is objectionable upon principle and is likely to be ineffective in practice. The act upon which it is based is inartificially constructed, and, were the question raised, would probably be held to be unconstitutional by the courts. Where police are selected, paid and discharged by the corporations and bear the name of "coal and iron police" it is evident that they are in effect the servants of their em ployers rather than of the Commonwealth whose authority they exercise. The arrest and incarceration of a citizen for breach of law is one of the most fundamental and delicate of the functions of sovereignty, and the protection of property and the prevention of breach of the peace and disturbance are among the most important of its duties. The one ought not to be delegated and the other ought not to be evaded. To attempt to do so is to abdicate sovereignty and to accomplish it would seem to be a legal impossibility. The State stands above interests in controversy and its powers ought not to be used by either of them. In case of disturbance, no confidence can be placed in the discreet use of the power of the State by persons dependent upon others for their positions. On the other hand, it is the duty of the State to see to it that the exercis of the franchises granted by her is not impaired or interfered with by violence. It would be well for you to consider whether the time has not arrived for the State to resume these functions and to authorize the appointment by the Governor of a constabulary of sufficient force, say ten in each county, to be used wherever needed in the State in the suppression of disorder. They could be utilized in the place of the corporation police, the game wardens, fish wardens, forest wardens, the officers of the different boards and commissions exercising police authority, and would enable the Executive in cases of emergency to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," as the Constitution requires, and they would be likely to inspire a confidence not now felt. The objection to such a course is the expense. To this objection there are several answers. The State ought to provide for its necessary work before being generous, no matter how meritorious the recipients of its bounty may be. It is doubtful whether the expense of a regular constabulary would, upon the whole, be greater than the occasional calling out of the National Guard, which it would at times obviate. Much of what would be the expense is now being incurred in desultory ways and the expense of the corporation police comes ultimately from the people. Finally it may be said that this constabulary could be taken from the ranks of the National Guard, thus starting with a disciplined service and that no doubt the corporations would be satisfied to be assured of protection to their property and to be relieved of the burden of maintaining their present police.

There are many incongruities in our laws with regard to corporations, due largely to the fact that the legislation has been often enacted with reference to particular subjects without sufficiently considering its relation to the general system, and they ought to be corrected. Probably the best method would be to provide for a commission of expert lawyers, to be appointed by the Governor, who could go over the whole subject carefully and report a code or what changes may be necessary. All corporations, before they can be chartered, are required to give notice by advertisement of their applications, except railroad and street railway companies. It would seem to be specially important that these companies should give such notice. The Act of 1889, as amended by the Act of 1901, requires that the charters of Street Railway Companies shall name the streets and highways upon which the railways are to be laid. But it further provides that the companies shall have authority to construct such extensions as they may deem necessary to increase their business, and this is accomplished by filing without public notice a copy of the minutes in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth. It has become a custom, more or less prevalent, to secure charters upon obscure streets and reach the main avenues by means of this privilege of extension, which is entirely within the control of the companies and is subject to no supervision. If a railroad be incorporated twenty miles in length it must, under the Act of April 4th, 1868, have a capital stock of ten thousand dollars per mile. If it be incorporated with a length of five miles and then be extended to twenty miles, under the Act of May 21, 1881, it is only required to have a capital stock of five thousand dollars per mile. The principle upon which the grant of franchises to corporations is supported is that there are business operations important to the community which are beyond the financial strength of the individual, and that by the union of the resources of many persons, may be accomplished and thus the public be benefited. As a compensation for the benefits so conferred, liability is transferred from the individual to the artificial person created by the law. We have been gradually losing sight of the public good involved in the arrangement and reducing the number of corporators until now any three persons may secure incorporation for profit. In other words, a man wishing to start any business venture by giving a share of stock to his clerk and another to his messenger may escape individual liability for the indebtedness incurred. But one step remains and that is the reductio ad absurdum of making a single person a corporation for profit. Most of such corporations now secure under our laws grants in perpetuity. There ought to be a reasonable time limit in every charter, say one hundred years, at the expiration of which the grant terminates so that some control

may be maintained and the future not burdened with consequences which cannot be foreseen. The mountains shall sink into the sea, in time the sun shall disappear from the heavens, and no charter should purport to endure forever. The question of requiring railroads, railways and pipe lines to file with their applications maps of the proposed routes may be considered, and the rights of telephone, electric light and natural gas companies in furnishing their facilities raising difficult problems ought to be defined.

In my Inaugural address of January 20, 1903, and in my message giving the objections to the act authorizing railroads to take dwel lings by condemnation proceedings (see Address, page 3, and Vetoes, page 125), I called attention to the principle that only public necessity could justify the taking of private property by eminent domain, and suggested the propriety of the ascertainment by the State of such need before any franchise is granted including this right. Without going over these propositions again, I renew the suggestion and refer you to what was there presented. If the Legislature should deem it wise that the State should exercise such supervision, there ought to be provision made for a competent State engi neer. The need for such an expert official would be not only for this purpose, but in the Highway Department and in connection with the building of bridges. From June 1, 1903, to June 1, 1904, there were paid to engineers for the preparation of plans and supervision of construction of bridges $25,277.55, and since that time probably fully as much more. The services of a capable engineer, regularly employed by the year, could be secured for a much less sum. true the payments are now made by the counties, but it would be a narrow view which would separate the people and the Commonwealth. Whatever may be the conclusion of the Legislature upon this subject, there ought to be the utmost care exercised in granting to corporations the right to take private property.

