endured, that there will be no set time when the great πρā§iç, or drama, of this world shall be brought to a fitting close, and every act receive its just recompense of reward? The wicked shall not stand in the judgment. Instead, however, of bringing forward such Old Testament texts in proof of the doctrine as a revealed truth, we would rather see in them a taking for granted of what the universal voice of humanity has ever proclaimed as the voice of God, uttered in the conscience as well as declared in his Word.

LXIV.

Platonic Use of the Word τύπος.

PAGE 64, LINE 4. ἥν τις μὴ γιγνώσκων οὐδ ̓ ἂν τύπον ἴδοι ποτέ, κ. τ. λ. Which, unless one knoweth, he can never know the type (the form) of life." That is, without this doctrine of the end of the wicked, and of the manner in which the present suspension and the final infliction of their doom contribute to the universal harmony, life would have no meaning. It would be Tohu and Bohu (Genesis, i., 2), a moral chaos, on which no intelligible form had been impressed; or, to take a comparison from Job, xxxviii., 14, it would be like a confused mass of clay, which had received the stamp (TÚTOç) of no significant seal. Tóπoç, also, in a secondary or metaphorical sense, means a summary description, or, in philosophy, a general idea, an outline, or model, requiring a correspondence or general conformity in the filling up of the more minute parts which are not specified. Hence the common phrase, έv túπw λéyɛiv, to say in general terms.

This use of the word may be found in the Republic, ii., 379, B., and the following pages, where Plato lays down what he styles τύποι περὶ θεολογίας, types in theology, or first principles respecting the Divine Nature, which are

ever to be kept in mind in forming a right estimate of God's character and government. In a similar application, we have τύπος, Romans, vi., 17 : χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ, ὑπηκούσατε ἐκ καρδίας εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε τύπον διδαχῆς-But, thanks be to God, ye have obeyed, from the heart, that form of doctrine in which ye were instructed. So, also, the derivative ὑποτύπωσις, 2 Timothy, i., 13—ὑποτύπωσιν ἔχε vyιaivóvтwv λóуwv, Hold fast the form of sound words (or doctrines)-doubtless referring to some symbol, creed, or catechism which Timothy had received from Paul, or had heard recited by him, containing an outline of the Christian faith, and which he was to use as a preacher and instructer in the Gospel. This Paul enjoins upon him to hold in faith and love (or, as he says in the passage in Romans, ék Kaρdías), instead of regarding it as a mere speculative scheme, into which, without care, such a TúяOÇ Or ŮTOTÚπωσις might degenerate.

Without understanding this type of life, we are told in the text, there could be no right judgment formed respecting happiness or blessedness, and their opposites. It is an expansion of the sentiment of Solon. A complete knowledge of what constitutes the blessed man depends, not only upon the end of his individual life, but also upon his relation to the great end, or ovvтéλeia, of the world or dispensation of which he forms a part. See Dissertation xxxviii., on the Greek Words for Happiness and Blessedness.

LXV.

Explanation of a Difficult Passage, in which Plato seems to assert that our Evils, in the Present State, exceed our Good.

PAGE 68, LINE 11. πλɛcóvwv dè T☎v μý. It is not easy to determine the true meaning here, or to decide with abso

lute certainty, whether the speaker intends to give the preponderance to good or evil in the present state; although there can be no doubt to which party, in this severe conflict, he would assign the final triumph. Ast renders it, pluribus vero quæ non sint bona, pugna, dicimus, immortalis est, &c.; to authorize which, he must supply ȧya@@v after un. In the Latin version to Clemens Alexandinus, Stromat., v., 593, it is translated, pluribus qui non sunt ejusmodi, which is as ambiguous as the Greek, and leaves it utterly uncertain whether ejusmodi is meant to refer to ȧyað☎v or évavríwv. Viger, in his Latin version of Eusebius, Præp. Evang., xi., 549, gives an entirely different rendering, by reading Tivov for Twv-quibuscum tamen genus aliud nullum misceatur—a sense which even his emendation, if it convey any meaning at all, would not yield. It might be, on the contrary (and the supposition has much intrinsic plausibility, if we lay aside all considerations drawn from other passages), that the writer meant, by twv μý, things neither good nor bad, or what some would style ȧdiápopa. Ficinus renders concisely, et quidem plurium, meaning thereby the evils; which construction, it may be supposed, he derived from supplying after μn the word έvavríwv, and regarding λɛtóvwv as governing Twv, instead of agreeing with it—as though the whole expression had been equivalent to ἐναντία πλείονα εἶναι τῶν μὴ ἐναντίων. The great objection to this is the exceeding awkwardness of the construction arising from thus piling negatives upon negatives.

