Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief

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Clarendon Press, 2003 - Language Arts & Disciplines - 261 pages
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In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume's argument is flawed. However, Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction.

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References to this book

Hume on Causation
Helen Beebee
No preview available - 2006
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About the author (2003)

Colin Howson is Professor of Philosophy at the London School of Economics.

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