The question whether trust companies, which have of recent years played so important a part in the management and settlement of estates, and with which so much of the current moneys of the community is deposited, should also be permitted to do an insurance, surety and guarantee business upon the same capital, which involves another kind of risk, is one of moment and could properly be considered by such a commission as that proposed.

The large deposits of coal, anthracite and bituminous, which underlie the valleys and mountains of this State, are being shipped in profusion over the world where they become the foundations of industries and bases of wealth, or are wasted in harmful wars in South Africa or Manchuria, with which we have no sympathy. One of these days, the deposits will have been exhausted. It is only fair

and exceedingly proper that Pennsylvania should derive some benefit from that which the Lord has given to her. I suggest that you consider the propriety of imposing a slight tax upon each ton of coal mined, so small in amount that it would not prove burdensome to consumers or interfere with trade, the proceeds of the tax to be used only in the construction of roads, or in the maintenance of schools in relief of the school tax now imposed by the counties.

The Constitution directs that immediately after each decennial United States Census, the General Assembly shall apportion the State into Senatorial and Representative Districts. No Senatorial apportionment was made after the census of 1880, 1890 or 1900. Not only is the mandate of the Constitution disobeyed, but the existing condition of affairs is unjust to Allegheny and other counties which have not the representation to which they are entitled. With the passing of each decade and the shifting of population, the unfitness of the present apportionment is increased. The difficulty has not been with the Legislature, which no doubt would have been entirely willing to fulfil its constitutional obligations, but inheres in the Constitution itself. Nevertheless, a solution must be found. The Constitution provides, Article II, Section 16, that the State shall be divided into fifty Senatorial districts of compact and contiguous territcry as nearly equal in population as may be. Each district elects one Senator. A ratio is determined by dividing the whole population of the State by fifty. Each county containing one or more ratios is entitled to one senator for each ratio. No county shall form a separate district unless it contains four-fifths of a ratio, except where the adjoining counties are each entitled to one or more senators, in which case it may have a senator with a population exceeding one-half of a ratio. No county shall be divided unless entitled to two or more senators. No city or county shall be entitled to representation exceeding one-sixth of the whole number of senators. The trouble with this method is that it cannot be applied. In the first place, fifty cannot be divided by six in such a way as to be applicable to senators. In my view the city which is entitled to eight and onethird senators is entitled to nine, if it has sufficient population, for the reason that a provision which deprives certain people of their representation because of location ought to be construed in such a way as to cause as little deprivation as possible. As they cannot have one-third of a senator without having a whole senator, they ought to have the entirety. This in practice, however, has been limited to eight instead of nine and is not the difficulty which has been regarded as insuperable. This difficulty may be illustrated by a reference to Lebanon county. It is surrounded by counties, each one of which has ratio or more, and is, therefore, entitled to a senator and

to be a separate senatorial district. Lebanon has not half a ratio and is, therefore, entitled to no senator. What is to be done with it? There are two main thoughts in the Constitution. One is that the State shall be divided into districts. This is essential and fundamental. The other is that the division shall be made in a certain specified manner. This is secondary and incidental, and if impracticable must yield in the place of least resistance. Maintaining the provision that the districts shall comprise compact and contiguous territory, as nearly equal in population as may be, and preserving as well as can be done, the lines of counties, the direction that "no county shall be divided unless entitled to two or more senators," must where necessary be overborne, and the districts be created notwithstanding.

It would be an advantage if the Houses had counsel charged with the duty of ascertaining the relation of proposed legislation to existing laws, and of seeing that legislation is so expressed as to accomplish the object intended. It is not to be expected that legislators should have technical training in law, and it is fair to them that they should be supplied with such assistance. At the last session, several meritorious acts were necessarily vetoed because of imperfect construction.

It has come to be a custom to provide for executive work by the appointment of commissions by the legislative body to whom it is entrusted. Beginning in a small way, the custom has gradually grown until a large proportion of such measures adopted are managed in this way. The Executive is only one of a number of commissioners having responsibility without control, and occasionally it has happened that an official, such as the State Treasurer, has been designated in the commission in such manner as to impose the duties upon the individual and not the incumbent of the office. It is a custom more honored in the breach than in the observance. Where gov ernments have fallen, it has generally been because of encroachments by one department upon the province of others. The Constitution has given "supreme executive power" to the Governor and it is his duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. It is, of course, a convenience to the Governor that he should be relieved of burdens, but it is a relief that ought not to be conceded. He may well appoint commissions when necessary, but it comports neither with his duty nor the dignity of his office that he should be a member of commissions otherwise appointed. A further and very plain objection is that when the Governor appoints, in case of incompetency or misbehavior, he may remove, while the Legislature, after adjourn ment, does not meet again for two years and can exercise no con trol over the appointees.