De nihilo nihilὡς οὐ δύναται οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γεvéolaι—which, as it stands in the Greek, unmarred by any attempt to transfer it to a more imperfect language, is one of the clearest axioms of reason he held to an elementary principle, or ȧpxý, more ancient than matter, even in its lowest organized state, and which he and others styled hyle (vλn). Although he sometimes seems to use this term in the sense of material or source, yet he could not have meant by it matter itself as something solid, extended, or resisting, since he expressly denies to it any of these properties, or, indeed, any connexion in itself with the sensible world; regarding it, in fact, as belonging to the vonτá, rather than, in any sense, to the alooŋrá. No sublimation or refinement of the conception of resisting substance, even when carried to its most æthereal limits-not even the nebular star dust* or rudimentary fluid of the universe, which some modern writers find so convenient an aid in the construction of planetary systems-made the least approach to it; for it was not a mere difference of degree, but a metaphysical entity altogether distinct. It is very difficult to understand precisely what idea Plato and other Greek philosophers attached to this elementary hyle, without form, exten *This is a favourite term with those scientific men who are ever talking about the progression of the universe from the lower to the higher, from the imperfect to the more perfect, from the unorganized to the organized, and, as they ought to say if they would consistently follow out their theory, from matter to mind, and, finally, to a God. But, on another hypothesis of occasional retrogradations (which no one who considers the vast extent of the universe can deny to be possible, probable, and in perfect consistency with some unfathomable designs of its Eternal Author), the peculiar celestial appearances indicated by this phrase may be, in fact, the floating remains of worlds going out, and in the last stages of their approach to inanity. We are too much in the condition of the fly on the Pyramids, to determine with any satisfaction, unless we resort to reasons drawn from revelation, which theory is correct, or whether we are physically nearer our descending or ascending node. sion, parts, or divisibility. Some ȧpxn or principle seems to have been in his mind as the origin of matter, which was not matter; and yet something separate from the Deity, and existing with him before the formation of the outward material universe. * We are confident, for the reasons assigned, that he did not hold to its necessary eternity, but it is not easy to determine whether he regarded it as an emanation, a generation, or a creation, in the more modern sense of the word. Whether it was merely space regarded as an ȧpx, or first principle, like the anεiрov, or infinite of Anaximander; or something similar to the unextended points in the modern theory of Boscovitch; whether it was the manifestation of the Divine power in space, so that visible outward matter would be only those impressions upon soul, of resistance, figure, &c., which are the result of the action of the Divine immaterial principle-a theory which, although ridiculed as Berkleian and absurd, gives us all the results or properties of matter, which is matter enough for all substantial purposes, while yet it leaves spirit, in reality, the only ovoía, or essence in the universe-or whatever else we may suppose, it is certain that Plato did not teach the necessary self-existence of matter according to the common idea, that is, as a substance composed of solid, extended parts or particles, whether regarded as existing in an organized or a chaotic state. The axiom De nihilo nihil, or others similar to it, may be found in his writings and those of Aristotle. They both regarded it as a self-evident truth; and the latter, in the first book of his Physics, c. 4, asserts that it was the common * In the passage of the Timæus which we have cited page 123, he uses language which seems to describe it as the matter or material from which matter was formed, yet still without any of its sensible properties. He also styles it there the mother of the sensible world, as though it were the passive or negative principle, while God was the father, or positive power, which produced its manifestations in time and space. opinion of all the ancient naturalists, that nothing could come into being from that which was not—κοινὴ δόξα τῶν φυσικῶν, ὡς οὐ ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΥ οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ΟΝΤΟΣ. This is capable, it is true, of being taken in the atheistic ́or materializing sense by those who lay no emphasis on the contrast between the two substantive verbs, or who regard the latter, in this expression, as significant of the material, or of the terminus a quo. If, however, we keep in mind the radical distinction between εἰμί and γίγνομαι, as explained page 171, and which is generally maintained by Plato in all important propositions, we shall find this sentence divested at once of all objectionable features, and presented, as it really is, as one of the clearest dictates of reason. This language may be, and has been, used by the atheist; but it is capable of being employed with far more