Rationality and the Reflective MindIn Rationality and the Reflective Mind, Keith Stanovich attempts to resolve the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science--the debate about how much irrationality to ascribe to human cognition. He shows how the insights of dual-process theory and evolutionary psychology can be combined to explain why humans are sometimes irrational even though they possess remarkably adaptive cognitive machinery. Stanovich argues that to fully characterize differences in rational thinking, we need to replace dual-process theories with tripartite models of cognition. Using a unique individual differences approach, he shows that the traditional second system (System 2) of dual-process theory must be further divided into the reflective mind and the algorithmic mind. Distinguishing them will allow us to better appreciate the significant differences in their key functions: The key function of the reflective mind is to detect the need to interrupt autonomous processing and to begin simulation activities, whereas that of the algorithmic mind is to sustain the processing of decoupled secondary representations in cognitive simulation. Stanovich then uses this algorithmic/reflective distinction to develop a taxonomy of cognitive errors made on tasks in the heuristics and biases literature. He presents the empirical data to show that the tendency to make these thinking errors is not highly related to intelligence. Using his tripartite model of cognition, Stanovich shows how, when both are properly defined, rationality is a more encompassing construct than intelligence, and that IQ tests fail to assess individual differences in rational thought. He then goes on to discuss the types of thinking processes that would be measured if rational thinking were to be assessed as IQ has been. |
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Contents
| 3 | |
| 29 | |
| 47 | |
| 61 | |
| 81 | |
| 95 | |
7 Intelligence as a Predictor of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks | 121 |
Empirical and Theoretical Relationships and Implications for the Great Rationality Debate | 155 |
9 The Social Implications of Separating the Concepts of Intelligence and Rationality | 175 |
10 The Assessment of Rational Thought | 191 |
References | 247 |
Author Index | 303 |
Subject Index | 319 |
Common terms and phrases
affective forecasting algorithmic mind algorithmic-level alternative argued assessment autonomous mind baserate behavior belief bias between-subjects bias blind spot biases literature Chapter cognitive ability cognitive decoupling cognitive miser cognitive science Components of Rational concept conjunction fallacy correlations Crystallized Facilitators Crystallized Rationality decision Dimensions Measurement Paradigms domain dual-process theory epistemic evaluation Evans evidence evolutionary evolutionary psychology example executive functioning Fischhoff fluid intelligence fluid rationality Flynn effect focal bias folk psychology Ford Explorer framing effects goal heuristics and biases hindsight bias individual differences intelligence tests IQ tests Journal of Experimental judgment Kahneman Klaczynski Major Dimensions Measurement Measurement Paradigms Source Meliorist mindware mindware gap myside myside bias Nisbett one’s outcome bias override failure Panglossian participants performance person problem psychology rational thought Rationality Debate reasoning tasks reflective mind representations serial associative cognition simulation Slovic social Stanovich & West strategy studies sustained decoupling tendency thinking dispositions thinking errors tion Tversky Type 2 processing

