XLII.

Highest Proof of the Divine Goodness, the a priori Conviction of the Moral Sense.

PAGE 51, LINE 13. 'Aya@oúç Tε Kai àρíoтovę. The ap peal is here directly to the moral sense. The intelligence and power of the Deity may be matters of inductive reasoning, although even for these, and especially the former, there may be as good a ground of belief in the a priori conviction which every man possesses. But we may safely say that no one really ever resorts to external induction for his own private individual satisfaction in the belief that God is good; although on other grounds, and from other motives, it may sometimes be made the subject of speculative argument. We cannot bear the contrary opinion. Just as by the laws of our minds we are compelled to assert that matter has in itself no inherent property of motion, notwithstanding all mere inductive experience of an ever-restless, ever-moving world is in opposition to such an a priori conviction; so, likewise, are we compelled to believe and feel that God is good, however much inductive argument from all the facts around us, in this world of disorder, might go towards maintaining the contrary dogma. Even those who assert most strenuously that the Divine benevolence is proved from the observation of external nature carry along with them this a priori conviction, without, perhaps, being aware of the fact, that from it is derived, to their own minds and the minds of others, the main force of every argument by which they would sustain their preconceived hypothesis. Let this innate conviction be utterly banished from the soul, and we might then see, if it were possible to put ourselves in that condition, what is the real strength, or, rather, real weakness of the a posteriori proof. Should even the great mass of facts which fall within the sphere of our observa

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tion be favourable to such a position, yet what right would we have to extend this to the immense scale of the uni. verse, unless impelled to it by the unconscious working of this innate law of our moral nature? If this world were filled with happiness to overflowing, how could so narrow an induction dare to step beyond its limits? What is our position, with infinite space all around us, and two illimitable eternities, before and behind us, that we should draw any inferences from a mere induction of facts as to the moral attributes of the Deity, unless in the soul itself there is some sure foundation for faith in their existence? If, however, on the other hand, we are actually compelled to reverse the picture, and to assert that misery, in our world at least, forms the rule, and happiness the exception-if the Bible tells us that man is born to sorrow-if Plato declares that our good things are much fewer in number than our evil things-and if the true voice of humanity has responded in all ages to these assertions both of profane and Holy Writ

-on what ground can we yet cling to the belief in the Di. vine benevolence, except by relying on the deep conviction of that moral sense, which tells us, and, even though worlds on worlds should exhibit facts to the contrary, would still tell us, that God is good.

If no induction can prove it, neither can any induction strip us of the belief as long as the soul remains true to herself. There is within us something higher than the speculative or the inductive reason, which exclaims, as the spontaneous sentiment of the soul, which she can neither demonstrate nor reject, If there be a God, he must be good, and must delight in goodness. The Judge of all the Earth must do right. In proof of this, Plato does not hesitate to appeal here to the consciences even of his supposed opponents, and therefore he says, Tévte övtes—all five of us, namely, the three parties to the dialogue, and the two imaginary disputants who speculatively deny a providence; as

much as to say, Here we all agree-here there is no need of argument; we all admit that, if there is a God, he must be good, however much we may differ as to that in which his goodness consists.

XLIII.

Sublime Mode in which the Bible represents the Divine Providence and Omniscience as contrasted with all mere Philos ophizing on these Attributes. Analysis of the Greek Word 'Avôpeía, as denoting one of the Cardinal Virtues of Soul. PAGE 62, LINE 2. Δειλίας γὰρ ἔκγονος, κ. τ. λ. By connecting this with what is said, page 46, line 10, àperõs μèv ἀνδρείαν είναι, δειλίαν δὲ, κακίας, we get the whole argument, which may be thus stated: We admit the Gods to be good: avopeía is a part of virtue; deiλía is its opposite; apyía is the offspring of deiλía: therefore it cannot be through ἀργία and ῥαθυμία that the Gods neglect the affairs of men. He had before proved that it could not be from want of power. This is conclusive. As a matter of reasoning, it is admirably stated, and is in itself unanswerable. And yet in a manner how different from all this parade of argument do the Scriptures treat this subject of the Divine providence and omniscience. How sublimely do they assume all these positions, without reasoning at all about them. The Lord looks down from heaven. His eyes behold, and his eyelids try the ways of the children of men. He knoweth our sitting down and our rising up. He understandeth our thought afar off. He never slumbereth nor sleepeth that keepeth Israel. As the mountains are round about Jerusalem, so the Lord is round about his people from henceforth and for evermore. The eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the good. This is the style worthy of a Divine revelation; and how poor aoes our cold philosophizing, even in its best, and loft

