blood, by man his blood shall be shed.' That's what God said and Moses wrote. Now, boys, come on with your Blackstone and Chief Justice Marshall!" Then, after throwing his bombshell, the old deacon sat down like a victorious gladiator.

"Deacon

Then up rose young Fuller. Skinner," he said, "the law that you and Moses indorse is nonsense. It has no logic in it. Your Mosaic law is that if a man kills a man another man must kill him. See what a logical deduction such a law would bring you to. Here one man kills another; another man kills him-and so on till we come to the last man on earth; who's going to kill him? He can't kill himself, for the law forbids suicide. Now, deacon, what in thunder are you going to do with that last man?"

Twenty years after this, Lawyer Fuller made another wise and witty answer before Judge McArthur when he was practising law in Chicago.

In his speech before the Judge, Mr. Fuller pleaded his client's ignorance of the law in extenuation of an offense he had committed.

"But, Mr. Fuller," said the Judge, "every man is presumed to know the law. Ignorance of the law is no excuse, you know."

"Yes, your Honor," responded Mr. Fuller, "I am aware that every shoemaker, tailor, mechanic and illiterate laborer is presumed to know the law-yes, every man is presumed to know it-except the Judges of the Supreme Court, and we have a Court of Appeals to correct their mistakes."

In Elmira, New York, the old home of exGovernor Hill, the lawyers tell a good story about "one Dave Hill," as they call him there.

"Governor Hill is a lawyer," said Congressman Ray of Norwich, "but he has always kept it quiet. However, he had one quite famous case. He defended a man named Gibson for defrauding the revenue. It was a tobacco case, and went to two Courts, Supreme and Superior. Everybody was surprised that Hill could take it so high; but he

did. Well, Gibson finally was convicted and was sent to Sing-Sing for ten years.

"Then," continued Congressman Ray. "Hill sent in his bill for a thousand dollars. Gibson's family kicked at this. They thought that the charge was too high. The Governor was a little sensitive about this. He is a fair man in his dealings, and looked around to get the opinion of his brother lawyers about fees in revenue cases. In New York, the next day, Governor Hill met William M. Evarts, the great constitutional lawyer who defended Andrew Johnson and Henry Ward Beecher.

"You're just the lawyer I want to see. Mr. Evarts,' said Hill, grasping his hand enthusiastically. 'You've had a good many internal revenue cases, haven't you?'

"Oh, yes, a good many,' said Evarts. "Well, Mr. Evarts, what is the custom about lawyers' fees in those cases?'

"Oh, just the same as with any other law,' said Evarts. 'We simply charge according to the work we do.'

"Now, Mr. Evarts,' said Hill confidentially, 'do you think I charged Gibson too much. Did I really charge him too much?"

"Well, Governor,' said Mr. Evarts, deliberately, 'the thought occurs to me, Mr. Hill, -simply occurs to me, you know that p-e-r-h-a-p-s Gibson might have been convicted for-for less money.'

The last time I met William M. Evarts, our late great lawyer and diplomat, was on the Boston & Maine train going up to his old Windsor, Vermont, farm.

"Have you seen your son Sherman today?" I asked, holding up a newspaper with a quarter-page cut in it.

"No, I can't see anything you know; I'm almost blind."

It brought tears in my eyes to see the great statesman open his blind eyes and still not be able to see Roger Sherman Evarts, the boy he worshiped.

As we passed New Haven I asked the lawyer how one ought to lie in the Pullman to sleep well-head to the engine or feet?"

"But Depew is a lawyer, isn't he?" I said. "Well, y-e-s, Depew is a lawyer-he is a lawyer; but all the law Depew knows wouldn't bias his answering any question."

A moment afterwards Evarts smiled dryly and said: "When you ask me whether you should lie on the right or left side to sleep well, perhaps I ought to say that in your case, Eli, you will lie anyway."

