respect to man, and pantheism (which is, in fact, the same doctrine) in respect to the universe. Πολλοστήν, Пoλλoσтý, as it appears in this sentence, is a very peculiar word. It signifies one of many, a fraction whose denominator is a very large number, and hence its name—an infinitesimal part. Compare the Philebus, 44, P.: τà ñOλλοστὰ σκληρότητι; where it is put in direct contrast with okληpóтaтa, as an infinitesimal fraction opposed to a superlative. There is also a peculiar grammatical anomaly in this word. According to the order of its construction in the sentence, it should be Toλ200τý, since it regularly refers to devτépa, and must be taken in connexion with it. It is, however, made accusative, in consequence of its position after the infinitive, ἀριθμεῖν, and by the attraction of αὐτήν. This differs from the ordinary case of attraction which exists between the relative and antecedent. It may be styled euphonic, because it seems to affect words solely for the sake of euphony, or, rather, homeophony, and on the mere ground of contiguity in location, although very remotely related in all other respects; so much so, that, in this way, great violence is sometimes done to the true grammatical construction. There is no need of resorting to any various reading, or to any conjectural emendation. We have no doubt, from the location of the word, that Plato wrote πоλLooτηv, however harsh the construction may appear to us. The position of Toσоúтwv also seems very awkward, and yet (although we cannot well keep it in that place when we adopt the order for a literal translation) it is easy to see that, by standing where it does, it has a much stronger emphasis than though it had occurred in the beginning of the clause; as though we should thus paraphrase it in English: "However great the number, carry it as high as you please, still by so much (TOσOÚTWV) is it remote," &c. This principle of local or euphonic attraction, although it sometimes interferes with grammatical smoothness, is undoubtedly in accordance with the genius of the language; and no true scholar can endure the attempts which are sometimes made to divest it of this peculiarity by means of pretended emendations. XXX. Argument of Ancient Atheists, that Apparent Evidences of Design were only Evidences of Subsequent Accommodation. Things (they said) older than Knowledge of Things, and therefore older than Soul. PAGE 31, LINE 8. Τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ πρότερα σωμάτων, κ. τ. λ. The full force of this cannot be appreciated unless we keep in mind the objection against which it was directed. The ancient atheists said that soul was the offspring or result of matter, and consequently younger. Hence what theists would call evidences of design, or of mind's preceding matter, they would regard as merely subsequent accommodations to an accidental existing state of things, which, had it been any other, would, in like manner, have drawn after it the only uses and accommodations to which it could be adapted; and which, in that case, would have carried with them like appearances of previous design, or, as Lucretius has most concisely expressed it, Nil adeo natum est in corpore, ut uti Thus, for example, they would say, in accordance with their theory, that teeth were not made of a certain shape with the previous design that the animal should eat herbs, but that, because they happened to be of a certain form (and there was no reason in themselves why they should be of one form rather than another), therefore nature applied them to the use, and the only use, adapted to their accidental structure. Again, if certain bodies had, in the course of ages, received from Túxn elongated projections from the main trunk, or an attenuated and flexible shape, or a rounded form, in all these cases, they would have said, and did say, that that animation residing in them (which was itself but a junior art, the production of an older púσiç), when it found itself thus circumstanced, made the best of its condition, by accommodating the one to a walking, the other to a crawling, and the other to a rolling locomotion. So, also, had they been acquainted with some of the arguments of our modern natural theology, they would have denied that the revolution of the earth on its axis was adjusted to twen. ty-four hours, with any design that such a period should correspond to designed circumstances in the alternating changes which occur in the economy of the animal and vegetable tribes. On the contrary, they would have contended that, in the eternal and fortuitous dance of Túxn, the earth having received such an accidental impulse as just produced the aforesaid period, nature, in time, accommodated to it the intervals for the exercise and relaxation of human bodies, together with all the periodical vicissitudes which seem to have relation to such a revolution; and that, had this accidental period been of any other length, the same adapting puois and rúxn would, long before this, have brought all the earthly economy into perfect harmony with it. This argument, of which we have given an imperfect outline, they carried to great length, and it is easy to see that it is capable of a most extensive and subtle application. It is difficult, if not impossible, for any one who admits the doctrine of occult properties to any extent in matter, to give a direct answer to the objections drawn from it; and yet we believe that not a vestige of any skeptical doubt which it may produce can remain upon the mind, after reading Paley's most valuable work on natural theology. As a specu S lative argument, this doctrine of subsequent accommodation, as opposed to a previous designed use, may have a formidable appearance, but it vanishes on a close observation of nature, because the soul, in such observation, instead of really relying on a posteriori facts, cannot divest itself of that a priori view which believes in design, and looks for design, and carries along the preconception of design as involved in those ideas of God and truth with which it enters upon the investigation. Plato, as we have seen, overcomes the difficulty by beginning with motion instead of evidences of design; thence, from this more remote point of view, proving the higher antiquity of soul, then of the acts or exercises of soul, one of which is Bouλnois, purpose, or design. Another subtle objection from this same school was, that knowledge, being the knowledge of things, must, therefore, have been posterior to things; hence that mind was younger than matter. In this they, of course, rejected the doctrine of any other knowledge than that of things, or that the mind or intellect contained, in any sense, its own ideas or intelligibles (vonτá); making it to be all from without by way of impression from the external world.* If this be * Should it be said that the objection may be stated in the same way in respect to ideal or eternal truth, and that there must have been vonτá before vous, or truth before knowledge, the only reply is, that God is at the same time, and from eternity, both vous and voŋtóv, intelligens and intelligibile, or intellectum. It is the absolute necessity of some such view which suggested to the most profound minds of antiquity the idea of a plurality in the Divine nature, a distinction of two hypostases, at least, with a third, vxn, to which they were related, and in which they were united. Instead of being contrary to reason, it was the highest result to which she arrived (if the truth was not rather obtained from some primitive revelation), as her only refuge against the cheerless and incomprehensible conception of an eternal, solitary monadity, or the equally difficult conception of a necessary, eternal, outward universe, towards which the Divine love and the Divine intelligence might be directed. atheism, as it most assuredly is, when held in relation to the Divine Mind, what shall we think of the corresponding doctrine when applied to the human soul? If we start from the conclusions to which such inquiries lead us, it should be borne in mind, that the only possible defence against them must be found in that ideal philosophy which supposes a knowledge belonging to mind, as mind, whether it be Divine or human, entirely independent of things, or of any outward world. The above atheistic objection is also expressed by Lucretius, with far more of poetry than piety: Exemplum porro gignundis rebus, et ipsa Notities hominum Divis unde insita primum, Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi? Lucretius, lib. v., 182. XXXI. Platonic Doctrine of the Evil Principle. Of 'Aváyên, or Necessity. 66 PAGE 32, LINE 2. Δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξερ. yağɛola" Nothing less than two, at least, the one that does us good, and the one that is able to do the contrary." We have here presented, in the most unequivocal terms, that grand defect in Plato's theology, which occasionally mars, by its presence, almost every part of his otherwise noble system. It is most clear, from this and other passages in his dialogues, that he held the doctrine of two uncreated principles or souls, one good (or the benefactor, as he styles him), the other evil. Neither Plato, however, nor Zoroaster, can be charged with the absurdity of believing in two Supremes. They avoided this by running into the incon |