Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust IssuesJerome Ellig During the 1990s, U.S. antitrust policy began to take greater account of economic theories that emphasize the critical role of innovation and change in the competitive process. Several high-profile antitrust cases have focused on dynamic innovation issues as much as or more than static economic efficiency. But does dynamic competition furnish a new rationale for activist antitrust, or a new reason for government to leave markets alone? In this volume, more than a dozen leading scholars with extensive antitrust experience explore this question in the context of the Microsoft case, merger policy, and intellectual property law. |
Contents
A Taxonomy of Dynamic Competition Theories | 16 |
Competence Explanations of Economic Profits | 45 |
Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement | 65 |
New Indicia for Antitrust Analysis in Markets | 95 |
Innovation and Monopoly Leveraging | 138 |
Network Effects and the Microsoft Case | 160 |
Technological Standards Innovation and Essential | 193 |
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Limitations | 229 |
Conclusion | 264 |
Common terms and phrases
analysis anticompetitive antitrust laws applications barriers to entry behavior browser bundling capability explanations compete competitive advantage competitors computer reservation systems consumer welfare contracts copyright protection costs create customers dynamic competition economic profits efficiency entrants equilibrium essential facility evolutionary example existing explanations of economic firm's grafts high-technology industries Horizontal Merger Guidelines imitation important incentives increase incumbent innovation intellectual property Internet Internet Explorer issues Langlois licensing lock-in Lotus Macintosh Managing Your Money market definition market power market share market structure Mercatus Center Microsoft monopolist monopoly leveraging monopoly power network effects operating system Ordover original overcurrent protection devices patent path dependence performance personal computer potential PPTCs product market property rights resources and capabilities restrictions result Schumpeter Schumpeterian software markets source code spreadsheet SSNIP standard static Strategic Management substitutes suggests sumers superior Teece theory tion tradeoff users vertical Windows