Mr. OBERSTAR. Our next panel consists of Mr. H.L. Bradley, Chairman of the Flight Security Committee of the Air Line Pilots Association; Ms. Juliette Lenoir, Vice President, Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO, and Mr. Brian Moreau, Vice President, Independent Union of Flight Attendants.

We are very pleased to have the testimony of these professionals who daily put their lives on the line for safety and security. It's all too often overlooked that the principal role of flight attendants is security, and safety, and attending to the needs and to the good conduct of their passengers in time of emergency. And of course, the Air Line Pilots Association is and will always continue to be in the forefront of both airline safety and security.

I notice that we also have Mr. Matt Finucane, Safety Director for the Association of Flight Attendants, and we appreciate your participation here.

Ms. Lenoir, would you begin your testimony, please?

TESTIMONY OF JULIETTE LENOIR, VICE PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, AFL-CIO, ACCOMPANIED BY MATT FINUCANE; H.L. BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN, FLIGHT SECURITY COMMITTEE, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION; AND BRIAN MOREAU, VICE PRESIDENT, INDEPENDENT UNION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS

Ms. LENOIR. Certainly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Oberstar, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the need for improved aviation safety. The Association of Flight Attendants' 24,000 members at 18 U.S. carriers must deal with security concerns on a daily basis. Many of our members have been on board when hijackings, attempted hijackings and bomb threat situations have been developed. Over the years we have worked closely with the FAA and the industry in developing and implementing a common strategy against attacks on aircraft and passengers. But much more needs to be done.

We have the following recommendations for improved safety: Flight attendants must be informed of threats that may jeopardize the safety and security of their flight. FAA regulations currently specify how a carrier must respond in the event of a security threat made against a specific carrier and flight number. However, these rules do not cover how a carrier must respond to a less specific threat, as in the case of Pan Am 103, and the rules leave it to the discretion of the airline, whether or not to inform the crew. This undermines the purpose of the Ground Security/Inflight Secu-/ rity Coordinator program which is designed to get important information to the crewmembers.

The FAA should develop a uniform protocol under which flight attendants will be alerted of a possible terrorist or hijack attempt. Upon receipt of this information the flight attendants can be particularly vigilant in their assessment of passenger behavior, carryon baggage, bags left on board at through and termination stations, and ramp activity. We were recently pleased to hear that Senator Alfonse D'Amato is introducing legislation that would require transfer of security information to crewmembers, and we hope that

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similar legislation would be considered favorably by this committee.

There must be greater communication and coordination among Government agencies, both U.S. and foreign, concerning security threats and this information must be efficiently and promptly passed on to the airlines. Whether or not problems in the dissemination of threat information contributed to the disaster of Pan Am Flight 103, we must learn from any mistakes that were made and make sure they do not happen again.

Flight attendant security training must be improved. This training often consists of outdated, unrealistic and repetitive videotapes with little emphasis on terrorism. In addition, these courses rarely involve interaction with an instructor. Having a qualified instructor present who can answer questions would add significantly to the effectiveness of the training.

The FAA should require a full complement of flight attendants on board an aircraft during boarding at intermediate stops. The regulations presently allow for a reduction in the number of flight attendants during these periods. This could play into the hands of terrorists, hijackers and disturbed individuals.

The FAA should ensure that security screeners are motivated and adequately trained given their enormous responsibility to the traveling public. Security screeners are missing too many weapons, as recent FAA fines demonstrate.

The FAA should expedite the procurement of Thermal Neutron Analysis detection devices and other sophisticated technologies that detect plastic explosives. We find little comfort in knowing that in two years, only six TNA devices will be in place.

The FAA should promote the on-time implementation of computer card airport access systems which can cancel unauthorized cards. The agency should not fall prey to carriers' requests for extensions based on cost concerns.

