form each company is distinct from the other. But it is also true that all competition is at an end between these two systems, because it is also true that these roads are under one control. The situation in holding plan is in all substantial points the same as in the trust scheme. Therefore the final holding may with some confidence be predicted from the decision in the court below, where Mr. Justice Thayer said in substance: "The scheme which was thus devised and consummated led inevitably to the following results: First, it placed the control of the two roads in the hands of a single person, to wit, the Securities Company, by virtue of its ownership of a large majority of the stock of both companies; second, it destroyed every motive for competition between the two roads engaged in interstate traffic which were natural competitors for business, by pooing the earnings of the two roads for the common benefit of the stockholders of both companies. It is our duty to ascertain whether the proof discloses a combination in direct restraint of interstate commerce, that is to say, a combination whereby the power has been acquired to suppress competition between two or more competing and parallel lines of railroad engaged in interstate commerce. If it does disclose such a combination, and we have little hesitation in answering this question in the affirmative, then the anti-trust act as it has been heretofore interpreted by the court of last resort has been violated, and the government is entitled to a decree." It may well be maintained that the present form of organization of the great industrial companies is beyond all the law that has been brought forward, for the single corporation, the present form, is not a combination in the eye of the law. The case upon which the legality of a large proportion of the great corporations depend is Trenton Potteries v. Oliphant (58 N. J. Eq. 507). The general process there had been the usual one; a single corporation had been formed which had bought outright the properties of the former companies. Mr. Chief Justice Magie held everything that was done valid: "Appellant is a corporation and not an individual. Corporations, however, may lawfully do any acts within the corporate powers conferred on them by legislative grant. Under our liberal corporation laws, corporate authority may be acquired by aggregations of individuals, organized as prescribed to engage in and carry on almost every conceivable manufacture or trade. Such corporations are empowered to purchase, hold and use property appropriate to their business. Under such powers it is obvious that a corporation may purchase the plant and business of competing individuals and concerns. The Legislature might have withheld such powers or imposed limitations upon their use. In the absence of prohibition or limitaton on their powers in this respect, it is impossible for the courts to pronounce acts done under legislative grant to be inimical to public policy. The grant of the Legislature authorizing and permitting such acts must fix for the courts the character and limit of public policy in that regard. It follows that a corporation empowered to carry on a particular business may lawfully purchase the plant and business of competitors, although such purchases may diminish or, for a time at least, destroy competition. Contracts for such purchases cannot be refused enforcement." 1 'The following cases, among others, discuss the combination of corporations: (1) The pool, Hopkins v. U. S., 171 U. S. 578; Addystone Pipe Co. v. U. S. 175 U. S. 211; Boyd v. American Carbon Co. 182 Pa. St. 206; Sabine Tram Co. v. Bancroft, 16 Tex. Cev. App. 170; (2) trust, Distilling Co. v. People, 156 Ill. 486; Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 75 Miss. 24; State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Oh. St. 137; State v. Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700; (3) holding corporation, Pearsall v. No. Pacific Co., 161 U. S. 646; Market St. Ry. v. Wellman, 109 Cal. 571; People v. Chicago Gas Trust, 130 Ill. 268; Grenville Press v. Planters Press, 70 Miss. 669; Marble Co. v. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115; (4) new incorporation, U. S. v. E. C. Knight, 156 U. S. 1; Harding v. Glucose, 182 Ill. 55; Central Shade Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353; Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Garst, 18 R. F. 484. The state of things at the present writing, then, seems to be this: That the pool, the first of these forms, is certainly bad; that the single corporation, the fourth form, is almost as certainly good; while the trust, the second form, is probably bad, which involves the holding corporation, the third form. From step to step in this succession there is a movement toward integration. Now that the end of that evolution has been reached in the single corporation, the law against combinations in restraint of trade may at last cease to operate. It has done a good work in forcing those who wish to bring together various corporations into greater enterprises to organize in an open manner under the general corporation laws. Then at last the State may impose such special regulation upon these industrial trusts as the situation requires. VI. This industrial reorganization during the last decade may be set down as marking the most important epoch in the economic history of the United States. When the recent movement is so described, it is recognized that it has come about from the combination of various smaller units into larger units. Such consolidation in the face of an adverse policy which made against all restriction of competition has been at times an almost desperate forward movement. That there is so much accomplished fact in consolidation to show despite this law against combination in restraint of trade is proof positive that there have been two opinions upon the social advantage of such concentration all the time, which has been the cause of this weakness. Upon the whole, however, the law against. the combination stands unaltered, but it is overreached