one city, and nearly 600,000 in another. | statistical details. And this fact of the While it has been but little talked of and written about here, it has been noticed by foreign statisticians who have studied the growth of population in both worlds, and who have anxiously inquired how long we can continue to grow at the present rate, and to accommodate Europe's surplus population, that an approach to the complete settlement of our country seems already to be within a measurable distance, and that one of its apparent consequences is the increase of our manufactories and of our town population. Already in the older parts of our country a change has been precipitated from agriculture to trade, and from rural to town life, such as has long been taking place in England and Continental countries. In this country the change has been nothing less than phenomenal. proportionate increase of municipal expenditure, like that of the increase of urban population, is not isolated and confined to our own country. The most capable of observers have noted the universality of these phenomena in progressive states, and they are peculiarly noticeable in England, France, Germany, and Italy. A third great fact is that of the steady increase of governmental regulation. No question has been more discussed, and certainly none deserves to be more discussed, than that concerning the proper functions of government. This question has been the battle-ground of great parties, and the way in which it has from time to time been answered has determined the political history of our own country not only, but of every other re"In 1790," say the officers of the last publican state. One party or school decensus, "one-thirtieth of the population of clares in favor of a centralized or paternal the United States lived in cities of 8000 in- State policy, the other cries laissez-faire, habitants and over; in 1800, one twenty- and demands a minimum of government. fifth; in 1810, and also in 1820, one-twen- But while this theoretical contention has tieth; in 1830, one-sixteenth; in 1840, one-been going on, the fact becomes ever twelfth; in 1850, one-eighth; in 1860, onesixth; and in 1870, a little over one-fifth." The ratio is now nearly one-quarter. In studying the problem of municipal government in this country this is the first great fact. The second is as follows: while out of a total public indebtedness -national, State, city, county, and other -in the United States in 1870 aggregating 3349 millions, 2480 millions was national, 352 millions State, 328 millions municipal, and 187 millions county, of the total indebtedness of 1880, which had decreased to 2997 millions, the national, State, and county debts had fallen to 1942, 234, and 123 millions respectively, and the municipal debt, including townships and school districts, had risen to 698 millions. plainer and plainer that in spite of all theory the practical functions of government are actually enlarged from day to day. Directly as society develops and social life becomes more complex, the attributes of the State are practically enlarged. This is brought out very clearly in the remark of Mr. Stanley Jevons that "it is impossible that we can have the constant multiplication of institutions and instruments of civilization which evolution is producing without a growing complication of relations, and a consequent growth of social regulations." This implies not only more administrative interference, but a growth and development of administrative organs, and the establishment of new and different relations among them. But the State does not itself administer These facts point conclusively to the the entire law which it sanctions, and as dual tendency-first, of the urban popula- the functions of government are enlarged, tion to become proportionately larger, and they are exercised less and less by the final second, of municipal expenditure to in- and absolute governing authority, and crease as compared with that of both State more and more by its subordinate agenand nation. For various reasons the pro-cies. Thus just as the sphere of governper field in which to test this latter ten- ment is extended, the central authority, dency is rather in the comparison of speaking generally, makes itself less dibudgets than in that of aggregate indebt-rectly felt, while the local authorities are edness, and if tested in that way the proofs would be many times stronger; but it is the tendency alone to which I here desire to attract attention, rather than to its always becoming more important; and the two great facts which have been referred to regarding the growth in population and expenditure of cities serve as tions which should be settled before considering the very difficult but still secondary matter as to what is the best method of organizing the executive and administrative departments of local governments. Unhappily, our law and practice do not throw any clear light upon or disclose any settled principles with regard to the matter. There is much talk of decentral a demonstration of this tendency. That | tures, and of those social conditions which municipalities thus become the organs require always a larger and larger share through which a constantly increasing of administrative attention and control. part of the functions of government is Under such circumstances it is evident performed is due to the fact that the con- that the question of the relation of the ditions of life in cities and in rural dis- municipalities to the State is of the largest tricts are altogether different. Masses of moment, and I believe that it is here, at men living together require a far more its very roots, that the problem of the elaborate governmental machinery than government of localities should be atthose living in less close proximity to tacked, if any satisfactory solution of it is each other. And not only do