senting, as it does, less of subtle physico-metaphysical discussion, and more that is in strictest harmony with the Holy Scriptures. The author is now to prove the doctrine of a special providence against those who speculatively admitted the existence of a Deity, and yet could not believe that he concerned himself with the ordinary affairs of human life; especially, what seemed to them of so little consequence— human sins. Cudworth asserts that "Plato, in his tenth book of Laws, professedly opposing the atheists, and undertaking to prove the existence of a Deity, does, notwithstanding, ascend no higher than to the Psyche, or Universal Mundane Soul, as the self-moving principle, and the immediate or proper cause of all the motion which is in the world. And this (he says) is all the God he there undertakes to prove." This very learned man must have strangely overlooked the latter part of this book, upon which we are now entering, or he could not have made so incorrect an assertion. It is true, that all which his previous argument has required as yet has been the existence of such a Psyche; but he now advances not only above self-motion, or psychical power, to the second hypostasis of intelligence, or Nous (as it may be regarded when viewed according to the statements and divisions of the Timæus), but also to that still higher degree which is above mind or intelligence, and which he elsewhere styles Tò 'Ayalóv; including, in the idea, all moral attributes-justice and severity, as well as benevolence and compassion. It is of this higher degree, or hypostasis, as we think it may be styled, that Plato, or some later Platonist, thus speaks, in that remarkable passage, contained in what is styled the second epistle to Dionysius, 312, E.: IIεpì Tòv πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' εστί, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα· καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν· δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα" All things relate to the King of all, and on his account are all things, and he is the cause of all things beautiful; but the second honours pertain to the second, and the third to the third." In other words, He is the final, or moral, as well as the designing, and the efficient or psychical cause of all things (Éveka ov Távта); for the manifestation of whose moral glory all things are created, moved, and constantly governed. Every reader must admit that the admirable arguments which follow in the remainder of the book are generally in strict accordance with the Holy Scriptures, and that Plato even reasons on this part of his subject in a more religious manner than many nominally Christian writers; much of whose theology and science might fairly be ranked with the very atheism with which he is here contending. XXXVIII. The Greek Words for Blessedness, Happiness, Fortune, &c. PAGE 42, LINE 14. ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι, κ. τ. λ. The words εὐδαίμων, εὐδαι povía, do not refer simply to a state of present pleasure or enjoyment; for, in that sense, the poets and others were right in asserting, and the philosopher could not deny, that wicked men are often happy. Evdaíuwv, in its primitive, etymological import, has a much higher sense than this; a sense derived to it at that time, when Aaíuwv remained unimpaired in its significance as one of the Divine names, and had not yet been corrupted into that atheistic sense of Fortune which it subsequently acquired in the natural degeneracy of man and of language. From ev and Aaíuwv, it would etymologically signify one who had the favour of Heaven; and its purest meaning would be best expressed by our good old Saxon word blessed. It refers not simply to a man's present state of feeling or enjoyment, but to the whole of his being and his relation to the whole; so that one in the midst of the most acute pain, like the martyrs in the flames, might be evdaíuwv; while another, in the present enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, might be ǎ02oç: as Socrates, in the Gorgias, describes the life of the sensualist as δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος, and asks if any one would dare to call such εὐδαίμονας, or blessed, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται—“ even if they have in the greatest abundance all that their souls may desire." Gorgias, 494, E. This is also the meaning of Solon in that most celebrated account which Herodotus gives of his interview with Croesus; although he sometimes uses õλbios instead of ɛvdaíμwv, out of accommodation to the language of the sensual Phrygian. Plato himself clearly gives this as the radical idea of the word, and seems evidently to allude to its etymology when he says, οὐ γὰρ ̓́ΑΝΕΥ ΓΕ ΘΕΩΝ μήποτέ τις εὐδαίμων ἐστίν—“ Without