NEW JERSEY COURT OF CHANCERY. The case of Martin v. McFall, 55 Atlantic Reporter 465, presents a noteworthy contrast to the case of Boyer v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 124 Federal Reporter 246, elsewhere reviewed. In the Federal case blacklisting was held legalin the present case boycotting is held illegal. Since in each instance the essence of the wrong is the interference by one party with the attempt of the other to contract with third persons, it would seem difficult to reconcile the decisions. In the present case the vice-chancellor defines what labor unions may and may not do: Labor unions may lawfully combine and form unions; they may strike; but they may not prevent others from working, or render it either difficult or uncomfortable for them to work; and they may not employ the boycott.

The rather curious remark is added that if the defendants did not intend to do the things forbidden by the restraining order then the order would do them no harm.

CARRIERS. (UNJUST DISCRIMINATION-PASS-INJURY TO PASSENGER-RIGHT OF RECOVERY.)

NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT.

In McNeill v. Durham & C. R. Co., 44 Southeastern Reporter 34, the carrying of a newspaper editor on a pass, given in consideration of advertising, is held to amount to unjust discrimination within the inhibition of Laws 1891, p. 277, c. 320, Sections 4 and 25, punishing unjust discrimination in passenger rates by a fine not exceeding $5,000. This is because the value of the advertising is not shown to be exactly equal

to the value of the pass, and because it amounted to a sale to the editor of his transportation on credit and not for cash. In discussing the public policy which was voiced in the act, the court refers to the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in State v. Railway Co., 122 N. C. 1052, 30 Southeastern Reporter 133, 41 L. R. A. 246, in which it was stated that the number of free passes issued in North Carolina in one year was over 100,000 and after deducting those permitted by the statute, over a quarter of a million of transportation was given away annually, mostly to the classes best able to pay, and which was preforce added to the fares of those who paid their way. Having determined that the editor's contract for transportation was illegal, the court then holds that he could not recover for injuries arising from the company's negligence, during his passage. This is on the theory that he and the company are in pari delicto. The case is distinguished from those holding ineffectual, stipulations on the backs of free passes, exempting the carrier from liability for injuries sustained by the holder thereof. In those instances the contract for transportation was legal, while in this case it was not so.

CARRIERS. (PASSENGER'S REFUSAL TO PAY EXTRA FARE-FORCIBLE EVICTION-ACTION FOR AsSAULT.)

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS. In Monnier v. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co., 67 Northeastern Reporter 569, the plaintiff recovered damages for an assault and battery by one of the defendant's conductors when the plaintiff was in one of the defendant's cars as a passenger. Plaintiff had gone to the defendant's station but found the ticket office, which had been open for an hour before the departure of the train, closed for five to ten minutes before the train pulled out and he was compelled to go aboard without a ticket. The price of the ticket plaintiff intended to purchase was fifteen cents but under the rules of the company he could be compelled to pay nineteen cents

on board the train. This he refused to do and was forcibly ejected. The case presented the question whether the plaintiff had any right to resist the conductor when he was ordered to leave the train. It was conceded that the company's rule requiring the extra fare was a valid and reasonable regulation and it is sanctioned by statute. The court was very much divided in its opinion. Three judges held that plaintiff was not justified in resisting the conductor by force but should have peaceably left the car and relied on his legal remedy, especially in view of the small amount involved. Numerous authori

ties are cited in support of this view. The court says, "He virtually invited all the force necessary to remove him, and since no more was applied than was necessary to effect the object he cannot recover either against the conductor or the defendant in an action for assault and battery." Three dissenting judges held that plaintiff had a right to resist the eviction by force; that no question of good taste was involved; and that the legal rights of the parties, turning on the question of fact as to plaintiff's ability to buy a ticket, had been settled by the verdict of the jury. Judge Cullen who cast the deciding vote takes the middle ground that the plaintiff was justified in forcibly resisting any attempt to remove him in case such an attempt amounted to an invasion of his legal rights; but also takes the view that the conductor was not obliged to rely on the passenger's word, but was justified in enforcing the rule of the company, the extra fare exacted not being beyond the limit fixed by the company's rule.

