welfare of its people, and be proud of their prosperity. If this Conference should result in laying the foundation of improved administration, social order, and greater security for life and property with in Ottoman territory, it will have averted ruin from these who, for generations, have done their best to deserve it. The whole question appears to be reduced to one of detail respecting the nature and efficacy of the proposed guarantees. Considering all that has passed, that both Sultan and subjects have tried the fortunes of war, and learnt by experience how little influence the fortunes of a localised strife have to alter their relative positions, how utterly useless has been the bloodshed and misery already occasioned, how disproportioned are the risk and effort to any probable gain by Russia from a general war, one cannot accept the idea of this Conference proving useless forthe purposes of pacification. There may have been threats by the Czar, and military preparations in the vicinity of the disturbed districts; but on the other hand, Russia has accepted, as bases of deliberation, not merely the principle of the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire, which even English newspapers of a particular character deride as impossible, but also puts her hand to a declaration that she does not intend to seek for any territorial advantages, any exclusive influence, or any concession with regard to the commerce of her subjects which those of every other nation may not equally obtain. She also accepts as terms which may form the basis of negotiation, the very stipulations which Servia practically rejected at the close of September, when she thought that England had finally abandoned her traditional policy. The sovereignty of the Porte will be respected, at least to the extent that the proposed reforms will be granted by the Sultan to the three provinces. Their general character seems to be agreed upon-nainely, that they are to consist of local institutions, under which the exercise of a certain extent of self-government will be guaranteed to the population. It has been conceded, in deference to Austria, that no autonomous tributary State, like Servia or Roumania, is to be carved out of northern Turkey. As far as Servia and Montenegro are concerned, that experiment has not answered; it apparently has not pacified the populations, and it certainly has not secured the peace of Europe. The question, therefore, is by general consent reduced to one of effectively guaranteeing to the provinces the exercise of self-government under the central administration of the Porte. Turkey confers upon this question, pledged, as we understand, to submit it entirely to the judgment and equitable consideration of the mediating Powers. He cannot be allowed to retreat from that position; and so long as Russia shows any disposition towards an equitable consideration, within the meaning of the very terms under which she enters the Conference, there ought not to be any insuperable impediment in the way of peace. Under these circumstances, Englishmen, of whatever party, will expect that the influence of their country will be thrown into the scale in favour of the extremest concessions which Turkey can be brought to adopt. The present is undoubtedly a favourable moment for adopting them; and if efficacious guarantees are a possibility, it is for the permanent interest of Europe and of England that they should be provided. The Conference will be altogether mismanaged and useless if it does not throw light upon the question as to who is the real enemy to the reformed administration of the provinces. Between impracticable views as to the sacredness of Ottoman sovereignty and its immunity from direct limitation on the one hand, and Russian views of military occupation on the other, there is a wide field for contending negotiators to traverse before they discover ground which all may agree to occupy. But at any rate it ought to be clearly ascertained in which direction each Government is designedly travelling. Up to the present time there are at least many reasons for concluding that Russia has not been bona fide seeking a pacific solution of these difficulties. The Porte may have seemed impracticable; but its general disposition to yield to the will of Europe, and particularly of Great Britain, has been clearly marked; while its recalcitrant movements have generally been explicable by reference to the foregone determination of its opponents to reject proposed arrangements, and the natural desire of a sovereign to avoid unnecessary humiliation in dealing with refractory subjects, encouraged and supported by foreign aid. At the last moment, however, after Lord Salisbury has started, there comes a despatch from Prince Gortschakoff, and another from Lord A. Loftus, which, if the representations made therein may be literally construed, would seem to assure the conclusion of peace. At all events it is a satisfactory sign, not merely that the Emperor Alexander, whose past history and pacific disposition deserve well of this country, is willing to make such assurances, but that he is anxious to publish them to the world. We shall see to what extent they may be relied upon when the Conference begins its work. As a leading member. of the Ottoman Cabinet is said to have phrased it, Turkey will give guarantees for the execution of these reforms: do not place us in a position of requiring guarantees in our turn against those who will watch over and supervise that execution. Prince Gortschakoff says that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg can be satisfied no longer with promises; nor, we may add, can the English people. The wastepaper currency of reform promises will no longer be tolerated; but the question of providing