cannot divest ourselves. Hence, after proving, even from physical premises, that there must be somewhere self-motion, the mind attaches this λóyos to its ovoμa, and affirms that this self-motion is soul, vxń, Geist, &c.-being the same unchanging notion, whatever be the name—and that this name, although affixed to the flowing and varying sensible phenomenon from which it may have been etymologically derived, ultimately represents the immutable λóyos of which that sensible* phenomenon is the symbol.

* Το dwell on this distinction between ὄνομα (or ῥῆμα) and λόγος at greater length, we may say, that the former simply represents a sensible perception or action (aiolŋróv), or what Plato sometimes calls eidwλov; the latter, a thought, an idea (idéa), the intelligibile, intellectum, or voŋtóv, being no part of the sensible image or action, but suggested or symbolized by it. All words, being a communication from mind to mind, through matter, must array the thought, during its passage, in the garments of the flesh, or, in other words, must originally represent something sensible. The ovoμa, then, in reality, goes no farther than this sensible image or action, which it primarily presents. There are but two stages in the process. The 2óyos, on the other hand, goes beyond this, and represents the intelligibile, or vonróv, of which that image, action, or alolŋróv, is but the symbol. Here, then, are, in fact, three stages, and the ɛidwλov, or action, which the word, as ovoμa, presents, does itself re-present something still behind it. The life of language is gone, when, with respect to abstract terms, the primary sensible images have faded away and become unknown, or, in other words, when this second stage in the process has been left out, and the word stands for the thought, in the same way that x and y represent quantities in algebra.

The same term may be regarded both as ὄνομα and λόγος. For example, the word circle, as a name, merely presents that round, sensible image, which, as far as the ridwλov is concerned, is the same to the vision of an animal as of a Newton; as λóyoç, it suggests that cardinal idea, involving all the properties of the figure, which is present to the mind of the mathematician, and of which this ɛidwλov is itself the word or representative. This cannot be better expressed than in the language of Plato himself, if the Epistles can in any way be regarded as genuine : κύκλος, τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἴσον ἀπέχον πάντη, ΛΟΓΟΣ ἂν εἴη ἐκείνου ᾧπερ στρογγύλον καὶ περιφερὲς

It is not a vain support to rely upon language. We may say, in the words which Plato puts into the mouth of Cratylus, Οἶμαι μὲν μείζω τινὰ δύναμιν εἶναι ἢ ἀνθρωπείαν, τὴν θεμένην τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν. Cratylus, 438, C. As is shown in this last-cited dialogue, it follows, in its origin and progress, an inward necessity, and must, therefore, possess inward truth and necessary correctness.* It is a striking proof of its Divine origin (we mean in the bounding, defining, classifying, and combining of ideas, and not in the outward vocal sounds affixed to them), that the atheist or materialist cannot use it as it is, but must change the meaning of its terms to suit non-existent notions, to which it never has been and never can be adapted, without introducing confusion extending far beyond the particular cases of amendment. He must have an entire new dialect, and that, too, one which will ever destroy itself by the contradictions, discords, and jarring inconsistencies which must exist between its parts, in every attempt to express the doctrine of death in words necessitated to glow with a life which no efforts can wholly quench.

It has been well observed, that there is no language under heaven in which the atheist, the pantheist, or the man who denies the reality of moral distinctions, can talk five minutes without a logical contradiction, or, in other words, a war of ideas. Should they form a new one, and take the utmost pains to adapt it to their philosophy of darkness, it will be found to be built on a disarrangement of the necessary and logical elements of speech, and must soon perish by reason of its own innate contradictions. No such Babel, formed in opposition to the high decree of Heaven, can ever ὄνομα καὶ κύκλος. "The word circle, representing the idea of equality in every direction, from extremities to a central point, is the 26yos of that to which roundness, and periphery, and circle, are the names." Plat., Epist., vii., 342, B. Compare, also, the Theatetus, 201, 202; Sophista, 221, A.

