Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership MattersFirmly rooting its argument in democratic and economic theory, the book argues that a more democratic distribution of communicative power within the public sphere and a structure that provides safeguards against abuse of media power provide two of three primary arguments for ownership dispersal. It also shows that dispersal is likely to result in more owners who will reasonably pursue socially valuable journalistic or creative objectives rather than a socially dysfunctional focus on the 'bottom line'. The middle chapters answer those agents, including the Federal Communication Commission, who favor 'deregulation' and who argue that existing or foreseeable ownership concentration is not a problem. The final chapter evaluates the constitutionality and desirability of various policy responses to concentration, including strict limits on media mergers. |
Contents
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
use his Germanys first media conglomerate to substantially aid Hitlers | 19 |
conditions of great uncertainty If she reasonably concludes that the | 26 |
| 48 | |
Many Owners Many Sources | 54 |
either a much more radically reformulated antitrust law or more | 60 |
can only be obtained politically through laws or government | 76 |
is constitutionally required in some Western European countries6 In | 125 |
overall quantity quality and diversity of speech27 He argues that | 129 |
embody an explicit textual constitutional command it is the | 130 |
case that might support such strong rights did not use | 138 |
Thus someone who wants a law invalidated regularly attributes to | 142 |
on her protected politically salient speech An absence of subsidized | 152 |
Solutions and Responses | 163 |
FLAWED REGULATORY LIMITS ON OWNERSHIP | 165 |
The Market or the Internet | 88 |
THE INTERNET AS A SOLUTION | 97 |
reduced although not eliminated since even those in charge | 182 |
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Common terms and phrases
advertising aims Amendment antitrust laws audience benefits blogs broadcast cable systems chapter Chicago School economic choice claim communicative power Compaine Compaine’s competition comScore concern constitutional consumer costs create Daily Kos democracy democratic distribution democratic role discourse dispersal of media diversity economic editorial editorial independence effect egalitarian empirical evaluate example favor FCC’s identify increase individual intermediate scrutiny Internet issue journalistic judicial activism limits marketplace of ideas mass media media concentration media entities media firm media markets media mergers media ownership concentration media power media products media-specific Miami Herald monopoly newspapers objections owners ownership dispersal ownership restrictions papers people’s percent perspective political possible potential power over content power over price predictably Press Clause press freedom problem profits prohibited public sphere purposes reason reduce relevant require rules scrutiny significant speech stations structural regulation subsidies Supreme Court Technorati tion
Popular passages
Page 5 - Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament ; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying ; it is a literal fact,— very momentous to us in these times.
Bibliographic information
| Title | Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters Communication, Society and Politics |
| Author | C. Edwin Baker |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press, 2006 |
| ISBN | 1139461036, 9781139461030 |
| Length | 256 pages |
| Subjects | › › Business & Economics / Industries / Media & Communications Language Arts & Disciplines / Journalism Political Science / American Government / General |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |