third seat, must we honour by prayers.” The reader is referred to the entire passage, which is too long for insertion here. They are spoken of as possessing wonderful intelligence, as feeling a deep sympathy in human affairs, as loving the good, hating the bad, and, in consequence of their middle position in the air, acting as interpreters and mediators between God and man. To the same effect Socrates speaks of them in the Symposion, 202, E.: kaì yàp TãV TÒ Δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι Θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ, ἑρμηνεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν. διὰ τούτου ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη· Θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστ τιν ἡ ὁμιλία θεοῖς σὺν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐγρηγορόσι καὶ καὶ θεύδουσι— For the whole demonial race is between God and mortals, acting as interpreters or messengers to both. Through this passes all divination, and the whole prophetical art; for God mingles not directly with the human race, but through these media is ever carried on the intercourse between Heaven and men, both when awake and when asleep.” See, also, Apuleius, De Deo Socratis, 674 : Hos Græci nomine Δαίμονας nuncupant, inter terricolas colicolasque vectores, hinc precum inde donorum. Compare with the above, Hesiod, Works and Days, 233: ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐόντες ἀθάνατοι λεύσσουσιν. For, close at hand, Immortal eyes behold us evermore. So, also, a few lines below, where he represents the number of these invisible beings as amounting to thirty thousand: Τρὶς γὰρ μυρίοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρη Milton must certainly have had in mind this passage from Hesiod, and perhaps, also, 2 Kings, vi., 17: Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth, Unseen, both when we sleep and when we wake. In one of Plato's strange myths, which may be found in the fourth book of The Laws, 713, C., the Aaíuoves, or Genii, are represented as having been anciently (in the reign of Saturn) the political governors of mankind, ruling them as man rules the inferior animals. It was intended, probably, to indicate the Divine origin of law and government, in opposition to the absurd paradox that they derive, not only their forms and practical administration, but also their inherent authority, solely from the consent of the governed. It is, however, a paradox which it is difficult to refute by arguments capable of being appreciated by the mass of mankind, and therefore Plato, as is usual with him in such cases, does not surrender the truth, or leave it out of his scheme of legislation, but throws himself back upon an ancient myth. The length of the passage compels us to omit the Greek. On account, however, of its intrinsic value, as exhibiting the origin and ancient mode of presenting certain ideas, a version is given in full: "We have received a tradition of the blessed life of the men of those days, how abundantly and spontaneously it had all things. And this is said to have been the cause of it: Saturn, knowing, as we have related, how that human nature, in the absolute self-control of human affairs, can never avoid being filled with violence and unrighteousness, appointed as rulers and magistrates to our cities, not men, but beings of a Divine and nobler race, namely, the Genii. Just as we now conduct towards the flocks and all tame herds, in that we do not constitute oxen as rulers over oxen, nor goats over goats, but we ourselves retain the dominion, the same thing did the Deity, because he was a lover of men. He appointed over us a better race than ourselves, namely, the Aaíμoves; who, G & taking the oversight with much ease, both to themselves and us, and giving to us peace, and reverence, and true freedom, and an abundant supply of right and justice, rendered the families of men most blessed, and free from all tumult and sedition. This myth (he proceeds), when accommodated to the truth (ảλŋ¤ɛíg xpwμɛvos), or truly interpreted, really means, that in whatever states, not God, but some mere earthly power, has the ultimate sovereignty, there there can be no escape from evils; that we ought, as far as possible, to imitate that mode of life which existed in the time of Saturn; and that, giving earnest heed to whatever principle of immortality may yet remain in human institu. tions, we should, in public and private, administer both our families and our states in accordance with it; naming Law (vóμov) the dispensation (Nov Aιavoμýv), or government of Mind or Reason." The specimen of Plato's philology exhibited in this last sentence is poor enough; but the sentiment