* See Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Cratylus.

stand. The ideas of incorporeal substance, of eternal verities, of moral distinctions, cannot be separated from language. The proof of soul and of God is stamped upon it as indelibly as it is written on the firmament of heaven itself. Some of the views we have been endeavouring to set forth may be found admirably stated in Varro's account of the Platonic or Socratic philosophy, especially in respect to the importance it attached to innate notions and words as representatives of them, in Cicero, Acad. Poster., viii.! Tertia deinde philosophiæ pars, quæ erat in ratione et in disserendo sic tractabatur; quanquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esset judicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem (vous) volebant rerum esse judicem : solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper esset, (τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα), simplex et unius modi (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ kai wσaúτws) et tale quale esset. Hanc illi ideam appellabant, jam a Platone ita nominatam: nos recte speciem (ɛidoc) possumus dicere. Sensus autem omnes hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo eas res quæ subjectæ sensibus viderentur, quæ essent ita mobiles (péovra) et concitatæ, ut nihil unquam unum esse constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem (došaoTóv) appellabant. Scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus (λóyo), qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. Verborum explicatio probabatur, qua de causa quæque essent ita nominata, quam etymologiam appellabant. Argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id quod explanari volebant, in qua tradebatur omnis dialectica disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusa.

XXIX.

Infinite Distance between Self-motion and Motion by Impulse. Impassable Chasm between Spirit and Matter. The Word Toλλooτý. Principle of Euphonic Attraction.

PAGE 30, LINE 13. ̓Αρ ̓ οὖν οὐχ ἡ δι' ἕτερον . . . . πολ. λOOTηv, K. T. λ. This is a very complicated and awkward sentence, with several anomalies, although the general meaning is quite clear. The following is a very free ren. dering: "Is not that motion, which takes place in one thing by reason of another, but which never effects that anything shall have motion in itself, by itself—is not such a principle of motion, we say, justly styled second, and even the most remote in degree of all such numbers, however great, as any one might choose to use in the computation ? being, in truth, that kind of motion or change which is peculiar to a soulless body." The order of the latter part (in which, however, we are compelled to use Toλλoorη for TоλλоσTý, in consequence of the change of position) would be as follows : δευτέρα τὲ καὶ πολλοστὴ τοσούτων ἀριθμῶν ὁπόσων τις ἂν βούλοιτο αὐτὴν ἀριθμεῖν. The general sense is, that motion by impulse, or the motion of matter, although it may be next in order (devrépa), is yet almost infinitely removed from self-motion, or the motion of soul; that is, by a distance greater than any limit assignable in numbers.

It is another mode of saying that there is an impassable chasm between them, by which they are forever parted and assigned to two distinct worlds of being. Materializing naturalists have ever been striving to fill up or bridge this chasm, either by a direct connexion through some most subtle matter, or imponderable agent, or occult quality, or by some tertium quid which might identify in one common essence these two motions, or, rather-the great object of all

their strivings to make the higher a result of the lower. These efforts, however, from the days of Plato to the present, have been all in vain. The distance between the natural and the supernatural, or between the spiritual and material, must ever remain impassable by any uniting essence. The most æthereal motions of matter, even of that class of substances which the ancients included under the general names πup and al☺ýp, and which the moderns have styled imponderable agents, make no approach to the self-motion or avтokívηois of Spirit. However subtile and attenuated they may be, yet, as matter, and falling under that one idea of matter to which we have before alluded (page 142), the ́ laws of our minds (from which we cannot escape, and aside from which there is, to us, no such thing as truth) compel us to regard them as destitute of all motion and all property of motion in themselves-in fact, as much so as the most ponderous mass of lead or iron. Plato was deeply sensible of the importance of this fundamental position, and therefore he labours so earnestly, even at the hazard of being thought tedious and prolix, to maintain it. We have made the remark before, and yet its importance and its adaptedness to our present subject will justly warrant its repetition. This point being conceded to the atheist, namely, that selfmotion may in some way be an occult property of matter in itself, or that the least and most æthereal atom in the universe could ever get in motion without the aid of that older and higher something to which he has here assigned the λόγος and the ὄνομα ; or that there is the distance of a hair's breadth between the ultimate ideas of change, cause, and the action of spirit-this, we say, being conceded to the atheist, all is lost. If this can be conceived of, or is not at war with the idea, or λóyos, of matter, as given us by the laws of our own minds, then may it also be conceived of as having an occult adaptive property, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, which would alike establish materialism in