We would also urge Congress, through closed-door hearings, if necessary, to reevaluate the current disparity between security here at home and security overseas. Are we really so safe here from terrorists? And what about the estranged spouse who want to blow up a plane to collect insurance? Has the FAA considered a passenger/baggage match program and x-ray analysis of all checked baggage, at least at all category X airports here in the United States?

We often hear aviation security professionals say it's just a matter of time before the United States is confronted with terrorism on its own soil. We were disturbed by the story of a purported Japanese Red Army terrorist who allegedly used a false passport to enter our country and remained for a month acquiring the raw materials necessary to construct bombs. According to news accounts, the alleged terrorist might have succeeded in his grisly task, had nit not been for a police officer who apprehended him for a minor violation and found three high explosive bombs in his automobile. Let us not kid ourselves about what could happen here in the United States. Perhaps if we bit the bullet and instituted stricter security measures now, we would not be forced to implement El Altype security in the U.S. after a domestic flight is tragically blown up.

We appreciate this opportunity to express our concerns to you, and we'll be happy to answer any questions the subcommittee may have.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. Bradley?

Mr. BRADLEY. I'm Captain Luke Bradley, Chairman of the Air Line Pilots Association's Flight Security Committee. Our president, Captain Duffy, would liked to have been here today, and fully intended to, however, he is occupied in other ways.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I think he probably has some other matters of pressing importance to-of perhaps momentary urgency.

Mr. BRADLEY. Yes, sir, at least.

I will summarize our testimony. We have submitted a full written testimony which we would like to have submitted for the record.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The Chair has already asked unanimous consent that all such statements appear in full in the record.

Mr. BRADLEY. Thank you, sir.

ALPA, which represents over 41,000 pilots who fly for 46 airlines, appreciates the invitation to share with you the pilots' perspective on the current state of security.

Today, I would like to address three aviation security subjects, airport access controls and security screening, direct notification to flight crews, and explosive detection technology.

Unfortunately, the aviation industry has demonstrated a propensity for waiting until after an accident occurs before taking action to correct known problems and then, often takes the wrong course of action or overreacts. PSA Flight 1771, and perhaps to a lesser degree, Pan Am Flight 103, were victims of this behavior. In both cases, the industry failed to address shortcomings in the aviation security system because of a mindset which says that it hasn't happened here yet, so we don't worry until it does. ALPA believes that passengers flying on U.S. aircraft deserve better protection than the safeguards which this attitude engenders.

What allowed the heinous crime to be committed on PSA Flight 1771 was a lack of control over employee identification. All evidence from the case points to the probability that this employee, who had been recently fired, still possessed identification which allowed him to bypass the security screening checkpoint. I'll come back to this point shortly.

Immediately after the downing of PSA Flight 1771, then-Secretary of Transportation Burnley issued an emergency directive prohibiting the bypass of screening checkpoints by airline employees, including flight crews. We believed then, and continue to believe, that this measure served no purpose other than to mislead the public into thinking that they were doing something.

In our estimation the screening of flight crews actually diminishes security by expending money, time, and effort on those employees who are the least likely to hijack an aircraft or maliciously harm their passengers. We would do better to commit our limited security resources to more productive measures.

Concerning the problem of improving airport access control, in early January of last year, we recommended to Secretary Burnley that the Department require installation of computerized access

systems at airports. We were pleased to note that shortly after our recommendation the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend Federal Aviation Regulation Part 107 to require certain airports to install these types of systems.

While we believe that the installation of advanced access controls will provide genuine benefits to security, the final rule on this issue, which became effective on February 8, 1989, is deeply flawed. Problems with the rule include the following: There is no requirement for the various computerized systems installed by airports to be compatible with each other or to share common technology; as the final rule is written, airport operators are not required to install card readers at screening checkpoints, thereby negating one of the most obvious benefits of this system. According to the airport organizations' calculations, the cost of the new system has been underestimated by the DOT and FAA by as much as a factor of three or maybe perhaps ten.