iest, and most religious efforts, appear in the comparison. Who can turn from the Grecian poets and philosophers, with all their acknowledged excellences-yea, even from the almost divine Plato himself to the Holy Scriptures, without feeling, for the time, a conviction amounting to the full assurance of absolute certainty, that the latter is indeed from Heaven-the voice of God, and not of man?

The term avopeía, here used, would seem, if etymologically considered, to be improperly applied to the Deity. This objection, however, is entitled to but little weight. The word is applicable to spiritual energy of any kind, as well as to that which is properly human. It denotes, strictly, energy of soul, or strength of will; not merely in the sense of physical power, outwardly to execute its volitions, but rather as a pure, internal, spiritual force, by which one man or one being may differ from another. There may be a good will, yet weak; but when this moral strength is added to the other cardinal virtues, the manly character is said to be complete, and hence the name. It is what the Apostle means by the word åpeτń (the same with the Latin virtus, from a similar etymology), when he says, Add to your faith virtue. In the Laches, 192, D., Plato defines it as καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς. Elsewhere, connecting it with all the virtues, he describes the truly brave man as one who fears nothing which ought not to be feared, while, at the same time, he fears everything which ought to be feared; thus viewing it as in unison with the highest wisdom, and as utterly opposed to that blind, counterfeit foolhardiness which has no relation to the rational soul, but belongs as much to the beast as to a human being. Hence he shows that "the truly brave, since he must know what is truly good, must necessarily partake of righteousness, temperance, and holiness; because to him alone it pertains, by reason of this virtue, to have a true fear in regard to God and man, so as to fear what ought to be feared, and to be ever bold when

engaged in right and duty" (vide the Laches, 199, D.); thus making ȧvopɛía the support and life of all the other virtues, according to a favourite theory, that they are all, when genuine, essentially connected; that, where one exists, all exist in a greater or less degree; and that, where one is wanting, all are to be suspected of spuriousness.

"that

In this sense of energy of will* it is properly applied to the Deity, notwithstanding the apparent etymological inconsistency. It strikingly suggests that definition of the Divine nature which Aristotle ascribes to Plato, namely, whose very essence is energy —ἡ ἀρχὴ ἦς οὐσία ἐνέργειά ἐστ TIV; that which must act with an intensity of energy proportioned to an infinite nature, ever in harmony with itself, and ever in the most vehement and burning opposition to all that is unlike. See remarks on this passage of Aristotle, page 190.

Δειλία is the opposite of ἀνδρεία. In some respects it is nearly synonymous with pa@vuía, easiness, fickleness, or weakness of will. Tpvon, effeminacy, the result of sensuality. No terms, certainly, could be more remote from any right conception of a spiritual God. To such as those with whom Plato supposes himself contending, and to all who deny a special providence (although they may not see the logical consequences as the philosopher has analyzed them), may be applied the language of the Bible: Ye thought that I was altogether such a one as yourselves. And yet men of this description often assume to be under the teaching of a higher philosophy than those weak and simple ones, who imagine that their smallest sins and their lightest cares are the objects of God's special regard.

Philosophical theism often seems to talk very piously,

* We would ever use the term will, in such a connexion as this, in its highest import, as distinguished from animal wilfulness, or mere volition, and as ever conjoined with reason; or, as Cicero defines it, Voluntas est qua quid cum ratione desiderat.