CARRIERS. (INJURY TO EXPRESS MESSENGERCONTRACT RELEASING RAILROAD COMPANY FROM

LIABILITY-VALIDITY.)

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT.

In Peterson v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 96 Northwestern Reporter 532, the plaintiff, an express messenger, sued for personal injuries received in the course of his employment, by the alleged negligence of the defendant railroad company. The defendant relied on a contract between itself

and plaintiff's employer, the American Express Company, whereby the latter covenanted to indemnify defendant from all such liabilities, and on a further contract between plaintiff and his employer whereby he assumed all risks of accident, and agreed in turn to indemnify the American Express Company from any damages it was compelled to pay in consequence of any claim for injuries. The court held that the contracts were not invalid as contravening public policy. The case is said to be a new one in Wisconsin, but the court relied on a decison by the United States Supreme Court, in Baltimore Ry. Co. v. Voight, 176 U. S. 498, 20 Supreme Court Reporter 385, 44 L. Ed. 560, in which it was held that an express messenger under similar facts, was not a

ING BREACH OF CONTRACT.)

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT. In the suit of the American Law Book Co. v. The Edward Thompson Co., 84 New York Supplement 225, plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from agreeing with subscribers to plaintiff's publication, to indemnify them against claims for damages for breaches of their contracts in declining to receive plaintiff's books and purchasing those of defendant. The theory of the defence was that plaintiff had no remedy in equity,-actions at law for breaches of contract, affording adequate relief. It was said in argument that cases where injunction had been granted to prevent solicitation of a breach of contract have involved only contracts for personal services, and that there was no precedent for the injunction sought in the present instance. The court says, however, that if there be no exact precedent to this injunction, none is needed. The defendant is engaged in an attempt to obtain business which the plaintiff has secured, having no regard to fairness of competition but by a resort to trick and device, and that the inadequacy of an action for damages is obvious. The complainant got its injunction.

CONVICTS. (BERTILLON MEASUREMENTS-PHOTO

GRAPHS-MANDAMUS TO COMPEL SURRENDER—
REVERSAL OF SENTENCE.)

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT.

In re Molineux, 83 New York Supplement 943. As an aftermath of the Molineux case the defendant brought mandamus to compel the surrender to him, after his final acquittal, of the photographs and Bertillon measurements which had been made of him while in prison under final sentence after his first trial, and before its reversal by the Court of Appeals. He was denied relief. Laws 1889, c. 382, p. 511, $40, authorized the Superintendent of State prisons to make rules and regulations for a record of photographs and other means of identifying each convict received, and Laws 1896, c. 440, p. 401, §1, requires the superintendent of State prisons to cause prisoners to be subjected to Bertillon measurements. The court says that the relator must have a clear legal right to what he asks for, and it does not appear in this case that he has one. The Superintendent of State prisons is under no obligation to surrender the photographs and measurements, which are no more damaging to the relator than the court records and other traces of his struggle for liberty. The case while peculiar, is not new, the same view having been taken in People ex rel Joyce v. York, 27 Misc. Rep. 658, 59 N. Y. Supp. 418, and Owen v. Partridge, 40 Misc. Rep. 415, 82 N. Y. Supp. 248.

CORPORATIONS. (CHRISTIAN SCIENCE CHURCHAPPLICATION FOR CHARTER.)

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT.

In re First Church of Christ, Scientist, 55 Atlantic Reporter 536, chronicles the unsuccessful attempt of a Christian Science church to secure a charter of incorporation in Pennsylvania. The court, in affirming the refusal of the charter by. the court below, holds that the evidence in the case does not support a finding that the corporation was one for private profit, though individual healers receive compensation, as this seems to be a personal recom

pense with which the society has nothing to do. But the charter is refused on the ground that the purposes of the proposed corporation include matters injurious to the community. The teaching that disease can be remedied by prayer alone is contrary to the policy of the law, which is to assume control and require the use of the most effective known means to overcome and stamp out those ills which otherwise would become epidemic. In such cases an attempt at treatment by those not possessing the lawful qualifications is violative of public policy. The court says: "Neither the law nor reason has any objection to the offer of prayer for the recovery of the sick." The objection seems to be to relying on it too exclusively.

