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of Hay; and, at this very Hour, they are res ported by some, to be the most considerable Allies the Emperor has to his Back, and yet the Confe

quences of a War with that Prince are apprehended as dangerous to the Intereft of this Nation. So that the Cantons of some

-d have been less confiderable in the Affairs of Europe, than the Cantons of Grub-ftreet.

But notwithstanding all that is here alledg'd against

this disaffected Set of Men, there are those in this Nation who will not believe them to be in a foreign Interest; and the Author of a certain Pamphlet, entituled, A Letter from an Elector of the Borough of Great Yarmouth, in the County of Norfolk, to Mr. Horatio Walpole, one of the Representatives in Parliament, for the said Borough, speaking of these Gentlemen, delivers himself in these Words.

“ I'have been a conftant Reader of all the Papers “ or Pamphlets that, for the laft four Years, have “ been published to justify the Conduct of Great Britain. I have likewife as constantly perused « the Teveral Performances on the other Side of the « Queftion, and I am so far from believing that the « Authors of the larrer intended the Instruction of « foreign Courts, or to throw Difficulties in the « Way of our own Meafures, that I think I could

myself, undertake to collect from them feveral “ Particulars, about which the Event hath since “ proved the Truth of their Sentiments, and which a therefore it is now to be with'd, had been more “ taken Notice of by their own Countrymen.

So far our Author ; but whether their speaking Iruth be a Reason, that they should be more taken Notice of by their Countrymen is what I am doubt

at least it is a Reafon that, I fear, will have but little Weight with a certain Party amongst us; however, this Reflection will bring us to conlider the Pamphlet a little farther.


ful of;

Those who argue in Juftification of the Measures that were taken, said “ That they who

knew well the State of the Nation, the Load of " the publick Debt, the Difficulty of laying new « Taxes, and the Expence of a War, would

readily be of Opinion, that a War hould, if « possible, be prevented; and faid further, " that, were we not under those particular Circum« stances, no honeft or wise Minister would be for“ ward to draw a Nation, especially a trading Nati

on into a War, the Issues of which must always “ be uncertain more particularly under a Confederacy:

Those who argued on the other Side, agreed to all this, and said, That, considering the State of the Nation, the Load of the publick Debt, the Difficulty of laying new Taxes, and the Expence of a War, it was to be with'd that Great Britain had not embroild her felf with the Neighbouring Powers, which they arprehended muft end in a War, or if an apparent Fear was shewn of entering into a War, the miserable Alternative, perhaps might be a dishonourable and disadvantagious Peace.

“ And again, those who writ in Justification of « what was done, maintain'd,

that they “ (meaning the Ministers) WISELY consider'd that a " War, if pollible, was to be avoided, in the Situ“ ation Affairs were in, from Circumstances that " would have been peculiar to it ;

a War in ' which we might fuffer much, but could not, our« felves, tell what to wish for ; we knew not “ what it was we would either do ourselves, or with “ were done by our Allies ;--and whoever considers « Things coolly (faid they) muft needs be of the same • Opinion; for Example; could we wish France “ hould recover in Flanders, what was, at so vaft

an Expence of Men and Money, taken from “ them Iaft War? could we wish them to extend © their Conquests on the Rhine, where the Cities

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bordering upon it are already all Weakness, and “ utterly unable to defend themselves?

Those who write on the contrary Side, agreed that we knew not what it was we would either do ourfelves, or will to be done by our Allies; they allowed, that it was pollible we might suffer by a War, and that we could not tell, ourselves, what to wish for ; and they were entirely of Opinion, that it might be dangerous to the Ballance of Power in Europe, that France sbould recover in Flanders, what, at so vaft an Expence of Men and Money, was taken from them the laft War; - nor did they think it would be any thing to the Advantage of England, to see them extend their Conquests on the Rhine. In fine, they endeavour'd

to represent certain Treaties as big with all the Mischiefs here described ; tiey were for making us believe, that fome Alliances were inconsistent and unnatural, and that they might draw us into a War, where we might fight against our own Interest, or if we could, in such a Situation, procure a Peace, it might possibly be upon Terms neither to our Honour nor Advantage and while good Meafures were taking, they argued against them for the very fame Reasons which the others brought in their Justification.

