Art and Belief
Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley, Paul Noordhof
Oxford University Press, 2017 - Art - 272 pages
Art and Belief Presents twelve new essays, addressing questions at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of art, while also advancing these debates. It brings together recent work on belief and truth with issues concerning belief that arise in the philosophy of art. Several contributors discuss the cognitive contributions artworks can make and the questions surrounding these. Can authors of fiction testify to their readers? If they can, are they culpable for the false beliefs of their readers formed in response to their work? If they cannot, that is, if the testimonial powers of authors of fiction are limited, is there some non-testimonial epistemic role that fiction can play? And in any case, is such a role relevant when determining the value of the work? Also explored are issues concerned with the phenomenon of fictional persuasion, specifically, what is the nature of the attitude involved in such cases, when we seemingly form beliefs about the real world in response to reading fiction? If these attitudes are typically unstable, unjustified, and unreliable, does this put pressure on the view that they are beliefs? If these attitudes are beliefs, does this put pressure on the view that all beliefs are aimed at truth? Finally, this book explores the nature of aesthetic testimony, and whether testimony of this kind is a legitimate source of beliefs about aesthetic properties and value.
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aesthetic judgements aesthetic testimony Aim of Belief amounts to knowledge argue argument artworks assertions availability heuristic basis of testimony behavioral belief formation beliefs from fiction Brokeback Mountain Chapter character claim cognitive doxastic effects emotions engaging with fiction epistemic epistemology evidence example experience explain fact false fictional attitudes fictional persuasion fictional text focus form beliefs functional profile genuine beliefs Gregory Currie illocutionary act imagination that amounts intention Jane Eyre kind knowledge from fiction Lamarque literary fiction literature motivation narrative nature of belief non-fiction normative account norms novel objects Oxford University Press Philosophical philosophy of mind positive pro tanto proposition Psychology question rational readers reading fiction reason regulated for truth relevant reliable Robson role signposts of factuality speech act Steglich-Petersen story subjects TBBs teleological account teleologist testimony-in-fiction thoughts transparency transportation true beliefs truth regulation undermine utterance volume Wide Sargasso Sea