awarded to the United States; for they showed the American territory as coming down to Portland Channel, according to the very language of the treaty of 1825, which language seems to have been ignored and defied in this decision. . .

The award is everywhere, except at a single point, which is Mount Fairweather, considerably within the line of American contention. It will also be perceived that the line of the award, after leaving Portland Channel, touches the line of the American. contention only at a point near Mount Vancouver in the St. Elias Alps, but that farther to the east it actually crosses the line of the American claim and cuts off a corner of what the American claim conceded to Canada in the vicinity of Mount St. Elias; a few square miles of glacier and cinder. The decision cuts off two islands which constituted the southern end of the so-called Alaskan "panhandle," and which had, prior to the Canadian pretension, being supposed to belong to Russian America, and subsequently to the United States, and which had been so chartered on all the maps, and gives them to Canada; and that instead of making Portland Canal the southern boundary of American territory according to the tenor of the treaty of 1825, it proceeds in the very face of the language of that treaty and traces the boundary through the narrow channel called Pearse Canal, and does not make the Portland Canal the boundary line until the point far to the east of the open sea is reached where Pearse Canal debouches from (or unites with) Portland Canal. On the other hand, it gives to the United States two small islands of unpronounceable names, not shown at all on many of the maps, situated at the mouth of Pearse Canal, indicated by two black blotches on the smaller of the subjoined maps, claimed by the Canadians in their pretension. Having regard to so much of the decision as relates to the southern boundary, it is our deliberate judgment that the decision gives the Canadians this much. more than they had a right to claim. This is mathematically true, unless in the year 1825

south meant north, and unless, since that time, the Portland Canal has changed its geographical location by crossing over from the south to the north side of the two islands known as Prince of Wales Island and Pearse Island.

The Anglo-Russian treaty of 1825, quoted above, declares that the line, after leaving the southernmost point of Prince of Wales Island, shall proceed toward the north along the pass called Portland Channel,-the language of the treaty being "remontera au nord le long de la passe dite Portland Channel." A glance at the map will show that the boundary, as made by the commission, does not leave the southernmost point of Prince of Wales Island and proceed toward the north by the Portland Channel, but that if it had done so it would have given Prince of Wales Island and Pearse Island to the United States. Instead of starting at the southernmost point of Prince of Wales Island and proceeding to the north along the pass called Portland Channel, it is made by this decision to start at the northern point of Prince of Wales Island and to proceed toward the north along Pearse Channel. A more obvious mal-interpretation and perversion of the language of a treaty could not be imag ined. It thus appears that the Canadian contention relating to the southern part of the boundary was not supported by any ground except "this ground, here in Canada." The Canadians wanted an outlet through Portland Channel in the vicinity of Port Simpson, and the award coolly gives it to them out of American territory, and the American commissioners yield.

A glance at the maps which the American Law Review prints with the "Note," from which we have quoted, leads us to wonder whether its editors have not mistaken Wales Island for Prince of Wales Island, the latter. confessedly American territory, lying some sixty or seventy miles west of Wales Island. The boundary line starts from the southernmost point of Prince of Wales Island; about this there was no controversy.

THE Canada Law Journal for November prints in full the reasons given by Lord Alverstone for his finding in reference to the Portland Channel, which are, in part, as follows:

The answer to this question "What channel is the Portland Channel?" depends upon the simple question, What did the contracting parties mean by the words "the channel called the Portland Channel" in Article III. of the treaty of 1825? This is a pure question of identity. . .

I will now endeavor to summarize the facts relating to the channel called Portland Channel, which the information afforded by the maps and documents to which I have referred establish. The first and most important is that it was perfectly well known before and at the date of the treaty that there were two channels or inlets, the one called Portland Channel, the other Observatory Inlet, both of them coming out to the Pacific Ocean. That the seaward entrance of Observatory Inlet was between Point Maskeylyne on the south and Point Wales on the north. That one entrance of Portland Channel was between the island now known as Kannagunut and Tongas Island. That the latitude of the mouth or entrance to the channel called Portland Channel, as described in the treaty and understood by the negotiators, was 54 degrees 45 minutes. The narrative of Vancouver refers to the channel between Wales Island and Sitklan Island, known as Tongas Passage, as a passage leading south-southeast toward the ocean— which he passed in hope of finding a more northern and westerly communication to the sea, and describes his subsequently finding the passage between Tongas Island on the north and Sitklan and Kannagunut on the south. The narrative and the maps leave some doubt on the question whether he intended to name Portland Channel to include Tongas Passage as well as the passage between Tongas Island on the north and Sitklan and Kannagunut Island on the south. In view of this doubt, I think, having regard to the language, that Vancouver may have

intended to include Tongas Passage in that name, and looking to the relative size of the two passages, I think that the negotiators may well have thought that the Portland Channel, after passing north of Pearse and Wales Island, issued into the sea by the two passages above described. . . .

