be provided sufficient R&D funds to finish the high tech development which they so wisely began four years ago. There has been a breakthrough in explosives vapor detection technology. Give FAA the resources so that it can finish the job. No one would like to be here again soon, trying to explain to the families of new victims of possibly another terrorist attack, why we had failed to act.

Thank you. I have a short form on a video which will describe the equipment very well.

Mr. OBERSTAR. We'll show the video right now.
[Video presentation made.]

Mr. OBERSTAR. Is that the conclusion of the video?
Mr. FINE. That's the conclusion. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Dr. Fine.
Mr. Paderson?

Mr. PADERSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, given the late hour, I'll summarize my remarks, and we have submitted a full statement to the committee.

First I'd like to thank you and the committee for the opportunity to come here today and talk to you about what we can do today to improve airline security and the safety of the passengers. My name is John Paderson, I'm the Sales and Marketing Manager for Ion Track Instruments. I've been involved in the development and application of security systems to protect against a variety of threats for the past 15 years, including bombings. I've asked to join me up here on the podium, Mr. Tony Jenkins, who's our Group Technical Director, and Mr. Jenkins is a noted authority in the area of explosives detection. Mr. Jenkins was one of the first scientists to develope a practical explosives detector, more than 20 years ago. Also with me today is Mr. Clint Seward, who's the President of our com

pany.

As I said before, Mr. Jenkins developed the first explosive detector 20 years ago. Explosive detection isn't a new science. In fact, it's been a commercial industry for the past 20 years. Explosives Detectors are available today that will detect the plastic explosive of concern to all the to travelers today, Semtex. In every instance that Ion Track Instruments has had access to captured samples of Semtex, we've been able to detect them. That includes the bomb that was confiscated from the El Al flight in London.

It should also be noted that the Nuclear Power Industry in the United States is required by law to screen every person going into a nuclear plant for the presence of concealed explosives. Eighty percent of those plants use ITI explosive detectors to do that job. Our own Federal Government, including the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Army all use ITI explosives detectors to protect their people and facilities. In fact, last year the U.S. Army made the largest purchase of explosive detectors ever in the history of the U.S. Government when they bought ITI explosive detectors to equip their EOD teams.

The airline industry today, faces a new threat. Mr. Chairman, earlier you mentioned that the threat has gone through two phases. You're absolutely right. In the past it was hijackings and the weapons were guns and knives. Today it's terrorists and criminals and their weapons are improvised explosive devices, bombs. Bombs are easy to make, easy to conceal, and once you place a

bomb, they offer safety and anonymity to the perpetrator. The tragic losses of Pan Am 103, KAL 858, and Air India 182, coupled with the fact that there were 1,831 high explosive bombings in the U.S. between 1976 and 1985-that's right, 1,831 high explosive bombings in the U.S. Those two factors underscore the seriousness of the situation.

X-rays and metal detectors, which are currently in use were deployed to protect against the hijacking threat. The threat has changed, and what we need is new equipment to be able to counter that threat. Looking for a bomb in baggage without an explosives detector, is like looking for a gun or a knife in that same baggage without an x-ray machine.

Explosive detectors are available that can protect the traveling public, and have been available for a while. We brought with us an example of one. This is our portable explosives detector that we manufacture, and this is standard issue for the U.S. Army. All the EOD teams use this particular device.

[Showing explosives detector device.]

Mr. PADERSON. It's called a Model 97, and it was recently tested, last month in fact, in conjunction with the FAA in Northwest Airlines at Boston's Logan Airport, to see how it could be integrated into the present security systems. The results, which we've summarized for you in Section 2 of this handout, show that you can take this type of device, integrate it into the current system, and not cause any delay into the processing of baggage or people. It also had a less than one percent false alarm rate during those tests. It weighs less than 30 pounds, costs a modest $12,000, detects in less than two second-that's right, detects in less than two seconds. And it's simple to use. It's detection capabilities are well known and well tested. Last year, in 1988, it was tested quite extensively at the FBI Academy during a week-long series of tests, and prior to that in 1987 it was tested at Baltimore-Washington International Airport, in a very extensive test using explosives in baggage.