the Gods no man can be called εὐδαίμων, blessed, or happy." So, also, in the Timæus, 90, D.: Aɛi δὲ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον, ἔχοντά τε 'ΕΥ μάλα κεκοσμημένον τὸν ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ ξύνοικον ἐν αὑτῷ διαφερόντως ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ είναι— He must be blessed beyond all others who cultivates the divine, and who has ever in harmony within him the indwelling God." The juxtaposition of terms here leaves no doubt that there was intended an allusion to the radical sense and etymology of the word. same allusion in the Orestes of Euripides: Ὅταν δ' ὁ ΔΑΙΜΩΝ ΕΥ διδῷ τί δεῖ φίλων ; There is the When God his blessing grants, what need of friends? Euripides, Orestes, 660. These lines are quoted by Aristotle in the discussion of the question, πότερον εὐδαίμων δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μή; Ethic. Nicomach., ix., 9. Even this cold and passionless writer tells us that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is a divine thing (θεῖον TI), and without the favour of Heaven cannot grow on the soil of earth: Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι θεῶν ἐστι δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι -66 'If, therefore, there is any other thing which is the gift of the Gods, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is Heaven's own peculiar boon." Ethic. Nicomach., lib. i., 9. For similar passages, the reader is referred to his Ethic. Eudem., lib. i., 8; Ethic. Nicomach., lib. i., 12; and especially to lib. x., 8, where, treating of εvdaμovía in its other aspect, as an active exercise of the soul, instead of simply a state of well-being, he defines it to be a contemplative energy-θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια—such as we have supposed (page 225) to form the chief element in the bliss of the heavenly world. It is this which, in his view, constitutes the happiness of the Deity, and of that human state which is nearest to the divine. In proof of it, he asserts that no one of the inferior animals can ever be styled εvdaíμwv, because the term implies a state possible only in relation to a religious and rational being, or one who could be sensible of the blessedness of the Divine favour: To μèv yàp veậ πᾶς ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων· τοῖς δ ̓ ἀνθρώποις ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμοῦ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας· καὶ ᾧ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Wherefore, as he says in what follows, every such a one is dɛopiλéoTαTоç, or most beloved of Heaven. It will be seen how visibly, in all these extracts, can be traced the radical, etymological idea of the term, as it was exhibited in the most primitive Greek, and how very similar it is to the corresponding one presented in the Bible, although the former may not be taken in so elevated a sense, and perhaps never comes up to the full etymological import which may fairly be supposed to be contained in its component parts. The Scriptures speak of it as the blessedness of that man who enjoys the Divine favour: Blessed is the man (or peo X ple) whose God is the Lord; blessed are they who dwell in thy house; who remain in the secret place of the Most High; who abide under the shadow of the Almighty. Thy favour is life, and thy loving kindness is better than life. Δυσδαίμων and δυσδαιμονία as clearly express the oppo. site view, namely, not merely present misery, but the state of one visited by the displeasure of Heaven. It is thus repeatedly used by Edipus, in the Phœnissæ of Euripides, when lamenting his wretched condition as one pursued from his earliest years by the wrath of the Gods, on account of his own sins and his father's impious disobedience to the oracle: ΑΡΑΣ παραλαβὼν Λαΐου καὶ παισὶ δούς. οὐ γὰρ, . . . ἄνευ θεῶν του, ταῦτ' ἐμηχανησάμην. εἶεν· τί δράσω δῆθ ̓ ὁ ΔΥΣΔΑΙΜΩΝ ἐγώ. Phanissa, 1626. In its later applications, evdaovía loses much of its old religious sense, and degenerates into a synonyme of εvtvxía, or good fortune, losing almost entirely its etymological reference to the favour of an overruling divinity. In this it shares the corruption of its principal component part, daíμwv. For a most striking illustration, however, of the radical primitive difference between εὐδαίμων and εὐτυχής, we may refer to Euripides, Medea, 1225: θνητῶν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ φύσει· By nature none of mortal race are blessed When wealth flows in, one man may be more happy The contrast between this beautiful Greek word and the one by which it is generally rendered in our own tongue is very striking. The Saxon happiness is from hap, signifying luck, fortune, or chance; a sense to which the Greek, as we |