corresponds precisely to Aristotle's definition of Law, as Νοῦς ἄνευ ὀρέξεως, or Mind without passion. We find the same mythical statement in the Politicus, 271, P. 272, A. It may also be connected with the doctrine to which there was an allusion (page 231) as having some support in the Sacred Volume, namely, of guardian or superintending angels having the care of particular nations. As we have already said, this is regarded by Eusebius, Præp. Evang., xi., 26, as maintained in the Septuagint version of Deuteronomy, xxxii., 8-ὅτε διεμέριζεν Ὁ Ὕψιστος ἔθνη, ὡς διέσπειρεν υἱοὺς ̓Αδάμ, ἔστησεν ὅρια ἐθνῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ΑΓΓΕΛΩΝ ΘΕΟΥ- "When the Most High divided the nations, when he dispersed the sons of Adam, he established the boundaries of the nations according to the number of the angels of God. But Jacob was the Lord's portion; Israel was the line of his inheritance.” LXVIII. Beauty and Accuracy of the Ancient and Platonic Division of the Four Cardinal Virtues. Deep Moral Significance of the Four Greek Words, Ακολασία, Ακρατεία, Εγκράτεια, and Σwopoovvn, as indicating the Four Moral Degrees. PAGE 69, LINE 4. σώζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη μeтà pρovǹoεws: "Righteousness and temperance, or sobriety, with wisdom, save us." There was something very admirable in the ancient classification of the virtues under the four cardinal heads, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and oopía-righteousness, temperance, fortitude (a term which we use for want of a better), and wisdom. A most philosophical analysis of them all may be found in the Republic, lib. iv., commencing 427, P., and continued through several pages. They may be briefly defined thus: Alkaloσúvn has immediate reference to the duties we owe our fellow beings, although it is used by Plato, in the Republic, in a more extensive sense, for the state of soul from whence all right actions proceed, and in the composition of which all the other virtues do more or less enter. Ewopoσúvŋ, more properly, relates to duties we owe ourselves, or, according to Plato's favourite allegorical comparison of the soul to a state, dikaιoσúvη would have regard to its foreign relations, σωφροσύνη to its internal police. Ανδρεία is that strength of soul or will which gives to all the virtues activity and efficacy. See remarks on ȧvôpɛía, Dissertation xliii., p. 257. Zopía, when ranked among the virtues, is practical wisdom, as distinguished from the scientific or speculative moral insight of the mere casuist. It is what Plato elsewhere frequently styles opóvnois—a wisdom-not grounded on scientific calculations of utility deduced from antecedents and consequents, but rather an innate perception of right, the result of a pure heart clearing the under standing; being, in fact, a sense or taste, rather than science In its highest import, it would be an innate discernment of our relations to God and the universe, and the same with the Scripture Σοφία. Cicero has attempted the same distinctions of the four cardinal virtues, without the names, in his Offices, lib. i., 5. He most clearly imitates Plato. Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quatuor partium oritur ex aliqua. Aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur; aut in hominum societate tuenda, tribuendoque suum cuique, et rerum contractarum fide; aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine et robore; aut in omnium quæ fiunt, quæque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Quæ quatuor, quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur. The etymology of this beautiful word owopooúvŋ is put before us in this very passage from our text: σωφροσύνη ΣΩΖΕΙ. It is clearly from σόω, σόος, σώζω, and φρήν, opóv; and would, accordingly, signify the saving or healing virtue of the soul, soundness of the spirit or spiritual health, in distinction from that dissipation, corruption, or internal war which is the result of the opposite. The division into what are styled the four cardinal virtues may be regarded as made Kатà TоLÓTηтα, in respect to quality. There is another arrangement, which, to use a term of Aristotle, is made катà πоσóτητα, in respect to quantity. This expresses what may be styled the moral degrees, ascending, by way of climax, from the lowest stage, or total privation of all virtue, to the highest condition, or perfect health of the soul. They are represented by four Greek terms, namely, ἀκολασία, ἀκρατεία, ἐγκράτεια, and σωφροσύνη. The etymological analysis alone of these words contains, in itself, volumes of morality of a purer and more practical kind than is to be found in many a frigid treatise of modern casuistry. The first of two them, as |