Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political CultureThe famed political critic “analyzes the issue most prominently posed in Oliver Stone’s film JFK . . . strong arguments against Kennedy mythologists” (Publishers Weekly). Rethinking Camelot is a thorough analysis of John F. Kennedy’s role in the US invasion of Vietnam and a probing reflection on the elite political culture that allowed and encouraged the Cold War. In it, Chomsky dismisses efforts to resurrect Camelot—an attractive American myth portraying JFK as a shining knight promising peace, foiled only by assassins bent on stopping this lone hero who would have unilaterally withdrawn from Vietnam had he lived. Chomsky argues that US institutions and political culture, not individual presidents, are the key to understanding US behavior during Vietnam. Rethinking Camelot is “an interesting work not only for the history it explores, but also as a study of how various individuals and groups write and interpret history” (Choice). Praise for Noam Chomsky “Chomsky is a global phenomenon . . . perhaps the most widely read voice on foreign policy on the planet.” —The New York Times Book Review “The conscience of the American people.” —New Statesman “Reading Chomsky is like standing in a wind tunnel. With relentless logic, Chomsky bids us to listen closely to what our leaders tell us—and to discern what they are leaving out . . . The questions Chomsky raises will eventually have to be answered. Agree with him or not, we lose out by not listening.” —Business Week “One of the radical heroes of our age . . . a towering intellect . . . powerful, always provocative.” —The Guardian |
Contents
| 1 | |
1 From Terror to Aggression | 49 |
2 Interpretations | 131 |
Notes | 185 |
Bibliography | 197 |
Index | 201 |
About the Author | 210 |
Other editions - View all
Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture Noam Chomsky Limited preview - 2015 |
Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture Noam Chomsky Limited preview - 1993 |
Common terms and phrases
action Administration advisers aggression American Arthur Schlesinger assassination attack basic Bergerud bombing Cambodia Camelot cited client regime combat troops commitment Communist continued counterinsurgency coup covert crimes defense doctrine dovish drawal economic effort escalation evidence Forrestal FRUSV Hilsman historian Ibid Indochina Indochina wars intent internal record intervention January Japan JFK’s Johnson Joint Chiefs Kennedy Kennedy’s Khmer Rouge Laos later Mansfield McGeorge Bundy McNamara McNamara-Taylor ment military murderous National Newman North November NSAM October operations Pentagon Papers personnel plan to withdraw political population post-Tet pre-Tet President President’s problem reports Review Robert McNamara Roger Hilsman Saigon Schlesinger’s sion Sorenson South Vietnam Southeast Asia Soviet statement tactical Taylor terror Tet Offensive thesis threat tion United Viet Cong Vietnam War Vietnamese violence White House withdraw from Vietnam withdraw without victory withdrawal plans writes