It is suggested on behalf of the United States that Portland Channel included both the channels-namely, the channel coming out between Point Maskelyne and Point Wales, and that running to the north of Pearse and Wales Islands, and that, upon the doctrine of the thalweg, the larger channel must be taken as the boundary. It is sufficient to say that, in my opinion, there is no foundation for this argument. The lengths and the points of land at their entrances are given in the case of each channel by Vancouver in a way which precludes the suggestion that he intended to include both channels under the one name, and it must be remembered that he was upon a voyage of discovery, and named these channels when he had discovered and explored them.

THE Canadian view of the Alaska Boundary Decision is ably set forth by Thomas Hodgins in The Canadian Law Times for December:

Before reviewing the decision of the majority of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal the plain and just-minded people of both nations. must admit that both Great Britain and Canada were disastrously handicapped when they submitted the international boundary dispute between Canada and Alaska to a tribunal of six members, one-half of whom, as American politicians, had previously given public expression to a decidedly hostile opinion against the then known BritishCanadian claims, subsequently formulated in the British case, and had therefore that taint of partiality which, according to the principles of international justice, and the rules of the common law of both nations, absolutely disqualified them from sitting as judges or jurors, and eminently from being ranked as "impartial jurists of repute" which

the two great sovereignties of Great Britain. and the United States, as trustees of the national honor, political justice, and good faith of their respective nations, had agreed to appoint to the Tribunal. . . .

With such prejudiced and therefore disqualified colleagues it was judicially, politically, and humanly impossible that impartial justice could be administered, or the recognized doctrines of International Law could be given effect to. And it would have been appropriate that a diplomatic protest should have been made against appointments which dishonored the real impartiality of Tribunals of International Arbitration, and the breach of the Treaty contract to refer the international dispute to "impartial jurists of repute." . . .

Questions five and six formulated the main crux of the dispute; whether the international boundary line crossed the bays and inlets indenting this "coast of the continent."

The fifth question asked: "Was it the intention and meaning of said Convention of 1825 that there should remain in the exclusive possession of Russia a continuous fringe, or strip, of coast on the mainland, not exceeding 10 marine leagues in width, separating the British possessions from the bays, ports, inlets, havens, and waters of the Ocean?"

The sixth question was only to become necessary in case the fifth was answered in the negative; and as to the bays and inlets it asked: "Was it the intention and meaning of the said Convention that, where the mainland coast is indented by deep inlets forming part of the territorial waters of Russia, the width of the lisiere was to be measured (a) from the line of the general direction of the mainland coast; or (b) from the line separating the waters of the Ocean from the territorial waters of Russia; or (c) from the heads of the aforesaid inlets?"

In considering these questions, it should be borne in mind-in addition to other points, hereinafter referred to-that a recog

nized uniform distance of three marine miles from the low-water mark of the tidal sea, determines where the Ocean begins. And as the majority of the Tribunal holds that tidal bays and inlets, being "sinuosities of the coasts," are "ocean" within the Treaty expression "ten marine leagues from the Ocean;" then their low-water mark should also determine where the Tribunal's "ocean" begins.

But the mouths of tidal rivers are also "sinuosities of the coast;" and the influent sea in such tidal rivers has also its low-water mark, which should similarly determine where they become "ocean" according to the above decision. Yet International Law, because the channels of bays, inlets, and rivers are filled to the ocean's tidal level, classes them under the generic term of "arms of the sea," and considers them in regard to sovereignty as if they were land. But the action in the influent sea in perpetually, or occasionally (as in the case of shoals of strands), submerging their lands, precludes them, it is submitted, apart from authority, from being imported into the definition "Ocean;" as that term is understood in International Law.

Then as to the seventh question: "What are the mountains situated parallel to the coast?" The British originally proposed the seaward base of the mountains as the boundary line. Russia objected, because the mountains might slope directly to the ocean, and practically give them no foothold on the coast, and asked that the line should be on the summit of "the mountains bordering on the coast." This was considered in the treaty by the words "the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast." But the majority of the tribunal has adopted a line which, at a number of points, rests on mountains lying far inland from the coast, and separated from it by nearer mountains, which come more within the words of the treaty as "situated parallel to the coast," than those selected by the tribunal.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE. (CAUSE OF DEATH, BLOOD POISONING FOLLOWING WOUND.)

IOWA SUPREME COURT.

