Markets, Morals and the LawThis collection of essays by one of America's leading legal theorists is unique in its scope: It shows how traditional problems of philosophy can be understood more clearly when considered in terms of law, economics and political science. There are four sections in the book. The first offers a new version of legal positivism and an original theory of legal rights. The second section critically evaluates the economic approach to law, and the third considers the relationship of justice to liability for unintentional harms and to the practice of settling disputes rather than fully litigating them. Finally, Coleman explores formal social choice in democratic theory, the relationship between market behaviour and voting, and the view that morality itself, like law, is a solution of the problem of market failure. This book will be of cardinal importance to philosophers of law, legal theorists, political scientists and economists. |
Contents
Rethinking the theory of legal rights | 28 |
Efficiency auction and exchange | 67 |
Efficiency utility and wealth maximization | 95 |
The foundations of constitutional economics | 133 |
Crimes kickers and transaction structures | 153 |
The morality of strict tort liability | 166 |
Corrective justice and wrongful gain | 184 |
Justice in settlements | 202 |
Market contractarianism | 243 |
Unanimity | 277 |
Democracy and social choice | 290 |
Morality and the theory of rational choice | 311 |
Notes | 343 |
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Common terms and phrases
accept action agree agreement allocation alternative analysis argue argument assignment bargaining cause choice claim class members compensation compliance conception conduct consent constitute constraints controversial corrective justice costs criminal decision defendant discussion distinction distribution economic efficiency entitlements example exchange exists externalities fact fail fair fault follow gain give given grounds harm impose individuals initial injurer institutions interest judges justice justified Kaldor-Hicks least legitimate less liability rules liberty loss market failure means ment moral necessary normative outcome Pareto Pareto optimal Pareto superior particular parties person political position positivism Posner possible preferences principle problem procedure produce protect question rational reason requires result rule of recognition secure sense settle settlement social specify standard strict liability theory tion tort trade transaction transfer unanimity unfair utility victim voting wealth maximization wrongful