of Hay -and, at this very Hour, they are re ported by fome, to be the most confiderable Allies the Emperor has to his Back, and yet the Confequences of a War with that Prince are apprehended as dangerous to the Intereft of this Nation. So that the Cantons of Sconfiderable in the Affairs of Europe, than the Cantons of Grub-freet.

-d have been lefs

But notwithstanding all that is here alledg'd against this difaffected Set of Men, there are those in this Nation who will not believe them to be in a foreign Intereft; and the Author of a certain Pamphlet, entituled, A Letter from an Elector of the Borough of Great Yarmouth, in the County of Norfolk, to Mr. Horatio Walpole, one of the Reprefentatives in Parliament, for the faid Borough, fpeaking of these Gentlemen, delivers himself in thefe Words.

"I have been a conftant Reader of all the Papers "or Pamphlets that, for the laft four Years, have "been published to justify the Conduct of Great "Britain.I have likewife as conftantly perused "the feveral Performances on the other Side of the "Queftion, and I am fo far from believing that the "Authors of the latter intended the Inftruction of "foreign Courts, or to throw Difficulties in the "Way of our own Meafures, that I think I could "myfelf, undertake to collect from them feveral "Particulars, about which the Event hath fince "proved the Truth of their Sentiments, and which "therefore it is now to be wifh'd, had been more "taken Notice of by their own Countrymen.

So far our Author; but whether their speaking Truth be a Reason, that they should be more taken Notice of by their Countrymen is what I am doubtful of ; at leaft it is a Reafon that, I fear, will have but little Weight with a certain Party amongst us; however, this Reflection will bring us to confider the Pamphlet a little farther.

Those

Thofe who argue in Juftification of the Measures that were taken, faid "That they who "knew well the State of the Nation, the Load of "the publick Debt, the Difficulty of laying new "Taxes, and the Expence of a War, would "readily be of Opinion, that a War fhould, if "poffible, be prevented; - and faid further, "that, were we not under thofe particular Circum"ftances, no honeft or wife Minifter would be for"ward to draw a Nation, efpecially a trading Nation into a War, the Iffues of which must always "be uncertain more particularly under a Confederacy.

Thofe who argued on the other Side, agreed to all this, and faid, That, confidering the State of the Nation, the Load of the publick Debt, the Difficulty of laying new Taxes, and the Expence of a War, it was to be wifh'd that Great Britain had not embroil'd her felf with the Neighbouring Powers, which they apprehended muft end in a War, or if an apparent Fear was fhewn of entering into a War, the miserable Alternative, perhaps might be a dishonourable and difadvantagious Peace.

"And again, those who writ in Juftification of "what was done, maintain'd, that they "(meaning the Minifters) WISELY confider'd that a "War, if poffible, was to be avoided, in the Situ"ation Affairs were in, from Circumftances that "would have been peculiar to it; a War in "which we might fuffer much, but could not, our"felves, tell what to wifh for ; we knew not "what it was we would either do ourselves, or wish were done by our Allies;-and whoever confiders "Things coolly (faid they) muft needs be of the fame "Opinion; for Example; could we wifh France "fhould recover in Flanders, what was, at so vaft << an Expence of Men and Money, taken from "them laft War? could we wish them to extend "their Conquefts on the Rhine, where the Cities

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"bordering upon it are already all Weakness, and utterly unable to defend themselves?

Those who write on the contrary Side, agreedthat we knew not what it was we would either do ourfelves, or wish to be done by our Allies; they allowed, -that it was poffible we might fuffer by a War, and that we could not tell, ourselves, what to wifb for;

and they were entirely of Opinion, that it might be dangerous to the Ballance of Power in Europe, that France bould recover in Flanders, what, at fo vaft an Expence of Men and Money, was taken from them the laft War; nor did they think it would be any thing to the Advantage of England, to fee them extend their Conquefts on the Rhine.

In fine, they endeavour'd to reprefent certain Treaties as big with all the Mischiefs here defcribed; they were for making us believe, that fome Alliances were inconfiftent and unnatural, and that they might draw us into a War, where we might fight against our own Intereft, or if we could, in fuch a Situation, procure a Peace, it might poffibly be upon Terms neither to our Honour nor Advantage and while good Meafures were taking, they argued against them for the very fame Reasons which the others brought in their Juftification.

