Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters
Firmly rooting its argument in democratic and economic theory, the book argues that a more democratic distribution of communicative power within the public sphere and a structure that provides safeguards against abuse of media power provide two of three primary arguments for ownership dispersal. It also shows that dispersal is likely to result in more owners who will reasonably pursue socially valuable journalistic or creative objectives rather than a socially dysfunctional focus on the 'bottom line'. The middle chapters answer those agents, including the Federal Communication Commission, who favor 'deregulation' and who argue that existing or foreseeable ownership concentration is not a problem. The final chapter evaluates the constitutionality and desirability of various policy responses to concentration, including strict limits on media mergers.
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use his Germanys first media conglomerate to substantially aid Hitlers
conditions of great uncertainty If she reasonably concludes that the
Many Owners Many Sources
either a much more radically reformulated antitrust law or more
can only be obtained politically through laws or government
is constitutionally required in some Western European countries6 In
overall quantity quality and diversity of speech27 He argues that
embody an explicit textual constitutional command it is the
case that might support such strong rights did not use
Thus someone who wants a law invalidated regularly attributes to
on her protected politically salient speech An absence of subsidized
Solutions and Responses
FLAWED REGULATORY LIMITS ON OWNERSHIP
The Market or the Internet
THE INTERNET AS A SOLUTION
reduced although not eliminated since even those in charge
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advertising aims Amendment antitrust laws audience benefits blogs broadcast cable systems chapter Chicago School economic choice claim communicative power Compaine Compaine’s competition comScore concern constitutional consumer costs create Daily Kos democracy democratic distribution democratic role discourse dispersal of media diversity economic editorial editorial independence effect egalitarian empirical evaluate example favor FCC’s identify increase individual intermediate scrutiny Internet issue journalistic judicial activism limits marketplace of ideas mass media media concentration media entities media firm media markets media mergers media ownership concentration media power media products media-specific Miami Herald monopoly newspapers objections owners ownership dispersal ownership restrictions papers people’s percent perspective political possible potential power over content power over price predictably Press Clause press freedom problem profits prohibited public sphere purposes reason reduce relevant require rules scrutiny significant speech stations structural regulation subsidies Supreme Court Technorati tion
Page 5 - Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament ; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying ; it is a literal fact,— very momentous to us in these times.