were such as no American army in these days would endure for a month. His methods were simply despotic. He thought that the Massachusetts Provincial Legislature should impress men into the Revolutionary army, should provide them with food and clothes only, not with pay, and should do nothing for their families. He himself, having declined the offered $500 per month, served his country for his expenses only, and so, he thought, should they, overlooking the difference between those whose households depended only on themselves and those who, like himself, had left slaves at work on their broad plantations. He thought that officers and men should be taken from different social classes, that officers should have power almost absolute, and that camp offenses should be punished by the lash. These imperial methods produced a good effect, on the whole; probably it was best that the General should err on one side if | York, whither Washington soon took his the army erred on the other. But there is no doubt that much of the discontent, the desertion, the uncertain enlistments, of the next two years proceeded from the difficulty found by Washington in adapting himself to the actual condition of the people, especially the New England people. It is the highest proof of his superiority that he overcame not merely all other obstacles, but even his own mistakes. Such as it was, the army remained in camp long enough to make everybody impatient. The delay was inevitable; it was easier to provide even discipline than powder; the troops kept going and coming because of short enlistments, and more than once the whole force was reduced to ten thousand men. With that patience which was one of Washington's strongest military qualities he withstood dissatisfaction within and criticism from without until the time had come to strike a heavier blow. Then, in a single night, he fortified Dorchester Heights, and this forced the evacuation of Boston. The British generals had to seek elbow-room elsewhere. They left Boston March 17, 1776, taking with them twelve hundred American loyalists, the bulk of what called itself "society" in New England. The navy went to Halifax, the army to New The Continental army also. Once there, he found new obstacles. From the very fact that they had not sent away their loyalists, there was less of unanimity among the people, nor had they been so well trained by the French and Indian wars. New England army was now away from home; it was unused to marches or evolutions, but it had learned some confidence in itself and in its commander, though it did not always do credit to either. It was soon re-enforced by troops from the Middle States, but a period of disaster followed, which severely tested the generalship of Washington. He no longer had, as in Massachusetts, all the loyalists shut up in the opposing camp; he found them scattered through the community. Long Island was one of their strongholds, and received the Continental army much less cordially than the British army was received at Staten Island. The Hudson River was debatable ground between opposing factions; Washington's own military family held incipient traitors. The outlook was not agreeable in any direction, at least in the Northern colonies, where the chief contest lay. There was a disastrous advance into Canada, under Montgomery and Arnold, culminating in the defeat before Quebec December 30, 1775, and the retreat conduct- | should have been in the Congress a mied the next spring by Thomas and Sulli- nority that shrank from adopting the van. It was clearly a military repulse, but | Declaration; and perhaps one ought not it was a great comfort to John Adams, looking from the remoteness of Philadelphia, to attribute all to a quite subordinate cause. "Our misfortunes in Canada,' he wrote to his wife, June 26, 1776, "are enough to melt a heart of stone. The small-pox is ten times more terrible than Britons, Canadians, and Indians together. This was the cause of our precipitate retreat from Quebec." Thus was disappointment slightly mitigated; but in the Carolinas, about the same time, it was the British who were disappointed, and the defense of Fort Moultrie especially gave comfort to all the patriotic party. It was a brilliant achievement, where the fate of Charleston and the Carolinas was determined by the defense of a fortress of palmetto logs, manned by less than five hundred men, under Moultrie, aided by Motte, Marion, and the since-renowned Sergeant Jasper. They had thirty-one cannon, but only a scanty supply of powder. Over them waved a flag of blue, with a crescent inscribed, "Liberty." Against them was a squadron of British ships, some of them carrying fifty guns; and they defended themselves so successfully for ten hours that the British invasion was checked, and then abandoned. This happened on June 28, 1776, just in time to counteract the discouragement that came from the fatal Canadian campaign. The encouragement was needed. Just before the time when the Continental Congress had begun its preliminary work on the great Declaration, General Joseph Reed, the newly appointed Adjutant-General, and one of Washington's most trusted associates, was writing thus from the field: "With an army of force before and a secret one behind, we stand on a point of land with six thousand old troops, if a year's service of about half can entitle them to this name, and about fifteen hundred raw levies of the province, many disaffected and more doubtful. Every man, from the General to the private, acquainted with our true situation, is exceeding ly discouraged. Had I known the true posture of affairs, no consideration would have tempted me to take part in the scene; and this sentiment is universal." Washington himself wrote almost as discouragingly, and it is scarcely strange that under these circumstances there to be surprised that the chief spokesman of this caution should have been that very John Dickinson who had, as the "Pennsylvania Farmer," done more than any other writer, save Thomas Paine only, to bring about the separation. It is often seen in history that the very sense of responsibility which rests on the early advocates of a measure makes them recoil when the time for action comes. Dickinson pointed out that the Declaration of Independence would not strengthen the colonies "by one man or by the least supply”; that it would expose the soldiers to new cruelties; that without some trial of their strength they ought not to risk "an alternative where to recede would be injury, and to persist might be destruction”; that it would be a menace to England, an