When Depew asked Evarts what he thought eventually would become of all the thoroughly wicked and depraved, he said:

"Well, Mr. Depew, they all probably will practise law a little while, then eventually go into politics and become Congressmen or Senators."

Robert Ingersoll was a good lawyer, and powerful in cross-examinations. The great agnostic was such a devoted husband that infidelity on the part of a husband always infuriated him. He held that a man's love should be given sacredly to his wife first, last and all the time.

In a divorce case in Peoria Mr. Ingersol believed that the defendant had been untrue to his wife, and he opened upon him with a severe and scathing cross-examination.

"You say, sir," he began, fastening his searching eyes on the witness, "that you have always been faithful to your marriage Vows?"

"Well-yes," hesitatingly.

"But you have associated with other women?"

"I presume so."

"Knocked around town with the boys to see them, I presume?"

"No, sir."

"Oh! They came to see you in your own house? You look like it. Now what women came to your house? No dallyingwhat woman-?"

"Judge," appealed the witness, "must I answer these foolish questions?"

"Yes, answer," said the Judge, sternly. "Now," said Ingersoll, feeling that he had the man in his grasp, "what woman, other than your wife came to your house in your wife's absence?"

"Well-ah-”

"Answer! Don't prevaricate!" said Ingersoll, pointing his finger right into the man's face. "Answer! Who was it?"

"Judge," said the witness with an appealing look, "must I answer?"

"Yes, go on, answer!" said the Judge. "Out with it!" hissed Ingersoll. "Who was that woman?"

"She w-was- the witness answered. "Out with it!" cried Ingersoll. "No lying now, shame-faced man!"

"She was," lisped the witness, with a quiet wink at the jury, "she was my mother-inlaw."

Judge Brady, for many years a popular city Judge in New York, could tell hundreds of legal stories, especially about Irish wit

nesses.

"One day," said the Judge, "O'Rafferty was up before me for assaulting Patrick Murphy.

"Mr. O'Rafferty,' I said, 'now, why did you strike Mr. Murphy?'

"Because, yer honor, Murphy would not give me a civil answer.'

"What was the civil question you asked him?"

"I asked him as polite as yez plase, yer honor, says I: Murphy, ain't your own brother the biggest thafe on Manhattan Island, excepting yourself and yer uncle who is absint in the penitentiary in Sing-Sing?

"And what rude answer did he give to such a civil question?'

"He said to me: Av course, O'Rafferty, prisint company excepted, so I said: Murphy, you're another, and thin, yer honor, I struck him wid me fist, I did!'"

The most laughable and dignified anticlimax perhaps ever made was made by Mr. Evarts when he was "swinging around the circle" with President Hayes. Mr. Evarts and a few friends drank the champagne and

did the speechmaking during that famous journey across the continent, while President Hayes and Lucy, his wife, entertained the temperance people and Y. M. C. A's.

In Omaha a dinner was given to the President and his party, and as usual it fell upon Mr. Evarts to make the after-dinner speech. In this speech, of course, he complimented the West and ended up his line of sweet sayings in the following anti-climax, delivered in the great orator's most dignified and impressive manner.

"Yes, gentlemen and ladies of Omaha, I like your great and growing West. I like her self-made men; and the more I travel West, the more I meet her public men, the more I am convinced of the truthfulness of the Bible statement that the wise men came -came from the East!"

Then came a great cheer, ending in shouts of laughter.

"The only thing that saved you," said Editor Rosewater of the "Bee" as he grasped Evarts' hand, "is the fact that there really are not ten men in this audience that didn't come from the East. Your anti-climax is taken as a compliment."

Horace Porter, lawyer and Ambassador to France, told me this story on Bishop Potter: It seems that Bishop Potter engaged a worldly coachman who formerly was employed by Bishop Farley of St. Patrick's, and afterward by Richard Croker, the patron saint of Tammany Hall.

"On Sunday morning," said General Porter, "the new coachman drove Bishop Potter to the rear entrance of Grace church on Fourth avenue, and then started for a saloon across the way.