This I take to be the true State of the Difpute for these laft four Years; as may be seen by turning back to the faid Writings; (thofe against the Meafures may ftill be found in the Hands of the Curious, and thofe on the other Side in the Shops of their respective Publishers) by which the Readers will perceive that one of the Parties, in this Controversy, (I won't say which) has had the Fate of Caffandria, that is, always to prophecy true, and never to be believed, I mean, by their Adverfaries, for the Publick indeed always went along with them in Opinion.

But the Difpute still fubfifts, and there is as great a Variety of Opinion concerning Affairs now de

pending,

pending, as there has been concerning what is past, for the Author of the Pamphlet entituled, A Letter from an Elector of the Borough of Great Yarmouth,

c. fays, "that, it being folemnly ftipulated, in "the fifth Article of the Quadruple Alliance,"That any of the said Dutchies and Estates (meaning "Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia) neither can nor "ought ever, at any Time, or in any Cafe what"foever, to be poffefs'd by any Prince who shall be "at the fame Time, King of Spain, and that a "King of Spain can never undertake and have the "Tutelage of the fame Prince.

"That it is agreed by all and every of the con"tracting Parties, and they are alike engaged, "that, during the Lives of the prefent Pollellors "of the Dutchies of Tuscany, Parma, e. or their "Male Succeffors, neither the Emperor, the King "of France, the King of Spain, nor the Prince de "fign'd for this Succeffion, fhall introduce any "Soldiers, of whatsoever Nation, of their own "Troops or others in their Pay, into the Places or "Countries of the faid Dutchies, or establish Gar"rifons in the Towns, Ports, Citadels, or Fortresses "therein fituated.

All this Provifion against the introducing of foreign Troops into Italy feems to have been calculated to make the Emperor eafy; for if fix thousand Men of Spanish Troops were once admitted into the Fortreffes of Tuscany, &c. they might make Way for fix or even ten times that Number, which his Imperial Majefty (not without good Reafon) might apprehend would threaten Danger to his Italian Dominions.-The Spaniards probably have not forgot by what Means the Emperor gain'd the Kingdom of Sicily, within the Memory of Man, nor can they be ignorant of what all the World knows, how burthenfome and disagreeable a German Government is to the People of Sicily as well as Naples, and therefore

it is very natural to believe that the King of Spain may be for taking Advantage of the favourable Difpofitions of the People towards him, and, fome Time or other, lay hold of a proper Conjuncture of Affairs, to attempt the Recovery of those ancient Demefnes of the Crown of Spain.

I fhall fay nothing of the Probability of the Tufcan Dominions being annex'd to the Crown of Spain, (contrary to the Quadruple Alliance) which muft happen, if the Prince of Afturias fhould die without Iffue, fince Don Carlos fucceeds him to the Crown of Spain, for this Matter has been well remark'd upon in a late Pamphlet.

"Thus (fays my Author) his Imperial Majefty "will have as much Reafon to apprehend a War " in Italy, in cafe he fhould accede to the Treaty "of Seville, as if he fhould not, and can this "Prince, or his Minifters, want the Information "of any Authors of this Side of the Water, to in"ftruct them whether it is their Intereft to enter 46 upon it before or after the Introduction of Spanish "Troops?

Nay, he goes further, and gives us very good Reafons why he conceives the Introduction of Spawifh Troops is by no means proper for fecuring the Succeffion, even to Don Carlos, and for this Reafon above all others, (fays he) the Variations from the Quadruple Alliance are to be apprehended by the Imperialists. But it is beft to deliver his own

Words.

"This Apprehenfion, I think, may be fupported, "not only by the Quadruple Alliance, but what, I "muft confefs, I am much furpriz'd at, by the "Authority of the late Seville Treaty ; but let "it firft be tried by the common Senfe of Mankind, "without Regard to either of them.

"Do we not fuppofe that a Provifion for the "fecond Family of the King of Spain, the Chil

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