Art and BeliefEma Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley, Paul Noordhof Art and Belief presents twelve new essays at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of art, particularly to do with the relation between belief and truth in our experience of art. Several contributors discuss the cognitive contributions artworks can make and the questions surrounding these. Can authors of fiction testify to their readers? If they can, are they culpable for the false beliefs of their readers formed in response to their work? If they cannot, that is, if the testimonial powers of authors of fiction are limited, is there some non-testimonial epistemic role that fiction can play? And in any case, is such a role relevant when determining the value of the work? Also explored are issues concerned with the phenomenon of fictional persuasion, specifically, what is the nature of the attitude involved in such cases (those in which we form beliefs about the real world in response to reading fiction)? If these attitudes are typically unstable, unjustified, and unreliable, does this put pressure on the view that they are beliefs? If these attitudes are beliefs, does this put pressure on the view that all beliefs are aimed at truth? The final pair of papers in the volume take different stances on the nature of aesthetic testimony, and whether testimony of this kind is a legitimate source of beliefs about aesthetic properties and value. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Author Testimony | 17 |
NonTestimonial Epistemic Contributions of Fictions | 83 |
Belief Truth and Attitudes from Fictional Persuasion | 151 |
Aesthetic Appreciation and Belief | 211 |
| 247 | |
| 253 | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept according acquire admire aesthetic amounts appeal argue argument assertions assume attitudes basis Chapter character claim cognitive concerning condition consider Currie discussion distinct earlier effects emotions engaging epistemic evidence example experience explain expressive fact factual false feelings fictional persuasion findings function further genuine give given Green idea imagination intention interest involved Journal judgements kind knowledge least less literary literature look matter means mental mind moral motivation narrative nature norms novel objects offer Oxford participants particular perhaps person Philosophical positive possible present problem proposition Psychology question rational readers reading reason regulation relevant reliable respect response result role seems sometimes story studies subjects suggest Suppose testimony theory things thoughts transparency transportation true beliefs truth University Press utterance volume