Even if the airports, airlines and the Federal Government find some way to overcome the problems of the final rule, we still will not realize the goal of improved access control at all of the effective airports until late 1992, at the very earliest. In the meantime, lax control over identification cards currently issued to airline employees will be perpetuated.

In order to address these deficiencies we recommend that the following actions be taken as expeditiously as possible.

One, require the FAA immediately to write a new standard for the issuance and control of existing identification cards by airports and air carriers.

Two, once the new standard is fully implemented, remove the prohibition on bypass procedures for uniformed, properly identified flight crews and other airline employees.

Three, create a permanent, high-level government/industry task force on aviation security to address the access control rule and provide future recommendations to the Transportation Secretary and FAA Administrator.

The primary use of the threat information disseminated by FAA involves a program which utilizes air carrier employees to assume the role and responsibility of ground security coordinators or GSCs. GSCs are responsible for ascertaining that the threat information received by the airline's corporate or flight operations executives is provided to and used by the flight crews and ground crews working a particular flight. Unfortunately, not all GSCs are receiving the information, or the intelligence, or other information provided by the FAA to the carriers.

A companion measure to the GSCs' efforts is the Inflight Security Coordinator program, the role and duties of which are assumed by the captain. ISCs are responsible for utilizing the threat or security information received by the GSCs. Unfortunately, the ISC program has not been formerly presented to all captains and the FAA has not yet completely developed or released a training program, which it possesses for this purpose.

In order to resolve these problems, we recommend that FAA make all Part 108 air carriers responsible for determining that GSCs are provided whatever threat information is available for each flight; create guidelines for the air lines to follow, which will

ensure that threat information and any pertinent intelligence is being properly channeled to each flight and all who are involved in it; re-examine and adopt the ISC training program, or a variation thereof, which the FAA currently possesses. There must be an overall strategy prompted by good leadership, coordinated and communicated to all people in the system.

I would like to briefly share with you some thoughts on how we can improve our posture through the use of technology. The FAA is coordinating the development of new technology explosive detection devices which remove human subjectivity from the detection equation. We are encouraged by this effort and call on the FAA to continue to bring these new technologies to maturity and, further, to explore other types of technology which may be even more effective. In the interim, the Federal Government should encourage the industry to purchase currently available advance types of x-ray equipment, which while still dependent upon human judgement, are capable of detecting many types of explosive materials and those include the plastics.

The real solution to the terrorism problem is to have our Government, and our citizens, as well as the media and all other governments condemn these acts and immoral attacks on innocent civilians. We must all, then, take steps to pursue the perpetrators and see that the proper punishment is dispensed, as well as condemnthose who would give sanctuary or support to them.

ing I thank you for the opportunity to present our viewpoints on some of the difficult security issues which face our industry and I will be pleased to answer your questions.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Ms. Lenoir and Captain Bradley. We appreciate the careful thought that you have given to these important issues on behalf of your membership, who depend on you to represent their viewpoints in these proceedings. And we value your contribution very highly. You are on the front line of safety and security for the traveling public, and your firsthand experience and concern about these matters carry very great weight with the members of this committee, and with this Chairman.

I think the suggestion for ID cards updating is something that ought to have been done already by the FAA. I'm surprised they haven't acted on it. And we'll pursue that matter further. The bypass matter is something we'll inquire with the FAA about. It may not be something to be instituted immediately, but something that can be acted upon when ID cards have been updated, as you've suggested.

I think an ongoing task force that will continually review security with participation by Government, industry, pilots, flight attendants, is just good common sense. You can't put rules in place and then abandon them for dozens of years, as we seem to have done so often in the past. Measures need to be updated constantly to accommodate the growing threat, or the changing nature of threat to airline security.

I think the common theme that runs throughout the hearing and the testimony of witnesses is two-fold. Threat evaluation, detection of explosive devices that then lead up to the point that both of you have raised, notification, notification of airlines, of airline professionals, and of passengers. And the bottleneck in all of this seems