Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership MattersFirmly rooting its argument in democratic and economic theory, the book argues that a more democratic distribution of communicative power within the public sphere and a structure that provides safeguards against abuse of media power provide two of three primary arguments for ownership dispersal. It also shows that dispersal is likely to result in more owners who will reasonably pursue socially valuable journalistic or creative objectives rather than a socially dysfunctional focus on the 'bottom line'. The middle chapters answer those agents, including the Federal Communication Commission, who favor 'deregulation' and who argue that existing or foreseeable ownership concentration is not a problem. The final chapter evaluates the constitutionality and desirability of various policy responses to concentration, including strict limits on media mergers. |
Contents
| 6 | |
Section 2 | 19 |
Section 3 | 26 |
Section 4 | 48 |
Section 5 | 54 |
Section 6 | 56 |
Section 7 | 60 |
Section 8 | 88 |
Section 11 | 124 |
Section 12 | 125 |
Section 13 | 130 |
Section 14 | 138 |
Section 15 | 142 |
Section 16 | 152 |
Section 17 | 163 |
Section 18 | 165 |
Section 9 | 97 |
Section 10 | 108 |
Section 19 | 182 |
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advertising aims Amendment antitrust laws audience benefits blogs broadcast cable systems chapter Chicago School economic choice claim communicative power Compaine Compaine's companies competition comScore concern constitutional consumer consumer sovereignty corporate costs create Daily Kos democracy democratic distribution democratic role discourse dispersal of media diversity economic editorial editorial independence effect egalitarian empirical evaluate example exist favor goal incentives increase individual intermediate scrutiny Internet issue journalism journalistic limits marketplace of ideas mass media media concentration media conglomerates media entities media markets media mergers media owners media products media-specific ment Miami Herald monopoly newspaper objections ownership dispersal papers percent perspective political possible potential power over price predictably Press Clause press freedom problem profit maximization profit-maximizing profits prohibited public sphere purchase purposes reason reduce relevant reported requires rules scrutiny significant speech stations structural regulation subsidies Supreme Court tion
Popular passages
Page 5 - Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament ; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying ; it is a literal fact,— very momentous to us in these times.