Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation DebateThis book transcends current debate on government regulation by lucidly outlining how regulations can be a fruitful combination of persuasion and sanctions. The regulation of business by the United States government is often ineffective despite being more adversarial in tone than in other nations. The authors draw on both empirical studies of regulation from around the world and modern game theory to illustrate innovative solutions to this problem. Their ideas include an argument for the empowerment of private and public interest groups in the regulatory process and a provocative discussion of how the government can support and encourage industry self-regulation. |
Contents
3 | |
2 The Benign Big Gun | 19 |
3 Tripartism | 54 |
4 Enforced SelfRegulation | 101 |
5 PartialIndustry Intervention | 133 |
6 Delegation and Participation in a Responsive Regulatory order | 158 |
Notes | 163 |
183 | |
197 | |
Other editions - View all
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Ian Ayres,John Braithwaite Limited preview - 1992 |
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Ian Ayres,John Braithwaite Limited preview - 1995 |
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Ian Ayres,John Braithwaite No preview available - 1992 |
Common terms and phrases
actors Administration agency’s analysis antitrust argued Australian behavior benefits benign big gun Braithwaite cartel Chapter citizens companies competitive competitors comply consumer contestable corporate Corporate Crime Reporter costs delegation deregulation dominant firm dominant-firm downstream economic economic rationality effective efficient capture empowered enforced self-regulation enforcement pyramid environmental escalation evolution of cooperation example executives fail firm’s forms of capture fringe fringe-firm intervention incentives increase inefficient inspectors institutions joint defection laissez-faire lobbying market failure monopsonist monopsony motivated negotiation noncompliance nursing home oligopoly OPEC partial-industry regulation participation players political possible prisoner's dilemma problem production profits protection public interest punitive rational Reagan regulated firms regulatory agencies regulatory culture regulatory encounters regulatory strategies republican residents responsive regulation reward payoff rules safety sanctions Scholz second sourcing second-sourcing social responsibility solutions sucker payoff temptation payoff tion tournament tripartism tripartite trust unregulated violations zero-sum capture