EVIDENCE. (SEIZURE OF PAPERS-ILLEGALITY— EFFECT ON COMPETENCY.)

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS.

In People v. Adams, 68 Northeastern Reporter 636, which was a prosecution for running a policy game, Adams being locally known as the "Policy King," private papers of the defendant which had been taken On a search warrant, were offered in evidence. The court in reviewing the admission of these papers in evidence said that no notice need be taken as to how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, the evidence being otherwise proper and material. If there was any illegal invasion of the defendant's rights, his remedy was by an independent proceeding. The following authorities are cited: Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519, 32 Northeastern Reporter 910; Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc. 329, 337; Commonwealth v. Lottery Tickets, 5 Cush. 369, 374; Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors, 4 Allen, 593, 600; Commonwealth v. Welsh, 110 Mass. 359; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261; Commonwealth v. Keenan, 148 Mass. 470, 20 Northeastern Reporter 101; Commonwealth v. Ryan, 157 Mass. 403, 32 Northeastern Reporter 349; I Greenleaf's Evidence, §254a, §229; 1 Taylor's Evidence, $922; 1 Bishop's Crim. Proc. (3rd Ed.)

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT.

In Deyoe v. the Superior Court of Mendocino County, 74 Pacific Reporter 28, Cal. St. 1903, p. 75, c. 67, declaring that a final judgment of divorce shall not be entered until the expiration of one year from the rendition of an interlocutory decree of divorce is held not to violate Constitution, Art. 4, §25, subd. 3, prohibiting special laws regulating the practice in courts of justice. The court reiterates the general principle that constitutional prohibition of class legislation does not forbid such classification as is substantial and germane to the purpose of the law, and then holds that divorce proceedings are so peculiar as to be legitimate subjects for special legislation. As constituting such peculiarity the court instances the theory that the State is a party, and is interested in the maintenance of the marital status. The following authorities are cited: "McBlain v. McBlain, 77 Cal. 507, 20 Pacific Reporter 61, Warner v. Warner, 100 Cal. 11, 14, 34 Pacific Reporter 523, 524; Hatton v. Hatton, 136 Cal. 353, 356, 68 Pacific Reporter 1016; Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 289, 61 Pacific Reporter 907, 50 L. R. A. 548. The existence of other Code regulations of divorce proceedings, is also pointed

out.

INDECENT PROPOSAL. (SOLICITATION TO SEXUAL INTERCOURSE-CAUSE OF ACTION.)

KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS.

In Reed v. Maley, 74 Southwestern Reporter 1079, the plaintiff sued to recover damages for a solicitation to sexual intercourse made her by defendant, and the sole question was whether such an indecent proposal, in the absence of tres

The

pass or assault, furnished a cause of action. This is answered in the negative. court says that the fact that no case has been discovered involving this question, conduces strongly to show that the legal profession for centuries has entertained the impression that a civil action will not lie on such a state of facts. Wadsworth v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 86 Tenn. 695, 8 Southwestern Reporter 574, 6 Am. St. Rep. 864 is referred to, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Lurton, in which he points out as the reason for refusing an independent action for mental suffering, the remote and metaphysical character of the damages, is quoted with approval. The court says that a solicitation by a criminal to a reputable citizen to join in arson, larceny, or robbery, would furnish no cause of action, notwithstanding the humiliation and indignation which the citizen might feel. A bawd's solicitation of a man to illicit relations with her would give him no cause of action; yet it should do so if a similar proposal would confer a right of recovery on a woman. The cases of Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589, 38 Am. Rep. 703; Bennett ບ. McIntire (Indiana Supreme Court), 23 Northeastern Reporter 78, 6 L. R. A. 736; City of Henderson v. Clayton (Kentucky) 57 Southwestern 1, 53 L. R. A. 145, and Hutchinson v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Company (Kentucky), 57 Southwestern 251 are all distinguished from the case at bar.