by the law in favor of the corporation. I EXAMINATIONS FOR THE BAR.' T is to be regretted that Professor Willis ton, to whom the committee originally assigned the task of preparing a paper on this important subject, is prevented from keeping his appointment. He would doubtless have laid before you a comprehensive review of the progress of the movement to raise the standard for admission to the bar, and of its present state in various parts of the union, supplemented by reflections and suggestions which would have been of value to those interested in the subject, either as judges, legislators or bar examiners. I have not engaged with the committee to supply 'An address before the American Bar Association at Hot Springs, Virginia, August 27, 1903. I am the place of such a paper, but only to pre- have sufficient general learning and must have studied law regularly and attentively for three years. The court has established a standing committee to conduct the examinations and has framed rules. We have encountered some difficulties in enforcing the excellent rules adopted by the court. Perhaps our experience may be of value to gentlemen from other States and their experience is likely to be useful to us. The real purpose of examinations for the bar is to secure proper preparation on the part of those who propose to practise law, and they are useful to the extent that they accomplish that end. They operate by a process of exclusion. It is not necessary to hold examinations for the purpose of admitting members to the bar. They are held for the purpose of excluding applicants, and the question always is, who shall be refused permission to commence the practice of law. I propose to deal with the subject from that point of view and to invite your attention to the classes of persons who in the public interest and for the greatest good of the greatest number, including themselves, ought not to be permitted to hold themselves out to the public as attorneys and counsellors at law. A general education is the first and most obvious requirement. The law is a science which cannot be studied by those who have not laid the foundation by a course of mental discipline and practice in study, and who have not acquired a certain fund of knowledge of common things. What is known in the United States as a high school course is generally recognized as the least amount of preliminary training and practice in study that will enable a young man to take up successfully a subject so intricate and complicated and calling for such powers of analysis and generalization as the law. This means that the law student shall attend school until he is eighteen or nineteen years of age, studying the English language, its grammar and literature, with exercises in composition, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, geography, the outlines of ancient and modern history, with special reference to English and American history, physics, and a course of two years in a classical or foreign language. These are the minimum requirements for admission to law schools of recognized standing and are the specific requirements for admission to the bar imposed by statute or rule of court in many States, including Ohio, New York, New Hampshire, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois. Iowa, Minnesota, Rhode Island and Vermont. In 1898 Mr. Goodell and Judge Danaher, members of the New York State board of law examiners and Mr. J. S. H. Frink of the New Hampshire board, gave to this association their opinion of the great value of a standard of general education as a condition of commencing the study of the law. Judge Danaher said that according to his observation, the requirements in New York had been productive of wonderful results in elevating the tone and general standard of the profession, and that from his experience he would rather abolish examinations in law than dispense with a high preliminary condition of general education. In New Jersey the value attached to general education is indicated by a provision which requires a candidate for admission to the bar to have studied law four years if he has not been admitted to the degree of bachelor of arts or bachelor of science. Three years' study is required from candidates holding those degrees. In Rhode Island a candidate who has received a classical education is required to study law only two years while other candidates are required to give three years to the study of law. On the continent of Europe the only avenue to the bar is through the universities. In England candidates for admission as attorneys or solicitors, as well as candidates for the bar, who are not university men, must submit to a preliminary examination about. equivalent to that required for graduation from an American high school, before entering upon the study of the law. The requirement is an entirely reasonable one. It means after all only that a young man who proposes to apply himself at the age of 21 or 22 to an intellectual vocation should devote himself up to that time in reasonable and necessary preparation. The requirement for general education as a condition of successful professional study, was happily stated by Blackstone a century and a half ago. "If the student in our laws hath formed both his sentiments and style by perusal and imitation of the purest classical writers, among whom the historians and orators will best deserve his regard; if he can reason with precision, and separate argument from fallacy, by the clear simple rules of pure unsophisticated logic; if he can fix his attention, and steadily pursue truth through the most intricate deduction, by the use of mathematical demonstrations; if he has enlarged his conceptions of nature and art, by a view of the several branches of genuine experimental philosophy; if he has impressed on his mind the sound maxims of the law of nature, the best and most authentic foundation of human laws; if, lastly he has contemplated those maxims reduced to a practical system in the laws of imperial Rome; if he has done this, or any part of it, a student thus qualified