cities re- to be discovered. Thus the manner in quire more government than rural dis- which the State should interfere with the tricts, but the character of the government municipalities through the exercise of its is very dissimilar in the two cases. It is central authority, and to what extent they so much more delicate and difficult in the should be left to themselves, free from sucase of cities, as to require a higher or-perior dictation or interference, are quesganization and a more perfectly framed law, thus adding to the chances of misrule, which always increase in more than geometrical ratio to the increase in complexity and difficulty of government. But while government thus becomes more difficult, it becomes less and less political in the every-day sense of the word, and more and more economical. The civilization of our time, which is one of constitution-ization, and nothing is more frequently al systems, sees in municipal and local heard than laudations of self-government governments only public business and po- coupled with the assertion that it is conlice corporations, or syndicates of com- stitutionally respected in this country as mon local interests, which act as the an inherent and well-recognized right of agents of the State, exercising its sover- localities. The constitution of the State eign authority for their self-government of New York, for example, as if to assure and at their own expense. They main- this right, says: It belongs exclusively tain the local police and sanitary sys- to the local power to fill the [local] offices, tems, protect the public health, carry on either by election or appointment." And the work of public education, sustain yet, as we shall see, the courts have so incharitable and corrective institutions, un- terpreted this section as to nullify it to all dertake great public enterprises, such as practical intents and purposes. Not only those which afford the water or gas sup- should all local governments be absoluteply, open and maintain streets and high-ly assured of this right to elect or appoint ways, and have a variety of other important minor duties. With a single exception-that of the organization and administration of justice-these are the most difficult as well as the most expensive functions of government, and just so far as they are performed by the municipalities and not by the central authority does municipal politics become of more importance to the actual well-being of the community than State or national politics, and more particularly because the one affects us immediately and intimately, and the other more remotely and indirectly. In discussing the government of municipalities we are thus brought face to face with the increasing difficulties of the problem, through the growth simultaneously of urban populations, of local expendi their own officers, but they should be supreme, so far as is compatible with the general welfare of the State, over things which affect them alone; and this for two reasons, viz., because it is the only means of making citizens feel a direct responsibility for the administration of their home affairs, and because the interference of the State, as at present practiced, is the direct source of the demoralization which prevails in State as well as city politics. Our real danger, the real mischief in our present system, which makes municipal good government apparently impossible, is not the character of our charters, but something much more radical, and which was seen years ago by De Tocqueville, namely, the almost absolute, and consequently irresponsible, power of the central govern ments. "In America," says that keen ob- | cal trading and bargaining, and for the server, "the Legislature of each State is advancement of spoils-hunters and spoilssupreme; nothing can impede its authori- distributors to the exclusion of others. ty-neither privileges, nor local immuni- | ties, nor personal influence, nor even the empire of reason-since it represents that majority which claims to be the sole organ of reason. Its own determination is therefore the only limit to its action." And this is literally true except where there is a constitutional limitation. Consequently, in the State of New York, where there is no such limitation, the municipalities are quite as much at the mercy of the Legislature as in the most autocratic state of Europe. Careless observers believe that we are free from the dangers of centraliza- | tion, overlooking the fact that we have so completely centralized all power in the Legislature as to make the State peculiar ly susceptible to these dangers. | While the Legislature has the absolute power to remedy this state of things, no remedy appears to be practically possible. But this is not because the Legislature declines to interfere out of any respect for the sacredness of the rights of localities. Never a winter comes but that body is overrun with schemes for charter legisla tion, got up in the interest of parties or of individuals, to change the constitution or to enlarge or decrease the powers of local offices as best suits the personal or party interest of those who propose them. Winter after winter there is extended discussion upon these measures, endless trading and log-rolling, until finally some of them become laws, while the majority simply have the effect of killing each other off. What some of the evils of this system have been and are, and particularly in This charter tinkering," as it is aptly the State of New York, may now be re- called, is an evil of the first magnitude, ferred to more in detail. The first to at- not only because of the condition in tract attention is the uncertainty and which it leaves our municipal charters, want of system in the law itself, but of but because it robs them of every element this enough has already been said. The of stability, and deprives the thoughtful