In Delaney v. Modern Accident Club, 97 Northwestern Reporter 91, the court holds that death resulting from blood poisoning following a wound received on a finger, is an accidental death within the terms of an accident insurance certificate. A number of authorities are elaborately reviewed, and the court holds that it is immaterial whether the bacilli causing the disease were introduced into the wound at the time it was inflicted and by the instrument inflicting it, or whether they were introduced afterwards and from other sources. "A disease brought about as the result of a wound, even though not the necessary or probable result, yet if it is the natural result of the wound and not of an independent cause, is properly attributed to the wound, and death resulting from the disease is a death resulting from the wound, even though the wound was not in its nature mortal or even dangerous. Even though the wound results in disease or death through the negligence of the injured person in failing to take ordinary and reasonable precautions to avoid the consequences, the death is the result of the wound."

tion Laws and repealing conflicting provisions) of the clause contained in Act of March 3, 1891, c. 551, 26 Stat. 1884, excluding "the class of contract laborers excluded by the Act of Feb. 26, 1885," did not amount to a repeal of that provision in the Acts of 1885 and 1891. This result is reached in view of the recital in the Congressional Record, p. 3205, showing that the House concurred in a Senate amendment omitting this clause, "leaving intact the Contract Labor Laws heretofore enacted and now on the statute books." The Act of Feb. 26, 1885, c. 164, 23 Stat. 332, forbade the immigration of any alien under contract made previous to immigration to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States: and under this decision this provision is still operative. The second holding is that an expert accountant is not a person belonging to any recognized learned profession so as to be within the exception contained in Act of March 3, 1903, c. 1012, §2, 32 Stat. 1214. This holding seems to turn on the incorporation of the word "learned" in the act of that year which had been omitted from previous statutes. Just what constitutes a member of a "learned" profession the court does not say.

ARCHITECTS. (PUBLICATION OF PLANS-FILING WITH BUILDING DEPARTMENT-LOSS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS.)

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT.

In Wright v. Eisle, 83 New York Supplement 887, the property rights of an architect. in plans prepared by him and filed with the building department of the city where the building is to be erected, are considered and held to be thereby lost.

The building department had approved of plaintiff's plans, and in consequence he su

perintended the construction of the house, receiving compensation therefor. So far the law protected him, but beyond that he had no further rights in his work. The cases of Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532, 7 Am. Rep. 480; Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617, 657, 9 Sup. Ct. 177, 32 L. Ed. 547; Jewelers' Mer. Agency v. Jewelers' Pub. Co., 155 N. Y. 241, 251, 49 New England Reporter 872, 41 L. R. A. 846, 63 Am. St. Rep. 666, are cited in support of this view. The court also holds that where an architect prepares plans for a client for a certain compensation they belong after publication, to the client and not. to the architect.

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT.

In Berman v. Schultz, 84 New York Supplement 22, the plaintiff sued for injuries to his horse and wagon from a collision with an automobile which was left unattended while the operator went into a building to deliver goods, and which had been started by some small boys playing near by. The court, in reversing a judgment for plaintiff, says that the law did not impose on the defendant the duty to make the starting of the machine impossible; that throwing off the current, putting on the brake, and throwing off the switch, so that the machine could not start of itself, were sufficient precautions, and it was not the operator's duty to chain the machine to a post, or in some way fasten it so that it would be impossible for it to be started by a third person. The act of the small boys was the proximate cause of the trouble.

was by members of a Telegraphers' Union, to prevent the disruption of that organization. by the carrying out of the defendant's purpose to discharge its members from employment. The court holds that in the absence of a contract a master may discharge his servant without notice whenever he pleases, and that in consequence of this right there can be no such thing as an unlawful conspiracy to destroy a labor union by discharging its members or refusing to employ them. The remedy for discharge from employment in violation of a contract is declared to be at law, and not in equity.

And then comes the most important holding in the case; that an employer having discharged employés belonging to a labor union has the right to keep a book containing their names and showing the reason of their discharge, and to invite inspection thereof by other employers, even though the latter therefore refuse to hire the discharged employés. The court says: "Suppose a man should file a bill alleging that he belonged to the Honorable and Ancient Order of Freemasons, or to the Presbyterian Church, or to the Grand Army of the Republic; that his employer had discharged him solely on that account; that he had discharged others of his employés, and intended to discharge all of them, for the same reason; that he kept a book which contained all the names of such discharged persons, and set opposite the name of each discharged person the fact that he had been discharged solely on the ground that he belonged to such organization; and that he had given such information to others, who refused to employ such persons on that account. Is it possible a court of equity could grant relief? If so, pray, on what ground? And yet that is a perfectly parallel case to this as made by the bill."

The court cites in support of this decision: Payne v. Western & Atlantic R. C. Co., 49 Am. Rep. 666; Dinah Worthington et al. v. James Waring et al., 157 Mass. 421, 32 New England Reporter 744, 20 L. R. A. 342, 34 Am. St. Rep. 294; Hundley v. Louisville &