We also have a walk-thru explosives detector which I'll ask Mr. Seward to hold up a picture of.

[Showing picture.]

Mr. PADERSON. This is called our Model 85 and it's extensively used in the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry and the Houses of Parliament in London. The Houses of Parliament situation is very instructive in our discussions earlier, or the discussions that were had earlier concerning deterrents.

And I'd like to ask Mr. Jenkins to take but a minute here to just summarize what the experiences have been in the Houses of Parliament.

Mr. JENKINS. In the late 1970s Mr. Airy-Neeve, a member of the British Parliament, was murdered in the House of Commons by a bomb. This was the culmination of ten years of bombings in which the House had suffered, on average, two bombings a year. Shortly after that particular bombing we introduced explosive detection devices, like Model 85 here, into the House. They have not had one bombing, or one bombing incident since that day.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.

Mr. PADERSON. It again demonstrates that the presence of explosive detectors will not only detect a terrorist, but will prevent the terrorist and deter him.

Mr. Chairman, the Model 85 searches 50,000 people a day in the United States alone, for concealed explosives. And it does so in less than six seconds for each person. We face a policy decision today, whether or not to deploy what's available to counter this new and deadly threat.

Deployment of today's technology doesn't eliminate the need for continued research. We're researching for the FAA, like our other panel members here. But likewise, continued R&D shouldn't delay deployment of what's available to protect the traveling public today.

The ATA has recommended approximately $17 million investment in explosive detectors and vapor detectors for the high risk airports. With equipment like we've just shown you, we can do that job in one-tenth the cost, or we can protect all U.S. carriers at all airports for the same price.

We also recommend increased funding for R&D so that new technologies like we have in our laboratory can be brought quickly to the forefront to counter tomorrow's threats.

In summary, the threat has changed from hijacking to bombings. ITI has the tools to do the job. What is needed is a policy decision to use today's tools. Number two, the funds to make it possible, and number three, increased funding for R&D.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, thank you very much for your attention, and we stand ready to answer any of your questions.

Mr. OBERSTAR. This is a very graphic demonstration, very powerful testimony from all three groups of witnesses, and we really appreciate your presentation. I know it's been a long wait for you. It's been a long wait for us, as well. We wanted to have this testimony and wish we could have done it, perhaps, even earlier in the day. But it is a graphic demonstration and persuasive demonstration of what can be done when the mind of man, the scientific genius is applied to counter the terror that can be devised by other minds of other men for destructive purposes.

It appears to me that each of these technologies performs a different role. I would like to have your response as to how each of these devices could be used in such a way that they aren't overlapping and that they perform different security functions.

Mr. PADERSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, with the portable explosive detector that we've shown you, you can quite easily search carry-on baggage. In fact, at Logan Airport, a couple of weeks ago, we searched 851 carry-on bags that were bound for domestic as well as international flights with less than a one percent false alarm rate, and also without delay in the system.

What you need is a continuous fast-acting detector in order to be able to handle the high flow of carry-on bags that you're going to encounter. And I would call your attention to the fact that that El Al bomb that was confiscated in Heathrow was in carry-on luggage. And it got through the x-ray system that was there and in place. So that that is a real weakness in the system that needs to be

plugged. And we need to do something in the area of carry-on baggage.

Our devices can also be used to search checked baggage as well. And we did that as well at Logan Airport.

Mr. BOZORGMANESH. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. OBERSTAR. Dr. Bozorgmanesh.

Mr. BOZORGMANESH. The TNA device was developed for checking baggage, and all the tests were done for checked in bags. There is a smaller device that we are developing right now, which is really a transfer of the technology from the checked in bags, for carry-on. But all the tests, and the demonstration of the units were for the checked in bags, and we don't recommend it right now for either passengers or for carry-on bags.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Dr. Fine.