second is the general insufficiency and and public-spirited citizen of every motive practical worthlessness of our municipal for taking an active interest in public afcharters. But the greatest of prevailing fairs. This class, tired of seeing the inevils are the absence of actual local self-terests of the community boldly and government, and the decay of genuine pub- shamelessly sacrificed to the greed of parlic spirit in our great cities. ties, may organize and effect a revolution The majority of our municipal charters at the charter elections by ousting bad or as they stand to-day entirely fail to repre- incompetent men, and placing in their sent the experienced judgment of the most stead honest and capable ones, only to capable men in the community as to what find their work undone, almost before is the best and most practical organization their representatives enter upon their ofof the administrative agencies of local fices, by a legislative enactment abolgovernment. One of these charters, ishing the offices altogether, and imposwhich is typical of them all, that of the ing the duties which belonged to them city of New York, is so filled with anoma- upon other branches of the government lous and unreasonable provisions that it to which the revolution did not reach. is a source of daily wonder why things do Referring to this matter, the commissionnot often go worse than actually happens, ers appointed by Governor Tilden in 1875 or, rather, how it is possible for it to pro- to devise a plan for the government of duce any good thing whatever, even by ac- cities in the State of New York say-and cident. Our Mayor has no real executive it is well worth quoting, for the evil repowers; our Board of Aldermen has only mains in essence, even if somewhat abated a scanty remnant of legislative authority, in practice: "It may be true that the first while it retains its control over the ap- attempts to secure legislative intervention pointments of the Chief Magistrate; the in the local affairs of our principal cities whole government is in the hands of com- were made by good citizens in the supmissioners, who are practically irrespon- posed interest of reform and good governsible to any superior authority; and the ment, and to counteract the schemes of commissions are so constituted that they corrupt officials. The notion that legislaprepare the way, without any possibility tive control was the proper remedy was a of detection, for the worst forms of politi- | serious mistake. The corrupt cliques and now, as heretofore, at any time change the personnel of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment, and specifically name such offices as are for the time being filled by dishonest and scheming men, as it did when the power over the budget was calmly confided to Tweed, Connolly, and Sweeny. The Legislature can at its pleasure spend the money of a locality for purely local purposes, although every citizen of the locality object, and may compel the levy and collection of a tax to meet the expenditure. In a word, it may compel municipal or local corporations to do whatever it may permit them to do. It may go further, and by changing their territorial limits, or by creating new offices with new functions, it can itself name the very men who are to fill the offices, in spite of the constitutional próvision that "it belongs exclusively to the local power to fill the offices, either by election or appointment." No better il rings thus sought to be baffled were quick to perceive that in the business of procuring special laws concerning local affairs they could easily outmatch the fitful and clumsy labors of disinterested citizens. The transfer of the control of the municipal resources from the localities to the Capitol had no other effect than to cause a like transfer of the methods and arts of corruption, and to make the fortunes of our principal cities the traffic of the lobbies. Municipal corruption, previously confined within territorial limits, thenceforth escaped all bounds, and spread to every quarter of the State. Cities were compelled by legislation to buy lands for parks and places because the owners wished to sell them; compelled to grade, pave, and sewer streets without inhabitants, and for no other purpose than to award corrupt contracts for the work. Cities were compelled to purchase at the public expense and at extravagant prices the property necessary for streets and ave-lustration of this could be cited than the nues, useless for any other purpose than to make a market for the adjoining property thus improved. Laws were enacted abolishing one office and creating another with the same duties, in order to transfer official emoluments from one man to another; and laws to change the functions of officers, with a view only to a new distribution of patronage; and to lengthen the terms of offices, for no other purpose than to retain in place officers who could not otherwise be elected or appointed." Now in respect of these matters the Legislature has no less power than it ever had. It may say of its acts as Louis XVI. did to the Duke of Orleans, "They are legal because we will it." The cities have no more protection against it than in the past, and in their helplessness are still at the mercy of politicians at the Capitol. The Legislature, which once went so far even as to make our municipal budget upon the reports of its own committees, can do so again whenever it wills; in fact, does it even now in a modified form when it refuses to the municipality the power to fix the pay of its own firemen and policemen, and when it passes laws compelling the New York City Board of Estimate and Apportionment to put into the local budget sums which are wholly for local purposes, or worse yet, sums with the payment of which the locality should never be burdened at all. Exercising the same absolute power, it