quirement that the airlines screen all passengers that board their aircraft at these airports. So that if the charter operator comes in and is able to dump his passengers into a sterile area, they become unscreened passengers, and that's a violation of the requirement. Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Right. Mr. LALLY. So that under FAA rules, the charter operator has two choices. One, he can screen his passengers at the point of enplanement, and then therefore have access to the sterile area, or they can screen their passengers upon arrival. And in that case they have to go out and come back in through the screening area. So aside from the threat involved, there is a processing problem, a logistical problem, of making sure all of the passengers that board the scheduled airlines are properly screened. Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Your assessment earlier that every airport is different is certainly true. And it's probably a plus in terms of security, because if someone's going to break the security, they have to learn the system at that particular field. I guess my basic concern is that those of us involved in general aviation certainly do our part in screening of passengers and so on. I've worked off a field where we did have a card that work in the gate, and it was our responsibility to see that the passenger was AOK to go on to the commercial airliner. That puts a little weight on your mind, too. Although, usually in that kind of a situation, working out of a small community, you probably know the people that you're carrying anyway, and they're probably a third or a fourth cousin, in some of the towns that I've live in, or have lived in, but they all tend to be related. But I guess that as we put this together and look at ways to reinforce the security at major airports where we still do have general aviation traffic, and particularly airports that originate international flights, like DFW, and Kansas City, and O'Hare, and so on, that it comes down to that thing that was discussed earlier, where's the trade-off between inconvenience and safety. And of course, safety has to be, I think, the number one issue. But we need to be prudent, I think, in our judgments in those areas. And of course, any suggestions you gentlemen have would be certainly welcome by this committee because that's what we're here for. We appreciate you coming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. And we really appreciate the gentleman's interest. And he's one that is very familiar with aviation, and we welcome his participation in the committee's deliberations. I have just a couple of concluding questions. One is the issue of interlining, which was raised earlier and with other witnesses. That is a matter that provides some serious security problems for airports, passengers moving from one line from one airport that is unsecured to a secured airport, and whether adequate precautions are taken to assure that passengers are screened. Do you feel that there is sufficient security provided to accommodate, or to account for, the interlining issue? Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, as far as the passengers are concerned, I think most airport operators are in concert. We ensure that the aircraft bringing a passenger in, if there's any question in our mind as to the quality of his screening, then we force that aircraft to a spot other than into a cleared area. He must go to the general aviation area and have his passengers transported around the airfield and put in on the non-sterile side, thereby having to be screened before they go aboard a commercial aircraft. There are others areas which have a small field, with only one or two flights a day, but they do have adequate screening devices and they are screening all passengers, and those people, then, would be permitted to come into a commuter area wherein the individual would be offloaded into a sterile area and be permitted to go aboard another air carrier. Mr. OBERSTAR. Now those are, I think, very prudent and responsible steps taken at domestic airports. It's a bigger problem with foreign airports, is it not? The security provided, as you've outlined, is not always in place in foreign airports with the interlining issue. Mr. LALLY. That's correct, Mr. Chairman. I think the airlines have a lot of confidence in the domestic system, in terms of interlining within the United States. Overseas the interlining aspect of the system has received attention by a number of authorities, including ICAO, and there is concern about security in transit lounges at airports overseas. And FAA pays a lot of attention to that, and gives airlines advice as to that problem, and how to react to it. And there have been times when the, my recollection is that certain airlines were identified, or certain routes were identified as perhaps lacking in the adequate security, and preventative measures were established at certain locations. I think maybe we could discuss more of that in perhaps the executive session. Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. We will pursue that— Mr. OBERSTAR. The gentleman from New York, yes. Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Jackson was very specific in saying that the airports are doing a good job with passengers. And I've found that to be the case. I fly into a very small airport in my home community, and I've noticed that they're quite diligent in checking me out as-maybe they should be with me-coming in and out. [Laughter.] But I'm wondering about baggage. Am I correct, and I hope I'm not, that most baggage checked in most airports in America is not checked, is not checked for security purposes? Mr. JACKSON. Well, a person arriving with baggage on a general aviation airplane, would be required to take his bag from the general aviation side around and check it in Mr. BOEHLERT. Commercial aviation, Mr. Jackson. Typical, this morning I checked in my airport, and got my tickets for my checked baggage, and that was taken out to the airplane. I don't think anyone checks that at all. They check me thoroughly when I go through with my hand carry stuff. But what about the majority of baggage that's brought to the majority of airports, is that checked at all? And if not, shouldn't it be? Mr. LALLY. Since 1972, FAA has required airlines to have FAA approved security programs. And in those programs there are security measures that relate to checked baggage. And those measures were enhanced a few years ago following an explosion at La Guardia Airport in 1975. And so, at the present time there are security procedures relating to checked baggage, and they may extend to actual inspection of that baggage by x-ray or by physical inspection if the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the airline's acceptance of the bags, so indicates. Mr. BOEHLERT. They may. That's permissive. But as a practical matter, and everybody's there at the last minute-I think employees of airlines have the highest stressed jobs in the world. Everybody's there and you've got to catch that plane, here's my luggage, they give you the ticket, they throw it on a cart, and it goes out to the plane, and I would venture an opinion that the overwhelming majority of that baggage is not checked by anyone. Mr. LALLY. Well, I guess what-it is not-the overwhelming majority of it is not physically inspected. But there are screening procedures that relate to all bags. And those screening procedures can result in the physical inspection or x-ray inspection of the bags. But you're right, as a system-wide requirement, there is generally actual inspection, physical inspection of individual bags is not done. Mr. BOEHLERT. Do you think it's necessary, or do you think the risk factor is not such that it justifies a more extensive inspection program? Mr. LALLY. No, I'm confident with the measures that are in place today, domestically. I don't think that's the same overseas. I think we need this equipment to inspect. Mr. BOEHLERT. Sure, I understand what you're saying. Mr. LALLY. But the threat, domestically, is not the same and the screening criteria that I mentioned went into effect in 1976, has never detected a bomb. That's because there haven't been any bombs. What it has detected is evidence of illegal activity. Contraband was detected. Guns were detected. Currency was detected. Drugs were detected. So it gives us some confidence in the adequacy of the criteria that are in place as being sufficient to identify criminal transactions. And I don't think the threat of sabotage is severe in this country, and I hope it stays that way, of course. Mr. BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. Mr. OBERSTAR. I want to thank the members of the panel for your very thorough responses to questions, and for your genuine concern about security, and for the actions that you and your member participants, airports and airlines alike, have given to the issue of security. These are matters of vital interest to all Americans, and matters that we shall continue to pursue. And we will delve further in the Executive Session. Mr. LALLY. Thank you, sir. Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Chairman, could I have one final parting shot, here. Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Following up on Mr. Boehlert's suggestion about helping us with the Aviation Trust Fund, the idea just occurred to me that if you fellows could use your many resources to convince the American people that if the trust fund stays tied up as it is, we're all going to get a 51 percent raise, I think we'd get it out in a hurry. [Laughter.] |