debated whether it is best at once to apply the law to such men, without argument (15 to 19), the Athenian devotes himself to the work of refutation, and commences a most subtle disquisition respecting the nature of soul as implying self-motion involved in its very essence. Hence he proves that matter cannot possess this power, and, therefore, soul being more ancient than body, the properties of soul must also be older than the properties of body. From this it is inferred that nature is the child, and not the mother of Art, as the Atheists said, and that, therefore, law, and will, and design, and thought, must have been before hard, and soft, and heavy, and light, and all the adaptations of the natural world. The Atheists had held that religion, and the belief in the existence of Gods, being the production of human law, which was a production of art, and art itself being the offspring of Nature, therefore religion and all ideas of the just and right were conventional among men, and had no other foundation. This argument is refuted by the Athenian by showing the superior antiquity of soul, and, therefore, of these ideas as essential parts of its constitution (25). In proving the selfenergy of soul, he goes into a very minute examination of the different kinds of motion, summing them all up, however, under two general heads; namely, motion by impulse, and that which moves something else by commencing motion in itself. This latter he identifies with psyche, or soul, by a species of logical necessity, or an argument drawn from the force of terms and the innate ideas involved in them. The next step is to determine whether it is one or more souls which are engaged in the affairs of the universe; the result of which inquiry is, that there are two, the one good and the other bad; the one constant, uniform, and ever exhibiting the highest reason in all its motions, which he compares to those of a sphere, the other irregular, disorderly, without reason, and full of madness (36). After this, there are stated three methods by which soul may guide the motions of the heavenly bodies; namely, by an indwelling spirit, or by a soul with an æthereal body, or entirely destitute of body, and external to the object of its guidance (42).

This brings the Athenian to the second grand division of the subject, namely, the arguments of those who deny a Providence. After premising that men are led to this opinion by seeing the apparent impunity and prosperity of the wicked (45), he shows that it is utterly derogatory to any right views of the Divine Nature. For if we admit that God is possessed of every virtue, indolence and indifference can form no part of his character. Neither can it be that there is in him any want of power. Therefore we cannot suppose

that he will neglect anything, either great or small. Next is shown the importance of small things as parts of a whole, absolutely essential to its totality, and that, without small things, the great could not exist. Hence the doctrine of a minute special providence, unless the Deity is to be regarded as inferior in wisdom to human artists (56). The method of this special providence is shown to be by such arrangements in the sovereignty of God (but not by any inherent necessity of things), that every agent finds its fitting place; namely, virtue rises and wickedness descends, until the one reaches The Most Holy Place, and the other sinks down to the most painful retributions of Hades (61). This Eternal Justice, or fixed law of God's government, no one can escape, and, unless it is kept in view, it will be impossible to form any right opinion respecting a blessed or miserable life (64).

The third grand division of the argument respects those who view sin as a trifle, and who confide in the general mercy of God as capable of being easily moved by prayers and sacrifices. He contrasts their views of the Deity with such as are entertained of the lowest class of human guardians, as though God could be bribed by the wages of iniquity, when dogs could not be prevailed upon by similar motives to admit the wolf into the flock. Arguments against those views which would regard sin as a small matter, and God as easily appeased, are drawn from the μáxn áðávaros, the battle of the universe, or everlasting conflict between good and evil, in which God and all good influences are contending for the victory, and where, of consequence, the least taking part with the enemy, or the least neutrality is treason against the cause of good throughout the universe (69, 74).

There are then enumerated six classes of offenders; namely, two to each of the three divisions of Atheists or semi-Atheists, differing in their degrees of guilt, and therefore requiring different gradations of punishment. The book closes with a specification of the various penalties, and a law against private chapels and private religious rites; in the course of which a very striking description is given of that class of Atheists who, while they had no religious belief themselves, made it their business to excite the superstitious fears of mankind for their own unnatural pleasure or profit.

N.B. All references to any of the dialogues of Plato, except the text of the present work, are made according to the pages and letters of the alphabet, as given in the standard edition of Stephanus, and as they may be found in the margin of the Leipsic.

PLATO CONTRA ATHEOS.

