διαπορευθῆναι. Phædon, 85, E. We take ἀνθρώπινος λóyos, in this passage, not in the sense of reason or argument, but rather as it is used in the Gorgias, 523, A., at the introduction of the mythical representation of the judgment after death: ἄκουε μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήση μυσ θον, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον. In the word σχεδίας above, Plato seems to have had an eye to Homer's account of the shipwreck of Ulysses, in his voyage on such a vessel from the island of Calypso, and thus to intimate that this BéλTLOTOS τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων could be regarded as at best only a temporary support, until the coming of that more sure (Bebaιóτεpos) word of Revelation. Can we doubt that the soul of our philosopher would have rejoiced in the an nouncement that there was even then in the world a 66 sure word of prophecy, like a light shining in a dark place," and that he would have surrendered all his speculative reasoning for the security and comfort of such an assurance?

XIX.

Invocation of the Divine Aid in the Argument. Striking Examples of this from other Dialogues.

66

PAGE 22, LINE 11. "Αγε δή, Θεὸν εἴποτε παρακλητέον ἡμῖν, νῦν ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω γενόμενον. “ If ever we ought to call upon God, let it be done now." Many professed Christian writers, both metaphysicians and theologians, might here take a lesson from the heathen philosopher. What more sublimely appropriate than this petition for Divine aid in an argument against those who denied the Divine existence? The dark, violent, and almost impassable torrent upon which they are about to embark is yet kept in mind, and in view of this the soul is led to seek for some aid out of itself. There is, we think, an allusion to some of those prayers which Homer puts into the mouths of his

heroes, as they are about to engage in some arduous and perilous contest; it may be to the prayer of Ajax for light in that desperate battle (lib. xvii., 645) in which Jove covers the whole field of conflict with thick darkness; or, perhaps, in still greater consistency with the metaphorical imagery here employed, to the prayer of Achilles, in the twenty-first book of the Iliad (273), when in danger of being overwhelmed by the rising floods of the angry and turbulent Scamander:

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ὡς οὔτις με θεῶν ἐλεεινὸν ὑπέστη,

ἐκ ποταμοῖο σαῶσαι.

Whether this be so or not, it is in this case a prayer which the purest Christianity need not blush to acknowledge and admire. There are several interesting examples of similar invocations in others of the Platonic dialogues, either put into the mouth of Socrates or of some speaker by whom he is evidently represented. We have but little doubt, too, that in these remarkable peculiarities of character, Plato accurately represents the model he so closely observed, and with whom his own intellectual existence may almost be regarded as identified. We may note, among others, the invocation in the fourth book of the Laws, at the commencement of his system of positive legislation for the state; a work which certainly, of all others, should never be attempted without a deep feeling of the necessity of Divine assistance. Θεὸν δὴ πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως καταστ κευὴν ἐπικαλώμεθα· ὁ δὲ ἀκούσειέ τε, καὶ ὑπακούσας ἵλεως εὐμενής τε ἡμῖν ἔλθοι, συνδιακοσμήσων τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, 712, Β. "Let us invoke the aid of God in the construction of our state. May he hear us, and when he has listened to our requests, may he kindly and propitiously come to our assistance, that he may jointly with ús arrange in order the state and the laws." How much higher a light than this is boasted of by those modern law-makers who

have endeavoured, as far as they could, to banish the voice of prayer from our legislative halls! Compare, also, the Philebus, 25, Β: Θεὸς μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν φράσει) ἂν πέρ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος γίγνηται. Here, too, the subject, in the discussion of which the Divine aid is invoked, is of the very highest importance, being no less than a most profound analysis of the radical difference between physical or sensual, and spiritual pleasure; a theme, in his estimation, so holy, that, when again alluding to it in the sixth book of the Republic, he utters the same word (ɛvøýμɛi) which was employed in driving all profanation, whether of speech or action, from the sacrificial altar, Rep., vi., 509, B.

