method, where applicable, is the more effective, because it can be used by a bare majority of either House, whereas a bill passed by both Houses may be vetoed by the governor, a point so important as to need a few words. Four States, three of them original States, vest legislative authority in the legislature alone. These are Rhode Island, Delaware, North Carolina, and Ohio. All the rest require a bill to be submitted to the governor, and permit him to return it to the legislature with his objections. If he so returns it, it can only be again passed "over the veto" by something more than a bare majority. To so pass a bill over the veto there is required In two States a majority of three-fifths in each In twenty-three States a majority of two-thirds in In nine States a majority in each House of all the members elected to that House. Here, therefore, as in the Federal Constitution, we find a useful safeguard against the unwisdom or misconduct of a legislature, and a method provided for escaping, in extreme cases, from those deadlocks which the system of checks and balances tends to occasion. I have adverted in a preceding chapter to the restrictions imposed on the legislatures of the States by their respective Constitutions. These restrictions, which are numerous, elaborate, and instructive, take two forms I. Exclusions of a subject from legislative competence, i.e. prohibitions to the legislature to pass any law on certain enumerated subjects. The most important classes of prohibited statutes are Statutes inconsistent with democratic principles, as, for example, granting titles of nobility, favouring Statutes against public policy, e.g. tolerating lot- 3 II. Restrictions on the procedure of the legislature, i.e. directions as to the particular forms to be observed and times to be allowed in passing bills, sometimes all bills, sometimes bills of a certain specified nature. Among these restrictions will be found provisions— As to the majorities necessary to pass certain bills. 1 See, for instance, Constitution of Texas of 1876. 2 Similar lists occur in the constitutions of all the Western and Southern States as well as of some Eastern States (e.g. Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1873, Art. iii. § 7; Constitution of New York, amendments of 1874 to Constitution of 1846). 3 Further information on this head will be found in Chapter XLIII. on State Finance. The local authorities had been usually forbidden by statute to borrow or tax beyond a certain amount, but as they had formed the habit of obtaining dispensations from the State legislatures, the check mentioned in the text has been imposed on the latter. Sometimes a majority of the whole number of members elected to each House is required, or a majority exceeding a bare majority. As to the method of taking the votes, e.g. by calling over the roll and recording the vote of each member. As to allowing certain intervals to elapse between each reading of a measure, and for preventing the hurried passage of bills at the end of the session. As to including in a bill only one subject, and expressing that subject in the title of the bill. Against re-enacting, or amending, or incorporating, any former Act by reference to its title merely, without setting out its contents.1 The two latter classes of provisions might be found wholesome in England, where much of the difficulty complained of by the judges in construing the law arises from the modern habit of incorporating parts of former statutes, and dealing with them by reference. Where statutes have been passed by a legislature upon a prohibited subject, or where the prescribed forms have been transgressed or omitted, the statute will be held void so far as inconsistent with the Constitution. Even these multiform restrictions on the State legislatures have not been found sufficient. Bitted and bridled as they are by the Constitutions, they contrive, as will appear in a later chapter, to do plenty of mischief in the direction of private or special legislation. 66 1 Indiana and Oregon direct every Act to be plainly worded, avoiding as far as possible technical terms, and Louisiana (Constitution of 1879, § 31) says: The General Assembly shall never adopt any system or code of laws by general reference to such system or code of laws, but in all cases shall recite at length the several provisions of the laws it may enact." Although State legislatures have of course no concern whatever with foreign affairs, this is not deemed a reason for abstaining from passing resolutions on that subject. The passion for resolutions is strong everywhere in America, and an expression of sympathy with an oppressed foreign nationality, or of displeasure at any unfriendly behaviour of a foreign power, is not only an obvious way of relieving the feelings of the legislators, but often an electioneering device, which appeals to some section of the State voters. Accordingly such resolutions are common, and, though of course quite irregular, quite innocuous. Debates in these bodies are seldom well reported, and sometimes not reported at all. One result is that the conduct of members escapes the scrutiny of their constituents; a better one that speeches are generally short and practical, the motive for rhetorical displays being absent. If a man does not make a reputation for oratory, he may for quick good sense and business habits. However, so much of the real work is done in committees that talent for intrigue or "management" usually counts for more than debating power. CHAPTER XLI THE STATE EXECUTIVE THE executive department in a State consists of a governor (in all the States), a lieutenant-governor (in twenty-seven), and of various minor officials. The governor, who, under the earlier Constitutions of most of the original thirteen States, was chosen by the legislature, is now always elected by the people, and by the same suffrage, practically universal, as the legislature. He is elected directly, not, as under the Federal Constitution, by a college of electors. His term of office is, in sixteen States, four years; in two States, three years; in eighteen States, two years; and in two States (Massachusetts and Rhode Island), one year. His salary varies from $10,000 (£2000) in New York and Pennsylvania to $1000 (£200) in Michigan. Some States limit his re-eligibility; but in those which do not there seems to exist no tradition forbidding a third term of office similar to that which has prevailed in the Federal Government since the days of Washington. The earlier Constitutions of the original States (except South Carolina) associated with the governor an executive council1 (called in Delaware the Privy Council), 1 This is another interesting illustration of the disposition to reproduce England. Vermont was still under the influence of English pre |