DE LEGIBUS LIBER X.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ τὰς αἰκίας, περὶ παντὸς ἓν εἰρήσθω τοιόνδε τι νόμιμον βιαίων πέρι· τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδένα μηδὲν φέρειν μηδὲ ἄγειν· μηδ' αὖ χρῆσθαι μηδενὶ τῶν τοῦ πέ

1. Пlɛρì πavтòs. In reference to the whole subject discussed in the preceding book (ix.), namely, übpeiç, or wrongs committed wilfully and with some degree of violence, of which aixía, treated of at the close of the ninth book, is one species, and sacrilege another. 2. Þépeiv―йyei. A collective phrase. "To take and carry away by violence." Compare Thucydides, i., 7: "Epɛpov yàp ảλλýλovç. "Ayεi Kaì dépei is a phrase derived from the earliest times, and is always employed in reference to acts of violence. Hence, because personal courage was anciently regarded as the chief part of human virtue, some have supposed that from yɛw, in this sense, came ¿yalòs, and from φέρειν, its comparative and superlative, φέρτερος, φέρτατος, or pépιoros. Such a view encounters etymological difficulties in the termination of ayalòs. Besides, it can only be maintained on the false theory that the savage life was the original state of men, and that moral terms partake of the ideas most prevalent in such a condition. We much prefer the derivation of Plato, although, in general, he is entitled to but little deference as a philologist. According to him, τὸ ἀγαθὸν is τὸ ἀγαστὸν, “ the wonderful, the admirable," from ǎyaμaι áɣáoμaι, “to wonder at," also "to admire with great delight." See the Cratylus, p. 412. The force of this will be better felt by comparing what the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Republic, of the wondrous idea of the ȧyalòv, or The Good, as surpassing all human comprehension. No one, on reading it, will be at a loss as to what led him to this etymology, whatever we may think of its philological correctness. It must be remarked, however, that, in reading the Cratylus, it is difficult to determine in what parts the writer is sincere, or how far he may be indulging in the severest satire against certain false systems of philosophy.

A

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λας, ἐὰν μὴ πείσῃ τὸν κεκτημένον. ἐκ γὰρ δὴ του τοιούτου πάντα ἠρτημένα τά τε εἰρημένα κακὰ γέγονε, καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. μέγιστα δὲ δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν αἱ τῶν νέων ἀκολα σίαι τε καὶ ὕβρεις· εἰς μέγιστα δὲ, ὅταν εἰς ἱερὰ γίγνων. ται, καὶ διαφερόντως αὖ μεγάλα, ὅταν εἰς δημόσια καὶ ἅγια ἢ κατὰ μέρη κοινὰ φυλετῶν ἤ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων κεκοινωνηκότων· εἰς ἱερὰ δὲ ἴδια καὶ τάφους, δεύτερα καὶ δευτέρως. εἰς δὲ γονέας, τρίτα, χωρὶς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων, ὅταν ὑβρίζῃ τις. τέταρτον δὲ γένος ὕβρεως, ὅταν ἀφροντιστῶν τις τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄγῃ ἢ φέρῃ ἢ χρῆταί τινι τῶν ἐκείνων, μὴ πείσας αὐτούς. πέμπτον δὲ, τὸ πολιτικὸν ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρισθεν, δίκην ἐπικαλούμενον. οἷς δὴ δοτέον εἰς κοινὸν νόμον ἑκάστοις. ἱεροσυλία μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται ξυλλήβδην, βίαιός τε καὶ λάθρα ἐὰν γίγνηται, τί χρὴ πάσχειν. ὅσα δὲ λόγῳ καὶ ὅσα ἔργῳ περὶ θεοὺς ὑβρίζει τις λέγων ἢ πράττων, τὸ παραμύθιον ὑποθεμένῳ ῥητέον ἃ δεῖ πάσχειν. ἔστω δὴ τόδε· θεοὺς

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3. Ἐὰν μὴ πείση, “ unless he get the consent.”

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4. Ύβρεις, “ violent wrongs committed wilfully and with malice prepense, whether by act or speech." The writer now proceeds to specify five different grades into which offences, of this kind might be divided : 1st, against sacred things public; 2d, against sacred things private; 3d, against parents; 4th, against magistrates; 5th, against private political rights of individual citizens.

5. Δευτέρως has respect to διαφερόντως above, referring not, like δεύτερα, to numerical rank, but to the grade of enormity.

6. Εἰς δὲ γονέας. See Note I., App.

7. Χωρὶς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων, namely, those mentioned in the ninth book.

8. Οταν ἀφροντιστῶν τις, "when any one who is reckless of the authority or respect due to magistrates."

9. The case of Tivì is determined here grammatically by the last verb, χρῆται, although in sense it is the common object of them all.

10. Οῖς δὴ δοτέον, “ for all which cases there must be a common law," or "a law in common containing provisions applicable to each respectively."

11. λέγων ἢ πράττων, “by speech or action.”

12. See Note II., App.