may action of the present Legislature in appointing by name the men who are to have the expenditure of from twenty to thirty millions of the money of the Mayor and Commonalty of the city of New York, without the right on the part of the citizens who are to pay for the new aqueduct to say an authoritative word as to who should fill the offices of commissioners. It is thus made apparent that in the State of New York, which has the largest city population of any State in the Union, the government of municipalities is conducted, except in the most picayune details, by the central and not by the local government, and that the term "local self-government" is in practice a mere delusive misnomer. The worst feature of this system, however, is not that its practical effect is to actually strangle local selfgovernment, but that it poisons or even kills outright all true municipal spirit. I believe it is almost entirely to this cause that we owe the evil which is commonly supposed to spring from other sources-I mean the facilities for corrupt political organization, and the difficulties experienced in effecting a counter-organization among responsible and self-respecting citizens. Under such a form of government great numbers of citizens soon lose all interest in voting, and the ballot-boxes fall into the possession of those who, to use the words of Mr. Mill, "do not bestow their suffrages on public grounds, but sell them for money, or vote at the beck of some one who has control over them, or whom for private reasons they desire to propitiate"; and the result invariably is, as pointed out by the same writer, "that popular election thus practiced, instead of a security against misgovernment, is but an additional wheel in its machinery." The defect of our system is that in municipalities the people have never been permitted actually to realize the dignity and responsibility of self-government. They have practically been denied the right to that experience which brings with it the only political education that renders a people capable of self-government. This is peculiarly harmful in the case of the larger cities, the very greatness of which has a tendency to eclipse the sense of private and personal responsibility on the part of their citizens, who, being lost in the crowd, feel themselves to be the ciphers rather than the units which go to make up the grand total of the population. As a conse not the popular interests. It is thus apparent that under our present system it is the merest misuse of words to speak of municipal liberties. It is of no avail to talk of partial remedies and of temporary compromises or changes. Until the radical evil is corrected the government of our cities will continue to be not only an unsolved, but an unsolvable, problem. And now it may be asked how the evil is to be corrected. I answer, by according constitutional protection to local governments; by providing in the State constitution for the enactment of a general code for the government of all cities, which code shall never be changed or amended except in such manner as to affect all cities alike. Municipalities will then cease to be "the sport of the lobby," and the fruits of popular activity in striving to secure good government can not be stolen by the politicians through the intervention of the central authority. Such is to-day the law in several States, notably Illinois and Ohio. In the former of these the constitution provides that "the General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the fol Local liberties are the only ones which most men fully realize the value of, the ones which all men most naturally and most gladly exercise, and these are just the ones which are refused to our city dwellers, who need them most because their government is most difficult. The result is that the history of municipal government with us, as with all peoples who are deprived of these liberties, is only the long story of an alternation of convulsions and failures; for the right of the Legislature to change our charters, to re-lowing enumerated cases, that is to say, strict, enlarge, or redistribute the powers conferred on our local representatives, is nothing less than a right to work revolutions at will, without even so much as consulting the cities themselves. Good government, consequently, if we ever have it, is purely accidental, and from bad government we have no escape except in appeal ing to the State to exercise its right of making revolutions for us, thus calling upon the very power whose continued interference has done most to produce the prevalent evils. At one time or another every possible plan, one only excepted, has been resorted to for the government of municipalities in this State, and that one is the honest democratic-republican plan which permits cities really to rule themselves. But this happens to be the people's plan, and it is not regarded with favor by the politicians, who have become a professional caste whose interests are for.... incorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing or amending the charter of any town, city, or village." In compliance with its terms the Legislature in 1875 passed a general "act to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages.” Cities which had charters at the time of its passage were permitted to change them for the general charter upon a vote of their citizens. In like manner incorporated towns might adopt the city charter upon complying with the prescribed form, and new or theretofore unchartered villages or towns were in the same way allowed to hold their political destinies in their own hands. This general law also contains alternative provisions, between which the corporators shall have the right of electing; for example, whenever the act is submitted to the electors for adoption, there is at the same time submitted for adoption or rejection |