Plastic explosives were also blamed for previous air disasters, including Korean Flight 858 in November, 1987, which killed 115 people; a TWA Athens-bound airliner in 1985, which killed 3; and an Air India jet that same year which killed 329. Earlier this month the brutality of terrorism was brought home. The wife of the Commander of the U.S.S. Vincennes narrowly escaped death when a pipe bomb exploded in her van. This explosion shattered the myth that terrorists won't attack within the continental United States. Plastic explosives have increasingly created a terrifying dilemma for American airport officials. Although new technology is being developed, plastic explosives can be easily concealed from current x-ray machines used to screen carry-on luggage and passengers. Explosives such as the widely-used Semtex can be camouflaged in everyday possessions like cans of shaving cream or tubes of toothpaste. Semtex can be set off by a detonator no bigger than a matchstick. These detonators are very difficult to identify and can easily escape unnoticed. Fortunately, Semtex gives off an odor that can be detected by trained dogs. My legislation would amend the Federal Aviation Act to require the use of so-called "sniffer dogs" at major international airports in the United States to detect plastic explosives. The dogs would be available to check all baggage on any airline which has received a recent terrorist threat, or for random use throughout the airport security area. Obviously, there are not enough dogs to check every single piece of luggage, but the mere presence-and I want to emphasize that, Mr. Chairman-the mere presence of these dogs, especially if given a high profile, would help deter terrorists from placing explosives in carry-on luggage. The FAA is now developing more sophisticated instruments, as you have heard today, to detect plastic explosives. A Thermal Neutron Analysis System, commonly known as TNA, has been invented to uncover sophisticated plastic explosives in checked luggage. However, according to the FAA, it will take at least one year before TNAs are available to all major airports, and they will cost approximately $750,000 each. Screening passengers and their carry-on luggage is a more pressing need. A vapor detector is now being devised for this purpose but it is still another two to three years away. Each vapor detector will cost approximately $125,000. Covering all 25 major international airports will eventually require 66 TNAs and about 200 vapor detectors. The total estimated cost of this would be around $74.5 million. What will be used to detect plastic explosives until these machines can be fully implemented? Dog teams would be a practical way to fill the current security void in a cost-efficient manner. I might add that the FAA is using sniffer dogs to some degree right now. The total cost of providing two teams for each of the 25 major airports would be roughly $2 million. This takes into account the initial $10,000 cost of training each dog team, the salaries of the officers who will handle the dogs, and the upkeep of the dogs. This is substantially less than the $75 million which will be spent on the new systems. I'm not saying we don't need the new systems, but as an interim measure, Mr. Chairman, I think this would be very beneficial and would deter many terrorists. The bottom line is this, Mr. Chairman. We must take preventive measures now before more Americans are murdered. The new technology being developed is reassuring for the future, but we cannot leave ourselves vulnerable to terrorist attacks while we wait. We need sniffer dogs, and we need them now. Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman for that recommendation and for the time and effort he has devoted to this subject. We welcome all the counsel and guidance that we can get on this issue. As I understand it, your legislation is a directive to the airport operators. Is that correct? Mr. BURTON. Yes, and the FAA. Yes, sir. Mr. OBERSTAR. And you include the FAA in this. I think the FAA probably has all the authority they need to institute that procedure. They probably would tell us, but we will ask them in executive session later today whether they need any more money to do So. But you are proposing a much less costly alternative or option, and one that we certainly shall pursue. Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I talked with the FAA people in my office last week. As I said before, it would cost approximately $2 million for this initial phase of sniffer dogs. I don't suggest or recommend that this take the place of the new technology being developed, but as I said in my statement, it is going to be one to three years before this new technology is actually put into place in these various airports. It is my contention that during this one to three year period we need to be doing something. Sniffer dogs do work. They are being used to some degree by the FAA right now, and I think they should be used more extensively-not only to catch terrorists, but as a deterrent. If you see those dogs in these airports, even though they work on a limited scale, I think it would be a real deterrent to terrorists who might try to put those explosives on planes. Mr. OBERSTAR. Earlier today we raised the issue and explored the deterrent effect of taking all those precautionary measures that are wise and prudent and sensible, some of which are visible to the public, that in and of themselves operate as deterrents. So we shall pursue this matter further. Are there questions of our witness? The gentleman from California? Mr. PACKARD. One quick question, Mr. Chairman. Much of our problem is overseas airports. Would you suggest that we put our own dogs there, or that we cooperate with foreign airport operators? Or how do you suggest we deal with that? Or are you only looking at domestic problems? Mr. BURTON. My legislation, Representative Packard, is for airports within the continental United States. But I would suggest that we should seek to work with foreign governments to use sniffer dogs in those airports which are considered high risk, and there are many of them overseas, during the interim period between now and when we get this new technology on line. So yes, I would suggest that the committee pursue negotiations with foreign governments to use the same type of operation there as well as in the United States. Mr. OBERSTAR. The gentleman from Tennessee? Mr. CLEMENT. You mentioned, concerning these sniffer dogs and relating that to the McCurdy bill, how much it would cost. As I understand it you are only talking about using those sniffer dogs in 25 major airports where, I believe, Congressman McCurdy was talking about 71 hubs in the United States. So we're not necessarily talking about the same territory that would be covered. Mr. BURTON. Well, the 25 airports to which I referred are involved primarily with international flights. They are the major international airports in the United States. But I have no objection to using sniffer dogs at many of our domestic airports because I believe that terrorists in the future might very well attack a domestic flight flying people to and from major cities within the continental United States. So in the short run, the next one to three years, I think we should have them at least at these 25 major international airports, but I would not object to spending an extra $2 million to $4 million to have them at the other airports, as well. Mr. CLEMENT. Now, for what purposes are these sniffer dogs going to be used? Mr. BURTON. Well, they would be where the metal detector device is at the gate when the luggage goes through there. They