Пλɛιóvwv would most naturally be referred to what just precedes it, namely, evavríwv. It might, however, be supposed that Plato wrote carelessly, and actually meant to connect it with dyalwv, farther above. In this case it would correspond to the clumsy English sentence, "full of good, and full of the contrary, but of more than what is not ;” which, notwithstanding its harshness, would leave little doubt as to the meaning, although it would require us to

regard πλɛιóvwv as governing Tv instead of agreeing with it. This view, namely, that tŵv un agrees with ảyalŵv understood, and is governed by λɛtóvwv, or which would regard the sentence as assigning a preponderance to the good, might likewise be strengthened by an inference very naturally drawn from his having so expressly given the superiority in the moving and control of the heavens to the beneficent soul; as where Clinias is made to say (page 38, line 1), οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν περιάγειν αὐτά. Especially might it be deduced from that subtle and beautiful disquisition on the resemblance of the heavenly motions to the motion of vous, or intellect, or of the best soul in distinction from that evil one which ever moves, μανικῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως, in madness and disorder. But, as we conceive, we are estopped from this interpretation, and compelled to acquiesce in the contrary, by the fact, that Plato, in the Republic, most expressly asserts that our evils exceed our good—ἀλλ ̓ ὀλίγων (ὁ θεός) αἴτιος, πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν. We cannot, therefore, help thinking that he suffered a morbid feeling of the immediate evils of the world directly around him, and which were magnified by contiguity, to cause him to forget the legitimate inferences from his own beautiful argument, and to make a declaration which would seem to imply that, on the whole, there is more evil than good. We may also indulge the supposition, that he refers merely to the present time, and believed that the great battle of the universe, or the μáxη álávaтoç, of which he soon speaks, would eventually bring out an opposite preponderance of good, and a final triumph of the beneficent over the evil and disorderly soul.

FF 2

LXVI.

Máxn 'Abávaros, or Battle of the Universe, between the Powers of Good and Evil. Sin, therefore, no Light Matter, because it is Treason against the Cause of Good, for which God is contending with the Evil Soul.

PAGE 68, LINE 11. ΜΑΧΗ δή, φαμέν, 'ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη, καὶ φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη. "Such, would we say, is an immortal conflict, and needing most wonderful care or vigilance." The simile which was commenced in Tóλɛuoç, several lines back, is here preserved and brought out in a style which it would be no extravagance to call sublime. All things are most vividly represented as engaged in an everlasting conflict between the powers of Good and Evil. This is the great ȧyúv which, as he elsewhere says, is ἀντὶ πάντων ἀγώνων, in the place of, or before, all other conflicts. In the description of this battle of the universe, the author seems inspired with a more than Homeric grandeur of imagination. The images in the Theomachia of the Iliad may have more tendency to excite and arouse the passions, but they are far inferior in the power of producing that swelling, yet calm feeling of moral sublimity with which the soul is filled in reading this noble passage. Not Gods alone

descending swell the fight,*

but all nature and all worlds rise into deeply interested parties to this universal strife. Order is everywhere struggling with disorder. Light is contending with darkness, truth with error, knowledge with ignorance. The science of medicine is fighting with disease, agriculture with the hostile stubbornness of the earth, art and science of every kind with the rude and savage life. On a higher

* Iliad, ΧΧ., 47. Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μεθ' όμιλον Ολύμπιοι ἤλυθον ἀνδρῶν.