the findings were justified by the evidence. We advise therefore that the judgment and order be affirmed. FOOTE, C., and HAYNE, C., concurred. The COURT. For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment and order are affirmed. PATERSON, J., did not participate in the decision of the above cause. [No. 12398. In Bank.-May 8, 1889.] THE PEOPLE, UPON COMPLAINT OF EL DORADO COUNTY, RESPONDENT, v. MICHAEL O'KEEFE, APPELLANT. TOLL-ROAD-PUBLIC HIGHWAY-DEDICATION-EXPIRATION OF FRAN CHISE. Case decided upon the authority of People v. Davidson, ante, p. 166. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of El Dorado County, and from an order denying a new trial. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Blanchard & Swisler, and A. P. Catlin, for Appellant. Attorney-General Johnson, M. P. Bennett, S. C. Denson, and C. F. Irwin, for Respondent. BELCHER, C. C.-This action, like People v. Davidson, ante, p. 166, this day decided, was brought to have a road adjudged a public highway, and to enjoin the defendant from collecting tolls thereon, or in any way interfering with travel over the same. The road is in El Dorado County, and about six miles long. It was constructed on public land in 1860 by a corporation which was duly organized for that purpose, and was named the Placerville Turnpike Company. The time fixed by the corporation for the continuance of its existence was nineteen years and five months, commencing August 1, 1860, and ending January 1, 1880. The road was known as the "Placerville Turnpike," and on the third day of December, 1860, the board of supervisors of the county made an order fixing the rates of toll to be charged for passing over it. Similar orders were afterward made, in November, 1863, in November, 1864, in November, 1865, in May, 1873, in June, 1878, and in July, 1879. On the second day of February, 1886, an order was made by the board of supervisors rescinding all orders theretofore made fixing rates of toll on the road. From the time the road was completed until the making of the last-named order, the road was continuously used by the public and tolls were collected thereon according to the rates fixed by the board. In 1873, the defendant became the owner of a majority of the stock of the Placerville Turnpike Company, and thereafter he had the whole management and control of the road. The road continued to be assessed to the company, but the defendant paid the taxes levied thereon. 1873 the defendant has obtained the title in fee to a strip of land forty feet wide and a mile long, over which the road passes. Since Upon these facts, the appellant makes the same points as were made in People v. Davidson. That case is decisive of this, and upon its authority the judgment and order here appealed from should be affirmed. FOOTE, C., and HAYNE, C., concurred. The COURT. For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment and order appealed from are affirmed. PATERSON, J., did not participate in the decision of the above cause. [No. 13134. In Bank.-May 17, 1889.] J. MARION BROOKS, PETITIONER, v. JOIN FISCHER, RESPONDENT. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LOS ANGELES CHARTER-JOINT RESOLUTION OF LEGISLATURE.-Under section 8 of article 11 of the constitution, a city charter may be approved by a majority vote of the members elected to each house of the legislature, without the concurrence of the governor. The approval of the charter of Los Angeles by a joint resolution of both houses of the legislature was sufficient to give it validity, without the enactment of a bill to be approved by the governor. ID. LEGISLATURE.-The legislature is not synonymous with the lawmaking power, and does not include the governor, except as applied to the enactment of laws. The legislature, as a distinct body, consists of the senate and assembly, and is empowered by the constitution to act as a distinct body, with reference to the approval of city charters. ID. MUNICIPAL CHARTER-CONFLICT WITH GENERAL LAWS.-Under the constitution, the charter to be framed for a city government must be consistent with the constitution and with the general laws of the state. But the whole charter cannot be held invalid because of a few of its provisions may be inconsistent with general statutes in force at the time of its adoption. APPLICATION for a writ of prohibition to prevent the city assessor of Los Angeles from proceeding to act under the provisions of the new charter of that city. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. W. T. Baggett, and J. Marion Brooks, for Petitioner. The legislature is the law-making power of the state, and no law can be passed except by bill approved by the gov (Const. art. 4, secs. 1, 6, 15, 18, 22, 26, 27; Hatch v. Stoneman, 66 Cal. 632; State v. Platt, 2 S. C. 150; 16 Am. Rep. 647; Boyers v. Crane, 1 W. Va. 176; May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546; Wolfe v. McCaul, 76 Va. 876; Story on the Constitution, secs. 881, 891; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378; State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46; 79 Am. Dec. 405. Charles McFarland, and Chapman & Hendrick, for Respondent. The governor is no part of the legislature. (Const., art. 3, sec. 1; art. 11, sec. 8.) In approving a charter, the legislature is not exercising the powers of ordinary legis lation, it being forbidden to pass local or special laws (Art. 4, sec. 25), and having no power to alter or amend the charter (Const. Amend. No. 16, 1887, pp. 89, 90), in like manner as it may alter or amend a bill. (Const., art. 4, sec. 15.) The power is that of mere approval or rejection of the charter, rather than of enactment. A reasonable doubt should be solved in favor of the legislative action. (Cooley's Const. Lim. 182.) S. D. Woods, amicus curiæ. WORKS, J.-This is a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the defendant from proceeding to act as assessor of the city of Los Angeles. The petition alleges, among other things: "1. That on the twentieth day of October, 1888, the qualified electors of said city ratified a charter for the government of said city, framed as provided by section 8, article 2, of the constitution of the state of California, and thereafter, to wit, on the day of -, 1889, a resolution was introduced in the senate, of the state of California (the legislature being then in session), entitled 'Senate Joint Resolution No. 2,' purporting to be a resolution approving the aforesaid charter; that a majority of the members elected to the senate, and a majority of the members elected to the assembly, voted in favor of said resolution on the twenty-third day of January, 1889 "2. Said charter was never submitted to the legislature of the state of California for its approval or rejection, as provided by section 8 of article 2 of the constitution; that neither the said resolution nor the said charter was ever read on three several days in each house, nor was either declared a case of urgency; that neither said resolution nor said charter was ever presented to the governor of the state of California for his approval or rejection, nor were they, or either of them, signed or approved by said governor. "3 That the powers and duties of the city assessor, in relation to the assessment of property prescribed by the laws existing prior to the framing of the aforesaid charter, were other than and essentially different from the powers and duties provided in said aforesaid charter. "4. That notwithstanding that said charter has never been submitted to the legislature for its approval or rejection, and never presented to and signed and approved by the governor, the said defendant, as city assessor, without and in excess of the duties and powers conferred by prior laws, threatens and is now proceeding to assess all taxable property in said city, according to and by virtue of the provisions of said charter, and not otherwise, and particularly the property of your petitioner, notwithstanding his attention has been called to excess of jurisdiction." The prayer of the petition "is for an alternative writ of prohibition commanding the defendant to refrain from further proceedings in the matter specified herein until the further order of the court, and to show cause before this court, at a time and place specified in the writ, why he should not be absolutely restrained from any further proceedings in said matter." It will be seen by the allegations of the petition that the sole question presented is as to the validity of the charter of the city of Los Angeles. Two objections are made to the charter: 1. That it was not legally adopted; 2. That it is inconsistent with the general laws of the state. 1. It is conceded that the charter was adopted by the legislature by a joint resolution passed by a majority of the members elected to both houses of the legislature, and |