This I take to be the true State of the Dispute for these last four Years; as may be seen by turning back to the said Writings; (those againt the Meafures may still be found in the Hands of the Curious, and those on the other Side in the Shops of their respective Publishers) by which the Readers will perceive that one of the Parties, in this controversy, (I won't say which) has had the Fate of Caffandria, that is, always to prophecy true, and never to be believed, I mean, by their Adverfaries, for the Publick indeed always went along with them in Opinion.

But the Difpute still lubafts, and there is as great a Variety of Opinion concerning Affairs now de


pending, as there has been concerning what is past, for the Author of the Pamphlet entituled, A Letter from an Elector of the Borough of Great Yarmouth, Esc. says, “ that, it being solemnly ftipulated, in u the fifth Article of the Quadruple Alliance, « That any of the said Dutchies and Estates (meaning Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia) neither can nor " ought ever, at any Time, or in any Cafe what“ foever, to be postessd by any

Prince who shall be “ at the same Time, King of Spain, and that a “ King of Spain can never undertake and have the “ Tutelage of the fame Prince.

That it is agreed by all and every of the conu tracting Parties, and they are alike engaged, “ that, during the Lives of the present Pollellors « of the Dutchies of Tuscany, Parma, @pe. or their “ Male Successors, neither the Emperor, the King “ of France, the King of Spain, nor the Prince de “ sign'd for this Succellion, shall introduce any “ Soldiers, of whatsoever Nation, of their own “ Troops or others in their Pay, into the Places or “ Countries of the said Dutchies, or establish Gar« risons in the Towns, Ports, Citadels, or Fortresses “ therein situated.

All this Provision against the introducing of foreign Troops into Italy seems to have been calculated to make the Emperor easy; for if fix thousand Men of Spanish Troops were once admitted into the Fortresses of Tuscany, Sc. they might make Way for fix or even ten times that Number, which his Imperial Majesty (not without_good Reason) might apprehend would threaten Danger to his Italian Dominions. The Spaniards probably have not forgot by what Meansthe Emperor gain'd the Kingdom of Sicily, within the Memory of Man, nor can they be ignorant of what all the World knows, how burthenTome and disagreeable a German Government is to the People of Sicily as well as Naples, and therefore it is very natural to believe that the King of Spain may be for taking Advantage of the favourable Difpofitions of the People towards him, and, fome Time or other, lay hold of a proper Conjuncture of Affairs, to attempt the Recovery of those ancient Demesnes of the Crown of Spain.

I shall say nothing of the Probability of the Tufcan Dominions being annex'd to the Crown of Spain, (contrary to the Quadruple Alliance) which must happen, if the Prince of Asturias should die without Issue, since Don Carlos fucceeds him to the Crown of Spain, for this Matter has been well remark'd upon in a late Pamphlet.

“ Thus (says my Author) his Imperial Majesty “ will have as much Reason to apprehend a War “ in Italy, in cafe he should accede to the Treaty « of Seville, as if he should not, and can this “ Prince, or his Ministers, want the Information “ of any Authors of this side of the Water, to in“ ftruct' them whether it is their Intereft to enter “ upon it before or after the Introduction of Spanijb “ Troops ?

Nay, he goes further, and gives us very good Reafons why he conceives the Introduction of Spamijb Troops is by no means proper for securing the Succession, even to Don Carlos, and for this Reason above all others, (fays he) the Variations from the Quadruple Alliance are to be apprehended by the Iniperialists.

But it is best to deliver his own Words.

“ This Apprehension, I think, may be fupported, “ not only by the Quadruple Alliance, but what, I “ must confess, I am much surpriz'd at, by the “ Authority of the late Seville Treaty; but let “ it firft be tried by the common Senfe of Mankind, “ without Regard to either of them.

Do we not suppose that a Provision for the “ fecond Family of the King of Spain, the Chil

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