Mr. FINE. Each technology, as I mentioned in my statement, has it's weaknesses. I don't want to get into the specific weaknesses in an open session. Even the different vapor devices have their strengths and their weaknesses. It's a very different thing to be able to detect an explosive on a bench or on a block than when it's buried in a suitcase somewhere under a real test, under real conditions, on the fly with people not expecting the next suitcase to be a bomb. It's very different to come out of the lab into the real world and do that sort of double-blind testing with all the different technologies and see how well they really do.

We recognize that each approach, whether it be TNA, vapor, xray, even a hand search is not going to find all the bombs, all the time. Take a hand search, take a suitcase apart. If there's a bomb hidden in a radio, as there was in that Pan Am flight, they wouldn't have seen it.

Mr. PADERSON. The other thing, Mr. Chairman, is that the technology that we've shown you is available today. That's one of the differences. We can do something today and not have to wait a year or two years.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, your point is well taken. I think it was made somewhere in the testimony that I have referred to in the safety issues that we have pursued with the FAA, and that is, all too often we find that the perfect becoming the enemy of the good. We have a good and tested and effective means of providing a desired objective, in this case security, and in other cases, safety, and wait and wait until the perfect device is found. Meanwhile, lives are often lost. I would like to see us move ahead, get these devices tested, see what are the limitations and work on them and deploy them as rapidly as possible.

Each of these technologies, though, it appears to me do not displace x-ray. X-ray has another purpose, detecting heavy metal in luggage or on person.

Mr. PADERSON. Correct.

Mr. FINE. Yes, x-ray, for example if you took vapor detection, someone with a bomb in a suitcase, if it's a sealed bomb in a metal, like a hand grenade, the x-ray's going to find that, the vapor detector won't. The vapor detector can be used on people. You can use neutrons or x-rays on people, if there's a bomb hidden on your person.

And the comment you just made about the state of technology, where we are at, is we can pick up the explosives, including the plastics carried by people, but not under all conditions. If you go under enough layers of clothing, we're not at that point yet. We're close to that, but we're not there yet. It's that kind of progression in the technology that is still to come. We can do it at the rate of two to six passengers a minute, not the 10 that are required.

You can't use again, the applications are very, very different. Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, I think, again, we have to be aware of the limitations but move ahead with the technology. I find that in so many cases you deploy the available technology, the state-of-the-art technology and perfections come as you go through generations of equipment and we will find answers to those questions that you've raised.

The Chair recognizes, at this point, the gentleman from Iowa. Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you gentlemen for your testimony this evening, I guess it is now.

I think the chairman pretty well covered any question that I might have as far as the technology is concerned, and I mentioned earlier on in the hearing that Iowa State University is starting to put together a non-destructive identification facility to do research in the areas that all you gentlemen are involved in.

Only one question, I guess, it's more of a judgment than anything else. But just the mere presence of any or all of the devices that you gentlemen are promoting, and the x-ray machine, how much of a deterrent is that? It's just the fact that somebody walks in and if they see somebody's looking, is that a deterrent in itself? Mr. PADERSON. The overt presence of additional detection, we believe strongly is a very real deterrent.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Yes, Dr. Fine?

Mr. FINE. And we went through a test-in answer to that question, we went through a test at Kennedy Airport last year with the U.S. Customs Service looking for narcotics with a modification of the EGIS, and we were there for 10 days. On the first four days narcotics were found within the airport, one hit at a time. For the remaining six days there wasn't a single person caught with narcotics coming through Kennedy, for a six-day period. And the reason was there was this new piece of gear being switched from terminal to terminal. People didn't know what it was, and presumably the drugs were just diverted to some other location. So I think that is important.

Mr. BOZORGMANESH. I'd like to just make a point. In my judgment it is true that it is deterrent to the amateurs, but to the determined state-sponsored terrorism, it is not. And I think unless the systems truly detect explosives, it will not work.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Thank you.

I come from a small town where the 7-11 closes at six, and I know one of the stores there put in a couple of dummy T.V. cameras, which effectively stopped the shoplifting. They didn't have enough money for the real ones, I guess. But it seems to work. It's the same idea of keeping-it's why police cars are plain black and white, so people know they're there.

Thank you, gentlemen, appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.