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expensive and more widely applicable detectors to identify plastic explosives. I would hope that the Members of this Subcommittee
could support this funding request during House consideration of the
Commerce/Justice/State appropriations bill.
The Department of State also offers a training program for
foreign civil aviation security officials through its Anti-terrorism Assistance Program (ATA). . Through ATA, the Department of State helps to ensure that participating foreign governments have an effective aviation security program including well-trained staff, supplemented by a variety of technical aids. Since its inception in 1983, the ATA program has trained over 650 students from 28 nations
in Advanced Civil Aviation Security or Airport Police Management.
BILATERAL CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENTS
A final set of issues relevant to consideration today is our
bilateral civil aviation agreements.
The Department has sought
improved security for international air travel by including security articles in each of the aviation bilateral agreements the U.S.
negotiates with our foreign aviation partners.
Our model security article commits each party to:
o Act in accord with several international
conventions which deal with specific threats to
Require their national airlines and other
operators to conform to ICAO's various security
Observe the security provisions of the other
party as a condition for entry into the territory
inspection measures be taken to protect planes,
passengers and crews as well as cargo and
aircraft stores prior to and during boarding.
intended to end the problem quickly.
o Recognize that the agreement provides a legal
basis for one Party to impose restrictions on the
airlines of the other party in the event the
second Party has not complied with the provisions
of the article.
Since 1985 when the U.S. began this effort to incorporate these
provisions into our bilateral civil aviation agreements, these modifications have come into effect with 22 nations and agreement on
text has been reached with another 27 countries.
We are working on
incorporating these changes into civil aviation agreements with more
than 30 other states with which we have such agreements.
Mr. Chairman, in closing let me say that preventing another
tragedy such as the Pan Am 103 bombing is now and will remain a
permanent preoccupation of the concerned agencies of the U.S.
With regard to those responsible for Pan Am 103, I am
confident that we will eventually identify them and that we will
then do everything in our power to bring them to justice.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Shortly after the PanAm incident I happened to be interviewed, along with Ray Kline, former Deputy Director of the CIA, about this matter of security. I think he made a point that was very telling and very important for closing the circle on this panel's testimony and supporting what Ambassador McManaway said. That is that we have to get to terrorism at its source, and that means, as you put it, pro-active. That means getting out, finding where they are, finding state-supported terrorism and attacking it at its source, using all the devices that we have at our disposal.
The FAA is not an intelligence-gathering agency. It must depend on intelligence provided to it by our other intelligence services, and once provided with that information it can act properly. Beyond intelligence gathering is getting at those who have destructive schemes in mind, and that's probably the most effective element of the whole security apparatus.
We thank you very much for your testimony and ask you to remain available for the executive session later today.
We have a number of other witnesses and panels whose testimony is going to be very interesting and important to completing the scope of the hearing. We will recess for roughly one hour and resume at 1:45.
The subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:45 p.m. this same day.]
Mr. OBERSTAR. The subcommittee will resume its sitting.
Our next panel of witnesses includes Mr. Richard Lally, Director of Security, Air Transport Association; Mr. Homer Boynton, Managing Director for Security, American Airlines and Vice Chairman of the Security Committee of the Air Transport Associacion; Mr. Robert Kierce, Staff Vice President for Security at Trans World Airlines; Mr. Robert Baudter, Manager for Corporate Security at United Airlines and Chairman of the Security Committee for the ATA; Mr. Edward F. Cunningham, Managing Director of Corporate Security for PanAm; Mr. Gerald Fitzgerald, Assistant Director for Aviation, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and a member of the Board of Directors of the American Association of Airport Executives; and Mr. Wilfred Jackson, Director of Airport Operations for the Baltimore Washington International Airport and Chairman, Operations, Safety and Security Committee of the Airport Operators Council International.
That's a very impressive list of witnesses. Would you please take your seats at the table?
We are expecting Congressman Dan Burton, whose testimony will be welcome at such time as he does arrive.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Lally, you are the leadoff witness on this panel. We welcome you. We welcome all of you and thank you for your participation in the hearings.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD LALLY, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, AIR
TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, ACCOMPANIED BY HOMER A. BOYN. TON, MANAGING DIRECTOR, SECURITY, AMERICAN AIRLINES AND VICE CHAIRMAN, SECURITY COMMITTEE, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION; ROBERT R. KIERCE, STAFF VICE PRESIDENT, SECURITY, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES; ROBERT F. BAUDTER, MAN. AGER, CORPORATE SECURITY, UNITED AIRLINES AND CHAIRMAN, SECURITY COMMITTEE, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION; EDWARD F. CUNNINGHAM, MANAGING DIRECTOR, CORPORATE SECURITY, PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS; GERALD FITZGERALD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR AVIATION, PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY AND MEMBER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES; AND WILFRED A. JACKSON, DIRECTOR OF AIRPORT OPERATIONS, BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS, SAFETY AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, AIRPORT OPERATORS COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL
Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You did introduce my colleagues who are present today from the major airlines, and I would just like to note that they are here to provide whatever assistance and information they can to the committee, both in this session and in the executive session, and they are on standby at your call to meet with you or other members of the committee or the staff as time progresses to provide whatever additional assistance they might be able to furnish.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.
Mr. LALLY. We have a formal statement that we have submitted for the record. I would like to summarize or highlight portions of it for the committee at this time.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Please proceed.
Mr. LALLY. The airlines have redoubled their efforts in the wake of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, instituting even tighter security screening procedures for international flights than were in effect before.
The security challenge faced by the airlines today is formidable, and the airlines cannot meet that challenge alone. They are mercial enterprises, not intelligence agencies. They rely on their Government and allied governments to help track and assess the many security threats made against commercial airlines each year. They very much need the Government's help, including the direct assistance of the Federal Aviation Administration's security specialists, to provide adequate security in high-risk areas of the world.
The nature of the security threat we face today is far different and far more dangerous from what it was in the early 1970s when we first began screening passengers and their carry-on baggage. Back then, hijacking was the primary threat; now it is sabotage by international terrorists seeking to influence the behavior of governments through acts of violence against commercial aviation. Modification of government policy is their real goal. Commercial aviation is merely a surrogate target. Meeting this new threat both warrants and
requires greater Government involvement in airline security. The U.S. Government