Perhaps, however, the most striking example of an invocation of this kind may be found in connexion with that sublime proœmium of the Timæus, to which we have already alluded. That too, it should be borne in mind, is a treatise on law, or, in other words, the legislation of the physical and intellectual universe, embracing equally the laws of mind and matter: ̓Αλλὰ τοῦτό γε δὴ πάντες ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὁρμῇ καὶ σμικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος θεὸν ἀεί που καλοῦσιν· ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς περὶ παντὸς λόγους ποιεῖσθαί πη μέλλοντας, εἰ γέγονεν, ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη θεούς ἐπικαλουμένους εὔχεσθαι πάντας κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις μὲν μάλιστα, ἐπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν, 27, C. "Even those who have but little of sobriety, in the undertaking of any affair, whether of small or great consequence, always call upon God. Much more, then, when about to engage in a discussion respecting the universe, whether it is generated or eternal, ought we to invoke God by prayer, that what we say may be, first of all, according to his mind, and then consistent with ourselves."

PAGE 23, LINE 1. Σπουδῇ πάση παρακεκλήσθων. The prayer on the present occasion has all the conciseness and simplicity that characterize all the recorded petitions of

Socrates. Compare the last he ever uttered, for an easy death, just before taking the cup of poison in the prison, Phædon, 117, Β: 'Αλλ' εὔχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὔχομαί τε, καὶ γένοιτο ταύτη. The longest specimen is that remarkable prayer at the end of the Phædrus, or the dialogue on Spiritual Beauty, which we cannot resist the temptation of quoting in full: 'N QIAE ΠΑΝ τε καὶ ἄλλοι θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν, τἄξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια· πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν· τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώ. φρων, 279, Β. "Oh thou beloved Universal Numen, and ye other Divinities, grant that I may become beautiful within, and that whatever of externals I may possess may be all in harmony with my inward (spiritual) being. May I regard the wise alone as rich; and may I have just so much of gold as no other would take from me but the virtuous man.' "The last sentence is somewhat obscure, but the whole petition approaches the spirit of the Gospel, although lacking some of the essential requisites of a Christian supplication. It may justify us in hoping that its author, had he received the rev. elation for which he longed, would not have remained "far from the kingdom of Heaven;" but it furnishes no grounds for the extravagant language of one who said, in his enthusiastic admiration of the heathen sage, sancte Socrates ora pro nobis. He is represented here, however, as receiving a strengthening of his confidence, and some degree of assurance from his supplication; for he says immediately, "holding fast to this (that is, the hope of Divine aid) as by some sure cable, let us embark," &c.; still keeping up the metaphor of the dangerous flood.

XX.

The Great Question of the Ancient Schools, Do all Things flow? &c.; with a Sketch of some of the principal Materializing or Atheistical Philosophers who belonged to the Ionic, and to the Physical School of Elea.

PAGE 23, LINE 4. Κατα δέ, ὦ ξένε, ὁπόταν φῇ τις, ἄρα ἕστηκε μὲν πάντα, κινεῖται δὲ οὐδέν; ἢ τούτῳ πᾶν τού ναντίον; For the common reading κατα δὲ, established by the concurrence of all the manuscripts, Ast would substitute κατὰ τάδε, connecting it with φαίνεται in the preceding sentence; and in this he follows Eusebius and the version of Ficinus. We think the common reading is correct, and that Ast and Ficinus have mistaken the spirit of the passage. The Athenian, entering alone in this dangerous flood, to try, as he says, its depth and strength, before calling upon his companions to follow, assumes for a time the parts both of interrogator and respondent. He consequently supposes an objector from the atheistic or Ionic school, adopting some of the peculiar phraseology or cant terms of that sect, and taking him up in the midst of his positions in some such way as this, " And so, then (kaì ɛiтa dɛ), answer me, if you please, one of these three questions: Do all things stand, and does nothing move? or is the opposite of this the case, namely, that all things move and nothing stands? or do some things move and some things stand? Give me, I say, an answer to these old queries, which have so long perplexed our schools of philosophy." To which supposed objector the Athenian replies by taking the third hypothesis as his starting position in this argument. There is much vivacity in this mode of introducing the discussion about motion, and κᾆτα (καὶ εἶτα) is the very particle by which it is best effected; it being used to introduce a sudden inference, and implying a previous ar