and to advise that increased security measures should be introduced to counter this threat. This bulletin remains in effect today. There was no information available that indicated that such a device would be used against a U.S. carrier, let alone more specific information concerning possible routes or actual flights. The British Ministry of Transport issued its own warnings about the device manufactured by the PFLP-GC on 22 November. Dissemination of this warning was broadened on 19 December. The information contained in the British warning is completely consistent with the information contained in the aviation security bulletin issued by the U.S. FAA on 18 November. In view of the publicity that these two aviation bulletins have received, and their possible links to the destruction of Pan Am 103, let me emphasize several critical points about them: There is no connection between the "Helsinki threat" and The "Helsinki threat" was a hoax. It had no relation O The U.S. and British security notices issued in response to the discovery of the PFLP-GC bombs are consistent. carriers were notified on 18 November by the FAA. U.S. In explaining how we react to possible threats to civil aviation, I must take a moment to describe the broader context of how the U.S. analyzes terrorist threat information. The vast majority of terrorist threats that we receive are against U.S. government personnel or facilities as well as U.S. businesses with a permanent and visible presence overseas. The national threat alert and advisory system is designed to advise security officials of these types of threats. Our system is based on a comprehensive, national-level process which responds to threat information received by any concerned U.S. agency and ensures that this information is acted upon in a timely manner. The objective of the system is to review and forward terrorist threat alert or advisory information quickly to those responsible for countering terrorist actions. We also use travel The national level system also includes a provision for alerting the general public of specific and credible terrorist threats via Department of State public travel advisories. advisories, in conjunction with the FAA, to advise the American public in those situations in which aviation security in a given airport is deemed inadequate to ensure the security of passengers. Aviation security bulletins are issued by the FAA and advise aviation security officials at U.S. carriers and elsewhere of information they need to help ensure the safety of U.S. air carriers operating throughout the world. The Department of State repeats these cables to posts affected by the bulletin so that specified officials at our diplomatic posts can assist the U.S. carriers in obtaining the cooperation of the host government in increasing security measures as appropriate. Such bulletins are not threat advisories to USG personnel are subject to a very limited distribution at Embassy. In the wake of Pan Am 103, we have restated these procedures to our embassies and consulates in the clearest possible language to ensure that all of them understand the purpose and limited dissemination of FAA Aviation Security Bulletins. Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you, this Committee, the Congress and the American people that there is not, and cannot be, a double standard between the travel security information available to official personnel overseas and to the American public. Let me reemphasize: o If we have a specific and credible threat to civil aviation security which cannot be countered, we will strongly recommend to the air carrier that it cancel the threatened flight. If necessary, we will issue a public travel advisory to II. - 7 PREVENTING ANOTHER PAN AM 103 DIPLOMACY Turning now to a second broad range of issues before the Committee, the Department of State has been active on the international front to help prevent another Pan Am 103. A special meeting of the Terrorism Experts Group of the Summit 7 was called in response to the Pan Am 103 bombing. At that meeting, the U.S. argued forcefully that the bombing of Pan Am 103 demonstrated the urgent need for upgrading air security measures worldwide. There was general agreement among the Summit 7 representatives that the threat to air travel is not limited to American carriers and that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is the appropriate forum for strengthening worldwide civil aviation security standards. Further, the Experts agreed that discussions should begin on the possibility of an international convention that would call for "tagging" plastic explosives e.g. those that are believed to have caused the Pan Am 103 explosion during their manufacturing process by those nations that produce such explosives. Following this meeting, the U.S. and Britain called for a special, ministerial-level meeting of the ICAO Council to discuss Pan Am 103 and its implication for international civil aviation. This meeting was held on February 15-16. Secretary Skinner of DOT led the U.S. delegation. Emerging from that meeting was a comprehensive workplan which will result in ICAO developing new security procedures to help prevent a repetition of the Pan Am tragedy. - 8 To advance the exchange of information on the complex topic of tagging explosives, the U.S. hosted in Washington on 2-3 March a meeting of explosives experts from a number of allied states. At the meeting a workplan was established for further research into the basic issues involved in detecting plastic explosives. The U.S also participated in similar meetings held earlier this month under ICAO auspices in Montreal. Further progress was made in these meetings concerning the feasibility and acceptability of chemical taggants for pre-blast detection of plastic explosives. Whether it will be possible to negotiate an international agreement regarding taggants remains to be seen. But, the common recognition by governments throughout the world that something more needs to be done to increase security from terrorist bombs represents a major step forward. Research and Development In terms of our own direct activities, the Department of State funds counterterrorism research and development which includes projects to help prevent aircraft sabotage. This national, interagency counterterrorism R&D program is coordinated with nearly thirty federal agencies. The FAA is one of our most important partners in this endeavor. In FY-1990 the Department of State is seeking $6 million to support this interagency program which provides seed money for a range of research and development programs which otherwise would not be funded by any particular federal agency. Included in this R&D program are projects to develop less |