guarantees will throw light upon the sincerity of Russia's demand upon the concert of the six Powers for a pacific solution. Let Russia show clearly when she gets into Conference that these guarantees are not to be made the pretext for encroachment, and Europe will gladly accept the Czar's assurances to Lord A. Loftus that he desires no conquest and aims at no aggrandisement. Until then it must be remembered that the imperial protestations as to the illusions and phantoms concerning Peter the Great's will and Catherine's aims, the misfortune to Russia of acquiring Constantinople, the inveterate suspicion of Russian policy, and the continual fear of Russian aggression and conquest, were combined with a very decided bint that necessity might oblige him to occupy Bulgaria. Lord Derby received with the greatest satisfaction the Emperor's assurance that he desired co-operation with England, and had no views on Constantinople, or of conquest. But while acceding to the imperial desire that such assurances should be made public, he added with a touch of appropriate sarcasm, "I thought its publication might be opportune, since the last few days had brought us the intelligence of the mobilisation of a considerable Russian force, and of the emission of the new Russian loan for 100 million of roubles." Under these circumstances, the duties of Lord Salisbury at the approaching Conference weight him with the heaviest responsibility, and he ought to be supported by the people of England. What we all of us want is either the establishment of a durable pacification, or the settlement of a broad and intelligible issue, the merits of which all may appreciate. We hope it will be clearly understood who is responsible for repressing a peaceful solution, what are the grounds on which war is appealed to, and the reasons for the particular attitude which may be assumed by Great Britain. If Turkey puts herself hopelessly in the wrong, and refuses adequate concessions, she must look to herself and her own capacity for guarding her empire and her territory. If, on the other hand, the treaty of Paris is to be set at nought, and a war of encroachment is begun, we must come to a clear understanding with the guaranteeing Powers as to the course to be taken. England will not, we are convinced, shrink from her treaty obligations and her duties as the champion of Ottoman independence. But at the same time, her interests, As Mr. Disraeli observed in 1875, are not so direct as those of other Powers. They are substantial interests which she cannot afford to neglect. If the issue of the negotiations at Constantinople is that war is the immediate result, it is in vain to speculate beforehand as to the duties of England, or the line which she will be bound to take. That depends, in the first place, upon the casus belli which is chosen, and the attitude of the rest of Europe with regard to it. If, unfortunately, that scramble for territory begins which all have deprecated, and a regard for public law and treaties is openly set at nought by Europe, it will be in vain to persuade Englishmen that Constantinople, the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, and the means of access to the Black Sea, are to be allowed to fall beneath the sway of a hostile and unprincipled Power. It is sometimes argued in Opposition newspapers by the political successors of the men who risked the fortunes of this country before the walls of Sebastopol, that we may abandon Constantinople to its fate. The authors of the Crimean expedition were men who believed that the English empire was scarcely safe unless that distant fortress was destroyed; for unless Russian encroachment were stayed, the Mediterranean would be converted into a Russian lake. Their successors now tell us, in their desperate straits for a weapon wherewith to assault the foreign policy of the Government, that even Constantinople itself is not worth a blow; and that we, who in the interval have abandoned Corfu and other harbours of importance, can safely permit the capital of the East to pass into the hands of an enemy. The fatal result, as it appears to us, would be, that a commanding position would be attained by Russia from which she could securely plan, and at her own time and option execute, an assault upon our Eastern communications, whether by the invasion of Egypt or a harassing naval warfare in the Mediterranean. We should have to secure the defence of Egypt: we should have to double the expenditure on our navy; and even then we should have to deal with an enemy who would have a secure base of operations, and an excellent harbour of refuge. It has been the unbroken policy of England ever since she obtained her Indian em 1 pire to secure her safety in the cast ly and neutral Power. It is of vital Imperial Ottoman Bank, the, 310. Invasion, various projects of, 280-panics INVESTMENTS, SPECULATIVE, 293. Ireland, threatening state of, in 1848, Italy, increase of speculation in, 314. Kalgan, sketches of, 691. Kansu, the mountains of, 698. KATHIAWAR, A RUN THROUGH, JUNAGHAR, 191-THE SCYTHIAN KATHIS, 399-THE Kathiawar, difficulties of access to, and Kathis of Kathiawar, the, 401 et seq.- Leipzig, the scene of the battle of, 53 et Lindau, Rudolph, the Philosopher's Pen- Lion of Kathiawar, the, 201. Log, the patent, 169. Lope de Vega, the works of, 29. Lowe, Mr., his speech on the Eastern Lützen, site of the battle of, 56. MACAULAY, LORD, HIS ATTACKS ON SWIFT, MACCARTHY'S DRAMAS OF CALDERON, M'Donald, Captain, of the Strathmore, 317. Magic and Magicians, modern, 35. Ministry, the, their policy on the Eastern MOBILISATION OF THE ARMY, the, and MOLIERE, 172-peculiarities of his humour, Mongols, character of the, 693, 703. 249. MORGAN'S TRANSLATION OF PREJEVAL- and carly life, 363-his personal appear- |