"Here, Patrick," said the surprised bishop, "don't go in there! Come back!"

But Patrick went right into the saloon,

stayed a moment, and came out wiping his mouth on his sleeve.

"Didn't you hear me call you, Patrick?" asked the bishop sternly.

"Yis, yer reverence, I did-indade, I did!" said Pat regretfully.

"But why didn't you come back?"

"I would have stopped, yer reverence," said Pat humbly; "but on me soul-bad luck to me--I didn't have the price fer but one drink!"

In his second article on "Irregular Associations," Professor George Wharton Pepper discusses "The Right to Act in the Common Name" and "The Right to Sue in the Common Name." On the first of the questions he says:

Summing up the discussion of the topic under consideration, the following conclusions may be stated: that in no case will a court either of law or equity inquire at the instance of a private citizen into the right of associates to act in corporate form; that in no case will a court of equity, even at the instance of the attorney-general, inquire into the right of associates to act in corporate form; that either a court of law or a court of equity will at the instance of a private citizen inquire whether or not associates possess the substantive right to do acts directly affecting the interest of the plaintiff; and that where a statute exists expressly recognizing the right of a court to inquire into the authority for corporate action it will be so construed as to limit the inquiry to questions of substance as distinguished from questions of form; and, in the case of substantial rights, to an investigation only of their acquisition by the associates and not to a consideration of whether the associates have rendered themselves to a judgment of forfeiture.

ATTACHMENT. (SEIZURE-PROCEDURE-SERVICE.)

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA.

In Lehman & Co. v. Rivers, 35 Southern Reporter, 296, it was contended that an attachment of the rights of a debtor in a suit which he had pending was not legally levied so as to entitle the attaching plaintiff to a lien on the right, the attachment defendant subsequently being declared a bankrupt. This contention was based on the fact that , though notice of the attachment was served on the clerk of the court and on the creditor of the right, no notice was served on the debtor of the right until garnishment proceedings wre commenced after judgment had been obtained in the attachment proceedings. To this contention the court replies: "While we think that in seizure of a right in suit notice should be served upon the debtor of the right, as well as upon the custodian, we do not think that we should hold that the lien recognized, as before mentioned, is lost because there was delay in notifying the debtor, when there was none in notifying the custodian." The court cites Citizens' Bank v. Miller, 45 La. Ann. 493, 12 South. 516, to the effect that a creditor seizing a right in litigation by his debtor is bound by the decree rendered in the suit instituted by him. Therefore, the court does not think that the debtor of the right has any interest in having the date of the attachment changed so as to defeat the lien claimed by the attachment plaintiff, especially where the creditor of the right has filed an answer and thus appeared in the attachment proceedings.

delay. It appeared that plaintiff was informed that the train was due to leave 20 minutes late, and did so leave, but only proceeded a short distance down the vard when it stopped and remained there 10 hours; and that the conductor of the train refused to give the passengers any information as to the probable extent of the delay or the cause thereof. The court held that under these facts, plaintiff had a cause of action and might recover exemplary damages, as a railroad company is chargeable with damages for delay in running its trains according to schedule time, unless such delay cannot be prevented by the exercise of reasonable care; but that actual damage for inconvenience, loss of time, or fatigue caused by the delay could not be recovered unless some pecuniary damage or personal loss had resulted to plaintiff.

CEMETERIES. (BURIAL LOT-RESIDUARY DEVISE -DESCENT.)

SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.

