently all poffibility of being otherwife; which is

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radically deftroyed when all potentiality is taken away. "This difcourfe holding, which in right to truth I shall not fear to affirm (unconcerned in the drollery of any oppofer to be more than mathematically demonstrative; it follows "inevitably,

C

"inevitably, that whofo is bound to profefs a Trinity, in"carnation, &c. is or was exiftent, is alfo bound to profefs that it is impoffible they fhould be not exiftent; "or, which is all one, that it is impoffible thefe points of "faith fhould be falfe.

"The fame appears out of the nature of distinction or "divifion applied to our predicate existent, as found in

thefe propofitions: for could that predicate bear a perti"nent diftinction, expreffing this and the other refpect, or "thus and thus, it might poffible be according to one of "thefe refpects, or thus confidered, and not be according to another; that is, another way confidered: but this evafion is here impoffible; for either thofe diftinguishing notions must be more potential or antecedent to the notion "of exiftent; and then they neither reach exiftent, nor "fuperveen to it as its determinations or actuations, which "differences ought to do; nor can any notion be more actual 66 or determinative in the line of substance or being, than "exiftent is; and fo fit to diftinguish it in that line: nor,

laftly, can any determination in the line of accidents ferve "the turn; for thofe fuppofe existence already put, and fo "the whole truth of the propofition entire and compleat an"tecedently to them. It is impoffible therefore that what "is thus affirmed to be true, fhould in any regard be af"firmed poffible to be false; the impoffibility of diftinguish"ing the predicate pertinently excluding here all poffibility "of divers refpects.

The fame is demonstrated from the impoffibility of dif tinguishing the fubjects of those faith-propofitions; for "thofe fubjects being propofitions themselves, and accepted for truths, as is fuppofed, they are incapable of diftin"Etion, as fhall be particularly fhewn hereafter. Befides, thofe fubjects being points of faith, and fo ftanding in "the abstract; that is, not defcending to fubfuming reSpects; even in that regard too they are freed from all "pertinent diftinguishableness.

"The fame is demonftrated from the nature of truth, "which confifts in an indivisible; whence there is nothing of "truth had, how great foever the conceived approaches to"wards it may be, till all may-not-bees, or potentiality "to be otherwife, be utterly excluded by the actuality of is, or exiftence; which put or difcovered, the light of

"truth