may enter upon the study of the law with incredible advantage and reputation." The resistance to even moderate requirements is illustrated by an act passed by the legislature of Ohio at its session next after the adoption by the Supreme Court of a rule requiring candidates for admission to the bar to produce a certificate of graduation from a high school, or of admission to a college of approved standing, or of an examination upon the subjects required for graduation from a high school. The act 91 provided that no rule of the Supreme Court requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to have received a diploma of graduation or a certificate granted by a board of school examiners, as a condition for admission to the bar, should affect or apply to any person who had studied law during a period of three years prior to the passage of the act. The statute might have been entitled appropriately an act to protect vested interests in illiteracy. The remarkable feature of it was that our law had provided from the earliest times that applicants for admission to the bar should have a general education. The rule of the Supreme Court did not, therefore, impose a new condition. It sought only to enforce an old condition by requiring specific and definite proof of compliance therewith. But anything specific and definite and certain is what those who propose to break into the profession by the back door most abhor. Glittering generalities is their delight. They are ready to produce general certificates, but they resent attempts to compel them to tell when and how and where they acquired their attainments or exactly what they are, or to submit their pretensions to test. Since the chief purpose of insisting upon preliminary general education is to insure a certain degree of mental maturity and of capacity on the part of the student to take up respect ought to be ascertained and passed the study of law, his qualifications in that upon before he is permitted to register as a student of law. In law schools of recognized standing, it is made a condition of admission. In New York he is given a year after registering as a student of law, to comply with the rule on the subject of general edu cation. The next most obvious and essential requirement for admission to the bar, is that the student shall study law for a certain period, which ought not to be less than three years. The law cannot be mastered except by prolonged and attentive study. Nothing can take the place of time, and experience has shown that three years are none too many to enable a person of average capacity to acquire a fair knowledge and understanding of the fundamental principles of the law. This is obvious when we remember that the subjects to be mastered include the law of real and personal property, torts, contracts, partnership, bailments, negotiable instruments, agency, suretyship, domestic relations, wills, corporations, equity, criminal law, constitutional law, pleading and evidence. A three years' course of study is required. in the following States: Delaware, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wyoming, Colorado and New York, and in Pennsylvania for admission to the bar of the Supreme Court. In New Jersey four years are required of those who have not received the degree of bachelor of arts or bachelor of science. In the following States two years' study of law is required: Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Two years was the former requirement in Ohio, which was raised to three years in 1894. The experience of bar examiners seems to be that the percentage of failures among those who have studied in law schools is about one half as compared with those who have studied without tuition or with the meagre tuition provided by a law office. The immense advantage of study in a law school, with its prescribed courses, regular exercises, periodical examinations, and the competitive association of men in classes, with their moot courts and debating clubs, is obvious. It cannot be denied that the schools furnish opportunities for study and develop ment of which the private student is deprived, and present advantages which in point of time alone are likely to make two years of study at a law school worth three years of private study. I do not find that the regulations for admission to the bar in any State require that any portion of the tuition shall be in a law school, but the time may come when candidates for the bar will be required by rule or statute to avail themselves of the superior opportunities for study provided by the law schools, for a portion at least, of the prescribed period of study. The familiar scheme which I have thus outlined proposing that the candidate for admission to the bar shall prepare himself by a course of preliminary study, and then shall apply himself for three years to the study of law, is simple enough and entirely reasonable and ought to insure a fair general standard. But to be effective it must be enforced. Rules prescribing standards of preliminary education and definite periods for the study of the law are of no avail unless they are rigidly enforced by insisting upon clear and explicit proof of the facts. Here the bar examiner is confronted with the difficulties presented by false certificates, false sometimes in detail and fact, but more often in general intent. With respect to certificates of general education, our experience in Ohio has shown that nothing can be depended upon as a substitute for a diploma of graduation except the test of an examination by examiners appointed by the Supreme Court, who act under a sense of direct responsibility to the court. Our rules originally provided for the acceptance of certificates of examination by local examiners, but the court found itself so frequently imposed on by such certificates that it adopted a rule providing for examinations to test the general educational qualifications of the candidate by a committee appointed by the court, where he was not able to produce a certificate of graduation from a high school, or of matriculation in a col |