would be there to sniff, if you will, the various pieces of luggage coming through there to try to detect plastic explosives that may be concealed in those bags. Mr. CLEMENT. What about these pipe bombs? Mr. BURTON. We have been told that the sensitivity of the sniffer dogs to these plastic explosives is such that they can be detected even within metal containers. Mr. CLEMENT. But you are also saying that just by the presence of the dog, being there in itself would deter- Mr. BURTON. I think it's a two-fold deterrent. These dogs only work for given periods of time; I won't go into the exact time because you may want to talk about that in closed testimony, but some of these dogs work for a limited period of time. But the very presence of the dogs, or dogs on a leash at the airport that may not be doing the sniffing, would be a deterrent. If you were a terrorist and you were going to put a plastic explosive on a plane and you knew that there were sniffer dogs at many of our airports, and you saw a dog on a leash with a security guard, I think you would be a little reluctant to take that device through the entrance to that plane. Mr. CLEMENT. Now, when you were talking to the FAA did they say they were going to do this at the 24 airports? Mr. BURTON. No. The FAA indicated that they use sniffer dogs now, but not for carry-on baggage. They use them to spot-check international flights behind the scenes when the bags are brought down to be put on the plane. I was urging them to use the sniffer dogs in a highly visible way to deter terrorists, as well as to pick up terrorist bombs that might be getting through these devices. Mr. CLEMENT. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. OBERSTAR. The gentleman from New York? Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Burton, I thank you for your testimony. I would like to enlist you in my club, and that club is to get the Aviation Trust Fund off budget. Could I get your point of view on that? Mr. BURTON. Well, that's one thing that I hadn't given much thought to. The Aviation Trust Fund as I understand it, Mr. Boehlert, is to be used specifically for aviation and aviation safety. Since it is for that specific purpose, I think we ought to use it for this. I probably could be enlisted to support your position. Mr. BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. Mr. BURTON. Did you walk me down that line? [Laughter.] Mr. OBERSTAR. I said to the gentleman, all we needed were five more votes. We came that short in the last Congress, so we promise you the dogs will be funded out of the "freed" Aviation Trust Fund. [Laughter.] I thank the gentleman for a very serious presentation and a very useful one. Mr. BURTON. Thank you. MR. LALLY, ET AL.-Resumed Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Lally, please resume your position. Again, I want to inquire of the airport operators, if they have a separate statement to make. I fear you misunderstood my earlier invitation to present your remarks. Mr. FITZGERALD. We do have separate statements to make. TESTIMONY OF GERALD FITZGERALD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR AVIATION, PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, AND MEMBER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES-Resumed Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I am Gerry Fitzgerald, the Assistant Director for Aviation of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and currently a member of the Board of Directors of the American Association of Airport Executives. On behalf of the Board and our membership I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify on aviation security matters, and I would request that our written statement be entered into the record. Aviation security is a vital component of the Nation's air transportation system. AAAE and its members have always been active participants in the efforts to improve security. The airports and airlines have worked hard at improving security and will continue to cooperate with the Federal Aviation Administration on implementing programs that will improve security procedures. The security situation has changed dramatically in recent years as the threats shift from hijacking to terrorist attacks. AAAE believes true aviation security can only be achieved by controlling terrorism at its source. Airports can deter terrorism, but it is the role of our Government to prevent terrorism attacks on our Nation and its citizens. The FAA must continue to conduct studies to assess the vulnerability of international and U.S. airports to current security threats. This essential first step allows both FAA and the airport operator to assess properly just what measures are required to deal effectively with perceived threats. This also allows the FAA, in close cooperation with the airports and airlines, to determine the best way to employ state-of-the-art technologies and operational procedures in the most economically viable and responsive manner. You simply put your resources where they will do the most good. On February 8th, the FAA adopted the final rule on access to secured areas of airports, and in our opinion failed to look beyond the Washington horizon to examine the implications of this wellintended proposal. In their efforts to respond to international events, the FAA issued a rule, imposed an implementation date, established fines for violations, but they have yet to issue an advisory circular to explain the rule or provide their regional offices with enough information to answer airport questions. The airports across this country are very disturbed by the impact of this new rule, for many reasons. We feel the FAA seriously underestimated the physical scope of its proposal, the cost of implementing it, and they failed to consider adequately the practicality of implementing a rule which does not address many of the critical elements. Most importantly, they failed to address the issue of where the money will come from. Let me just briefly discuss these three points. The physical scope-the rule suggests an average of 128 access points for an airport that screens more than 25 million people annually. As a point of reference, Kennedy International Airport alone has 1,500 access doors. At LaGuardia we have 750 access doors, and at Newark International Airport we have approximately 1,000, as compared to their average of 128. The FAA suggests that the cost will be about $170 million to implement the rule for the entire 279-airport facility system. Given the vagueness of the rule and the lack of clear guidance as to what actually will be required and how extensive these systems must be, we believe the cost could be as much as ten times the amount estimated by the FAA. For Kennedy Airport alone, the cost of installing access control systems will exceed $27 million. We are estimating a cost of approximately $18,000 per door. This does not include the costs for cargo facilities or hangar facilities, which will most certainly be much more than the $18,000 per passenger terminal door. In addition to this, the airports must pay the annual costs associated with operating and maintaining the systems, which will be millions of dollars per year imposed upon us as operating costs. After the cost, the rule itself is vague. It fails even to define what is a secured area. It fails to tell us how to adequately secure cargo doors or hangar doors that need to be open to service aircraft. It fails to address exclusive areas or the accountability of other tenants and users on the airport. We think the lack of clarity in the new rule will result in immense and largely unnecessary security around general aviation |