it to the full committee, which will meet on Thursday to complete the markup on this bill.

I think it is also important to mention that the Appropriations Committee has jumped the gun on some of these issues and included language in the supplemental appropriation bill dealing with security matters, that are the subject in fact of today's hearing and they did it knowing that they were legislating in an appropriations bill.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT KNISELY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR BUDGET AND PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY DARLENE M. FREEMAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Mr. KNISELY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today to discuss the Department of Transportation's views concerning H.R. 1659. With me today is Ms. Darlene Freeman, Deputy Director of the FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security.

As you know, Secretary Skinner is in Europe this week to maintain the momentum of February's ICAO's aviation conference in Montreal, and build a unified approach to improved aviation security.

He announced his specific agenda for security initiatives April 3rd, following his and the President's meetings with Pan Am 103 families.

He is meeting this week with officials in Italy, West Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and France, and one subject will be the placement of explosives detection technology abroad.

Use of the TNA devices overseas requires diplomatic and technical coordination, and he hopes to facilitate this process. We must be ready to place the equipment where it is most needed, as soon as it is manufactured.

Before outlining the Department's views concerning H.R. 1659, I would first like to describe briefly for you several major security initiatives which Secretary Skinner has announced since his March 23rd appearance before this subcommittee.

As you said, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Skinner needed no prodding. These initiatives include requiring_deployment of explosives detection systems such as the Thermal Neutron Analysis device at the busiest airports in the U.S. and overseas where U.S. airlines operate. The U.S. will immediately initiate negotiations with foreign governments regarding installation of these systems at foreign airports, consistent with the Secretary's European initiative;

Assigning additional FAA security specialists to provide greater surveillance and assistance to U.S. carriers operating at the busiest airports in the U.S. and overseas;

Improving the FAA security bulletin process through which important security information is disseminated to the aviation community, in a variety of ways, including: making compliance by U.S. air carriers with such directives mandatory; requiring acknowledged receipt within 24 hours; requiring carriers to submit to FAA

within 72 hours specific information on how they plan to carry out preventative measures; and ensuring that specific information in security bulletins is distributed to pilots-in-command of airline flights;

Elevating standards for x-ray and metal detection equipment to assure that U.S. air carriers are using state-of-the-art equipment; forming a National Aviation Security Advisory Committee to provide a forum for the exchange and coordination of security programs and research and development designed to further enhance aviation security; and conducting a top-to-bottom review and evaluation by FAA of how well U.S. air carriers are complying with security requirements.

This effort will look at each airline's resources and general philosophy toward security.

Discussing with foreign governments new procedures for more effective coordination of the international assessment and dissemination of security information and countermeasures is also included. All of these measures are being addressed with a high sense of priority. The fight against terrorism is one of Secretary Skinner's highest priorities.

I would like to turn, now, to a brief discussion of H.R. 1659 which is pending before the subcommittee. H.R. 1659 would require the FAA Administrator, within 60 days after the bill's enactment, to mandate the installation and use by air carriers, at selected airports, domestically and overseas, of explosives detection equipment equivalent to or better than TNA technology.

The bill would also establish a grant program through which air carriers could receive up to $100 million in reimbursement for the purchase and installation of required explosives detection equipment. The $100 million would be available commencing with $50 million in grant authority in fiscal year 1989.

The legislation would also make available an additional $170 million in grant authority-$85 million in fiscal year 1989-under the Airport Improvement Act for airports to purchase and install equipment needed to comply with FAA regulatory requirements regarding controlled access to secured areas of airports.

Although we recognize and fully appreciate your intent in proposing H.R. 1659, we do not support its enactment. The Secretary has already announced that the FAA will act to require explosives detection equipment such as the TNA at appropriate airports here and overseas.

The FAA already possesses ample authority to issue such a requirement, and, as previously noted, this matter is a high priority with us. We have already begun efforts to define the nature of the equipment to be required, along with a timetable and priority schedule. Legislation is not needed to facilitate our efforts in this

area.

We would ask only for the subcommittee's continued support as we move forward to achieve the benefits of the state-of-the-art explosives detection technology on which we have worked for so long. We also do not believe that there is a need for Federal funding of explosives detection equipment as contemplated by the bill's proposed $100 million grant program.

1

The Secretary has considered various funding options for TNAtype equipment and concluded that there is not sufficient reason to alter the existing framework under which air carriers are responsible for meeting FAA-imposed security requirements.

In fact this framework is no different than that which exists for any other FAA regulatory requirements, such as the TCAS collision avoidance systems, even if costs to the regulated party may be associated with their installation.

We agree that there is a need for a strong Federal presence in the security area, and the Federal Government has played a significant role. Between fiscal year 1980 and 1989, for example, FAA has invested about $45 million for the development of TNA and vapor detection technology alone.

Additionally, we are increasing our security staff by 56 inspectors this year, and we are seeking in our fiscal year 1990 budget an additional 120 security inspectors who will work closely with airports and airlines, here and abroad, to improve security.

Our presence overseas will be strengthened as a part of this increased staffing effort. These are legitimate facets of an appropriate Federal role, and we intend to continue to play a strong, active role in combatting the threat of terrorism.

We also do not support the bill's increased grant authority of $170 million to be made available to airport operators for purchasing and installing equipment to carry out FAA requirements related to access to secured areas.

Airport operators may already use their entitlement grant funds under existing Airport Improvement Program grant authority to defray from 75 to 90 percent of the costs of required security equipment, if they choose.