In re Waldron, 58 Atlantic Reporter, 453, was a proceeding for an opinion as to whether or not a burial lot in a cemetery passed under a general residuary clause to testator's widow. The court cites Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 414, wherein it was held that an executor empowered to sell all the testator's real estate to pay pecuniary and residuary legacies was not warranted in selling a burial lot, unless specially directed by the will, and notes the implied approval of this doctrine in Gardner v. Swan Point, 20 R. I. 646, 40 Atl. 871, 78 Am. St. Rep. 897. Attention is called to the improbability of a testator having in mind a burial lot when making a residuary devise. It is further noted. that a burial lot, where bodies have ben buried, cannot be mortgaged for a debt, and that

a deed of it carries only a right to use it for burial purposes. With these facts and authorities in mind the court says: "While we do not mean to say that a burial lot is not property, yet all of these limitations tend to show that it has been shorn of so many of the ordinary attributes of property as to raise the presumption that it is not intended to be passed under a general devise in which it is not specially mentioned. A strong reason for this is found in the right to control the corpse, as between a widow and next of kin, as shown in Pierce v. Swan Point, 10 R. I. 227, 14 Am. Rep. 667, and Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R. I. 155, 26 Atl. 42, 19 L. R. A. 558, 49 Am. St. Rep. 762. The right of custody of the remains and the right of property in the burial lot should go together, where it is possible. Following the doctrine of Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 414, and the implied approval of it in Gardner v. Swan Point, 20 R. I. 646, 40 Atl. 871, 78 Am. St. Rep. 897, a burial lot does not pass under a general residuary devise, but it descends to the heirs as intestate property. It is a family burial lot. It is that fact alone which gives a peculiar limitation to its tenure. The heir takes it subject to all the conditions for which the ancestor held it. A sort of trust attaches to the land for the benefit of the family. Neither the widow nor the child can be excluded from it for want of title, yet such a result might follow if the tenure was like that of the other real estate. Children could exclude a widow, or a widow could exclude children, by virtue of ownership of the land. The view therefore, taken in Derby v. Derby, supra, was founded in sound reason and policy, and it has been regarded as the law in this state for a long time. It did not quite touch the point involved here, because the question was whether the lot should be sold to pay debts or legacies. Still we do not hesitate to follow its doctrine."

Accordingly the court was of the opinion that a burial lot does not pass by a residuary clause in a will, but descends to testator's heirs as intestate property.

DAMAGES. (ASSESSMENT ON DEFAULT.)

SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.

Dyson v. Rhode Island Co., 57 Atlantic Reporter 771, is a learned and scholarly opinion delineating the practice in assessment of damages on default from the earliest times to the present. The Court reviews the authorities on this point and quotes extensively from Coke, the Year Books and other authorities. As a result the court comes to the conclusion that the court has authority to assess damages on default, with or without the aid of a jury, and that in case a jury is called in to determine the damages the court has inherent power to award more or less than the jury award. For those desiring to brush up on their Latin and law French this opinion is of special interest as is contains numerous quotations from the authorities in the original. As the opinion may, perhaps, be unavailable to many of our readers, who nevertheless desire to be up on legal forms, we quote the form of a writ ad inquirendum de damnis as given in the opinion. This writ is as follows: "Rex vic' salutem. Ostensum est nobis ex parte P. de L. quòd cum B. de S. in curia nostra, etc., sum' esset ad respondend' eidem P. de placito quare cepit unum cquum ipsius Petri in separali ipsius Petri, & cum injuste detinuit contra vadium & pleg', & idem B. venisset in eadem curia & dixisset quòd ipse cepit averia illa in damno suo pascentia separalem pasturam ipsius Bernardi & partes hinc inde posuissent se in juratam patriae, per quam postca in eadem curis nostra convictum fuit quod praed' Bernardus averia cepit in damno suo in se parali pastura insius Bernardi, ita quod idem Bernardus per considerationem curiae nostrae haberet retornum averiorum praedictorun: Praefatus Bernardus licèt praedictus Petrus rationabiles & sufficientes emend' pro damnis & transgressione praedictis sae ius ei obtulerit, praedicta averia detinet imparcata, contra legem & consuetudinem regni nostri, ad damnum ipsius Petri non modicum & gravamen. quia nolumus quod praedictus Petrus injurietur hac parte, tibi praecipimus quòd in praesentia eorundem Petri & Bernardi ad hoc praemonitorum si interesse voluerint, per sacramentum

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