power against him. Aristotle gives us the key to this higher sense in another place, where he says, with his usual conciseness, ὥστε ἔσται πρὶν γενέσθαι—that essential or necessary being must be before generation; or, in other words, that there must be a being before a becoming. Vide Arist., Phys. Ausc., i., 9. The position, thus understood, is that which forms the very soul of Plato's philosophy, namely, the superior rank and antiquity of incorporeal substance in respect to all derived or generated things. It is the very position which he so strongly maintains in this tenth book of The Laws, to wit, "that soul (in its largest sense, and including the Divine Soul, as the source from whence all other spirits proceed, and in which they may be said to pre-exist) must, of necessity, have existed eternally, or that mind is necessarily older than matter." Instead of being favourable to atheism, it is, when thus held, the grand conservative principle which ever stands in direct opposition to it. The English fails properly to express the axiom, in this sense, from the want of two words exactly corresponding to εἰμί and γίγνομαι; and when care lessly rendered it seems to favour the eternal existence of matter. The Latin has the same defect; and hence the atheistic perversion by Lucretius to a purpose so different from that intended by Plato and the Grecian theists. This arises from referring the term ὄντος, as well as γιγνομένου, to generated and phenomenal being, to which, when used in this higher sense, and especially when placed in such direct antithesis, it has no application; and we are thus led into the mistake that all the ancient philosophers taught that matter could only proceed from pre-existent matter. The idea conveyed by the proposition, οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι, or, if the positive form is preferred, πάντα ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος γενέσθαι, may be shown to be very similar to that of the Apostle, Hebrews, xi., 3: By faith we understand that the worlds were made by the Word of God, so that the things that are seen were not made (yɛyovévaı) from things which do appear, ἐκ φαινομένων. There is another reading given by Griesbach, namely, έk μǹ paivoμévwv; on what authority, however, we know not. This would change the sentence to the positive form, and bring it nearer to the Greek maxim when taken in the higher sense to which we have alluded, but would not essentially vary its meaning. It would then be rendered, By faith we understand that the worlds were formed, so that the things which are seen were made from things which are not seen; or, in other words, that the visible or phenomenal was made from the invisible. A slight attention will show a resemblance to the Greek maxim which does not at first sight appear, and that the language of the Apostle is in several respects similar to the Platonic. Besides the distinctions so frequently conveyed by ǎvra and yɩyvóμɛva, the same ideas are variously expressed in Plato by the terms ópará or paivóμɛva (the visible, or phenomenal), used in place of γιγνόμενα ; and ἀόρατα, ἀειδή, οι μὴ φαινόμενα, used as synonymous with τὰ ὄντα. By these and kindred terms he ever opposes the visible to the invisible, the phenomenal to the essential, the ever-changing objects of sense (τὰ αἰσθητά) to the νοητά, or those necessary, eternal things which are the objects of the intellect alone. It is not supposed that Paul had any direct reference to Plato or to Platonic language; but we cannot doubt that he uses these words in a similar philosophical sense, especially when we compare the many coincidences of expression, and remember that, although originally derived from Plato, these terms, in the Apostle's time, had become a part of the current scholastic phraseology, with which he must have been familiar. So, also, the words τà μǹ ẞheпóμεva (the unseen things), which we find He. brews, xi., 1, and which are equivalent to uǹ païvóμeva in the third verse, are elsewhere used by the Apostle to express the same class of substances which are so frequently styled by Plato, τὰ ὄντα, τὰ ὁρατά, τὰ ἀειδή, τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ TaνTà Kai woαúτws exovтa. Compare 2d Corinthians, iv., 18: μὴ σκοπούντων ἡμῶν τὰ βλεπόμενα ἀλλὰ τὰ μὴ βλε πόμενα· τὰ γὰρ βλεπόμενα πρόσκαιρα, τὰ δὲ μὴ βλεπόpeva aiúvia-while we aim not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are unseen; for the things which are seen are temporal (belong to time); the things which are unseen are eternal. The striking resemblance which this bears to some passages in the Phædon cannot be mistaken : Θῶμεν οὖν δὴ δύο εἴδη, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδές· και τὸ μὲν ἀειδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέ TOTE KATÀ TAνTá-"Let us lay down two classes of being, the seen and the unseen: the unseen, eternal in their relations; the seen, never the same, but ever changing." Phedon, 79, A. The terms are nearly, if not quite, synony. mous. Прóσkαιpa is that which exists in time, temporal, or, rather, temporary-liable to change the opposite of ȧeì κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχοντα. On the other hand, αιώνια is that which is eternal, not simply in duration, but in its very nature, as not belonging to time-fixed, unchangeable, and ne |