The argument in support of plaintiff's recovery was that the solicitation to commit adultery constituted a common law offense, and that for a criminal act occasioning injury to a particular individual a cause of action arose. Kentucky Statutes, Section 466, provides that a person injured by the violation of any statute may recover, although a penalty or a forfeiture is also imposed. But the court says that there is no statute denouncing a penalty for a solicitation to commit adultery, and while assuming for the sake of argument that the defendant could have been indicted at common law, it is of the opinion that that fact would not furnish a ground for civil recovery. Judge Hobson dissents.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS.

In People v. Pearson, 68 Northeastern Reporter 243, an indictment was prosecuted under Penal Code, Section 288, punishing one who fails to furnish medical attendance to a minor, in violation of a duty. imposed by law. The question of liability, the court holds, is determined by the fact whether an ordinarily prudent person, solicitous for the welfare of the child would deem it necessary to call in a physician. The phrase "duty imposed by law" has reference to persons designated by the common law as parents, guardians, etc. A considerable review of the growth of medical science is presented, and then comes the important holding that by the term "medical attendance," attendance by a regular licensed physician is meant, and attendance by one who, on account of his religious belief, neglects to furn ish proper medical care, relying on prayer for divine aid, is not included. The question of the constitutionality of the statute is then considered, as to whether it violates Const. Art. 1, Section 3, guaranteeing religious liberty, and the court says in substance that a person cannot, under the guise of religious belief, commit acts which the Legislature has stigmatized as crimes. The following authorities are cited: Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686704, 15 Am. Dec. 322; Lawton v. Steele, 119 N. Y. 226-236, 23 Northeastern Reporter 878, 7 L. R. A. 134, 16 Am. St. Rep. 813; Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504-583, 12 L. Ed. 256.

In a concurring opinion Judge Cullen expresses the opinion that the State cannot dictate the medical treatment which an adult may choose to receive.

INSURANCE. (DEFENSE OF SUICIDE.—STATUTORY
PROHIBITION.--AGREEMENT FOR LESSER INDEM-
NITY. VALIDITY.)

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI,

In Whitfield v. Etna Life Ins. Co., 125 Federal Reporter 269, the effect of Rev. St.

of Mo. 1889, Section 7896 (which provides that suicide shall be no defense to a suit on a life insurance policy, unless it be shown that the insured contemplated suicide when he applied for the policy, and that any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void), on a contract providing for a lesser indemnity, in this case $500 instead of $5000, if insured committed suicide, is considered and the provision of the policy is held valid notwithstanding the statute. The opinion turns to a considerable degree on the definition of the term "defense," as used in the statute. The court holds that the Legislature has not undertaken to say that parties making a contract of insurance shall not agree upon the amount of compensation to be paid by the company in the event of death from suicide. Baltimore Ry. Co. v. Voight, 176 U. S. 498, 20 Supreme Court Reporter 385, 44 L. Ed. 560; Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 565, 25 L. Ed. 892, are cited on the right of private contract, and on the construction of statutes in derogation of the common law; and the court says that the decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals, in Keller v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 58 Mo. App. 557 is not binding on it, as the court of appeals is not a court of the highest jurisdiction in Missouri.

INVENTIONS. (AGREEMENT BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE.-UNCONSCIONABLE CHARACTER.) UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF AP

PEALS, FIRST CIRCUIT. In Thibodeau v. Hildreth, 134 Federal Reporter 1892, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals held that an agreement by an employé, in consideration of his employment, to give his employer the benefit of all inventions made by him, and to keep the same forever secret if the employer required, was not unconscionable, or against public policy, and such an agreement would not be canceled at the employé's instance. The opinion is very brief and amounts to a little more than a bare assertion of the contract's validity; but it is said that such agreements are not uncommon, and may be necessary for a reasonable protection of the employer's business.