affront to France, and a cause of dissension among the colonies themselves. Others joined him, and Rutledge, of South Carolina, said privately that "it required the impudence of a New-Englander for them in their disjointed state to propose a treaty to a nation now at peace.' John Adams, on the other hand, believed that the whole thing should have been done seven months earlier. But the will of the Congress was so clear that Rutledge at last joined in the vote for the sake of unanimity, and the Pennsylvania Farmer could only absent himself from the Congress. On the day after the adoption of Richard Henry Lee's original resolutions as to declaring independence and entering into foreign treaties, John Adams wrote, "Yesterday the greatest question was decided which ever was debated in America, and a greater perhaps never was nor will be decided any more." Two days after, the draft of Jefferson's "Declaration," with its few amendments, was adopted by Congress, and three days later John Adams wrote to his wife, “Our army at Crown Point is an object of wretchedness enough to fill a humane mind with horror-displaced, defeated, discontented, dispirited, diseased, naked, undisciplined, eaten up with vermin, no clothes, bed, blankets, no medicines, no victuals but salt pork and flour." On the same day-such is the power of the human mind to restore itself by a change of thoughts-he sent her a much longer epistle on the varieties of English style and the 66 general order, July 9, 1776, with the follow- | sion of Newport, Rhode Island, signaling ing announcement: "The General hopes their arrival by burning the house of Willthis important event will serve as an in- iam Ellery, who had signed the great Deccentive to every officer and soldier to act laration. with fidelity and courage, as knowing that now the peace and safety of his country depend (under God) solely on the success of our arms; and that he is now in the service of a State possessed of sufficient power to reward his merit and advance him to the highest honors of a free country." Thus early did this far-seeing Virginian give his allegiance to the new government as a nation, "a state,' a free country"; not an agglomeration of states only, or a temporary league of free countries. And he needed for his encouragement all the strength he could gain from this new-born loyalty. 72 66 Yet amid all these accumulated disasters Washington wrote to Congress that he could see "without despondency even for a moment" what America called her 'gloomy hours." He could breathe more freely at last when, on December 8, he crossed the Delaware at Trenton with what the discouraged Reed had called "the wretched fragments of a broken army," now diminished to 3000 men. As his last boat crossed, the advanced guard of Howe's army reached the river, and looked eagerly for means of transportation. Washington had seized everything that could float upon the water within seventy miles. On December 20, 1776, Washington told John Hancock, then President of the Congress, Ten days more will put an end to the existence of our army." Yet at Christmas he surprised the Hessians at Trenton, recrossing the river and returning on his course with what was perhaps the most brilliant single stroke of war that he ever achieved. A few days later he defeated Cornwallis at Princeton with almost equal ability; and all this he did with but 5000 During that year there had been in service 47,000 "Continentals" and 27,000 militia. Where were they all? These large figures had only been obtained through that system of short enlistments against which Washington had in vain protested It was a gloomy and arduous year, the year 1776. The first duty now assigned to Washington was that of sustaining himself on Long Island and guarding New York. Long Island was the scene of terrible disaster; the forces under Putnam were hemmed in and cut to pieces (August 27), making Greenwood Cemetery a scene of death before it was a place of burial. In this fatal battle 8000 Americans, still raw and under a raw commander (Putnam), were opposed to 20,000 train-men, one-half militia, the rest little more. ed Hessian soldiers, supported by a powerful fleet. Washington decided to retreat from Long Island. With extraordinary promptness and energy he collected in a few hours from a range of fourteen miles a sufficient supply of boats, this being done in such secrecy that even his aides did not know it. For forty-eight hours he did not sleep, being nearly the whole time in the saddle. He sent 9000 men with all their baggage and field artillery across a rapid river nearly a mile wide within hearing of the enemy's camp: "the bestconducted retreat I ever read of," wrote General Greene. Then began the desertions, by companies and almost by regi-institutions it is hard to convince a nation ments. They continued during all his that a long war is before it; it is apt to be memorable retreat through the Jerseys, easily persuaded that peace will return in when his troops were barefooted and dis- about sixty days; its strength is seen, if at heartened, and yet he contested every inch all, in its reserved power and its final reof ground. At the beginning of his march sources. The dawn of independence seemhe heard of the loss of Fort Washington ed overcast indeed when the campaign of with 2600 men, their ordnance, ammuni- 1776 closed, and Washington, with only tion, and stores. The day before he cross-three or four thousand men, went sadly ed the Delaware the British took posses- into winter-quarters at Morristown. enlistments for three months, or even for one month. It is useless for this generation to exclaim against what may seem slowness or imbecility in the government of that day. Why, we ask, did they not foresee what the war would be? why did they not insist on longer enlistments? We have seen in our own time the uselessness of these questionings. Under popular "SHE SAT WITH CLASPED HANDS AND BOWED HEAD."-[SEE PAGE 748.] guard, but after a few hours he was removed to another chamber. This was chiefly to prevent any possible attempt at escape which Ashby might make, with the assistance of the other prisoners, who, knowing the weak points of the castle, might be able, with a bold leader, to strike an effective blow for liberty. The moonbeams now were streaming in Suddenly, in the neighborhood of the chimney, there was a slight noise. No one in the room heard it, for they were all sleeping too soundly. The noise ceased for a time; then it was renewed. It was a rustling, sliding sound, as of some living thing moving there. After this the noise ceased. |