It is an airport operator's choice as to how to spend entitlement funds among various eligible projects. We do not favor provisions that would fund 100 percent of any eligible program, or increasing the overall grant program to assist airports in complying with FAA's recent rulemaking on secured access.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to stress that we appreciate the subcommittee's interest in working to help improve the security of our air transportation system. We look forward to working closely with you and members of this subcommittee to strengthen our Nation's ability to respond to terrorist threats.

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. We would be pleased to respond to questions you may have at this time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. We want to reiterate the real appreciation on our part, on both sides of the aisle, for the splendid cooperation we have had with the Department all through this very, very important matter, and other issues involving aviation.

Mr. KNISELY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I would like to ask both you, Mr. Knisely, and Ms. Freeman, to remain available through the balance of the hearing, unless you have some really overwhelming, pressing, other demands, because there may be some questions raised by other witnesses-in fact I think there will be questions and issues raised by

other witnesses to which you may wish to respond, and to which we might like to have you respond later on.

Mr. KNISELY. Of course, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Fine.

The first question is, who is the object of the terrorist attack, or, what is the object of the terrorist attack?

Mr. KNISELY. I think the object of the terrorist attack is the U.S. presence, or the U.S. flag, or simply that plane. There have been, as you noted earlier, Mr. Chairman, terrorist attacks on other airlines around the world, as reflected by the conviction reported this morning in the Korean incident.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Certainly in the Pan Am 103 tragedy, there were citizens from 20 other countries destroyed in that bombing, weren't there?

Mr. KNISELY. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The attack of the terrorist certainly was not on Pan Am Airlines, was it?

Mr. KNISELY. No. I think the threat was addressed to all passengers that fly internationally.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And although we do not know, publicly, I think the State Department and our intelligence agencies are doing a splendid job in piecing together causes-that is, the terrorist motivation side, or the physical cause, and I think that is a different matter-but the terrorist motivation for that attack I think iswithout getting specific and going into areas that are sensitive, or classified-I think it is fair to say that this, and other random terrorist attacks have, as their objective, changing U.S. policy, changing U.S. actions abroad, retaliation against the United States as a Government, and as a people.

Wouldn't you say that is a fair statement?

Mr. KNISELY. I think that might be true, Mr. Chairman, but American passengers fly on other airlines as well, so I do not think the attacks would necessarily be limited to American air carriers. Mr. OBERSTAR. And American air carriers just happen to be probably the most visible presence of the United States abroad, and a convenient target for very cowardly attacks. These terrorists are by no means brave people.

Mr. KNISELY. I think we have seen some evolution of activities against air carriers, starting with hijacking. Presently it is terrorist attacks on American carriers. Perhaps it will be on other carriers

soon.

Mr. OBERSTAR. That may well be. As threats against oil tankers were issued in the Persian Gulf during the Iran/Iraq war, protective measures by the United States and other West European governments were taken. The French were threatened, and the Italians were threatened at a time.

It is clear that the focus of the terrorist attacks against U.S. airlines, is against U.S. policy, against the U.S. Government, against the United States' presence, and for a variety of other reasons.

This is a foreign policy issue. It is clearly not like other responsibilities the airlines have to maintain aircraft in top-flight working condition. This is not like a minimum equipment list issue.

And therefore, I think it is not quite right to say that the framework proposed by the Department, to fund the TÑA and other security measures-as you say on page four. Quote.

"This framework is no different than that which exists for other FAA regulatory requirements such as TCAS." TCAS clearly is a carrier responsibility, and Mode C, clearly, a general aviation responsibility. If they are going to fly in those congested areas, they have got to have this equipment.

But there is a different dimension in the matter of terrorism, and I think therefore, a different response in providing the necessary equipment to defend against these random attacks is necessary, and that is why I think the funding ought to be provided out of the aviation trust fund or through the tax structure, rather than through outlays on the part of the carriers.

Mr. KNISELY. Mr. Chairman, I think that the attacks may encompass both American carriers and foreign carriers, and could be directed at passengers of other nations. I think the risk could be equally seen as one which needs to be addressed by the passengers. While I do not believe the carriers should assume the burden for this, there is the security surcharge. We would expect that those charges-if they were imposed by the carriers would be passed through to the passengers who are assuming the risk.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. We already have a mechanism for providing facilities and equipment. The Aviation Trust Fund. I think it is in place, it is available, the funding is available, and while there are some budgetary questions about how you deal with it, those are technical matters that I think can be dealt with. I would like to move on to another issue, and that is the cost of putting in the access doors, and you have a different view on how it should be funded.

Let's leave the how it should be funded issue aside, since we will agree to disagree for the moment on that matter.

Mr. KNISELY. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And try to get an understanding of the costs. In the FAA assessment of the number of security doors-which was presented in earlier testimony-the number was considerably lower than the number of doors requiring security controls as submitted in testimony by airport operators.

What was the basis for the FAA-DOT estimates? Where did the FAA get those numbers from, and why is there such a wide discrepancy between the number of doors in the FAA estimate, and that of the operators of the airports?

Mr. KNISELY. Ms. Freeman has volunteered to answer that question, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Very good.

Ms. FREEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, the estimates of the FAA in putting out the automated access rule were based on a survey of some 50 airport layout plans, and the concept that the FAA was employing, of a funneling-through concept, which would not require direct access controls of every single door at an airport, but, rather, would provide for direct access control of a primary access point, and any subsequent doors beyond that would be considered to be indirectly controlled.