Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and CooperationThe term "Prisoner's Dilemma" comes from the original anecdote used to illustrate this game of strategy. Two prisoners, held incommunicado, are charged with the same crime. They can be convicted only if either confesses. If both prisoners confess, their payoff is minus one. If neither confesses, it is plus one. If only one confesses, he is set free for having turned state's evidence and is given a reward of plus two to boot. The prisoner who holds out is convicted on the strength of the other's testimony and is given a more severe sentence than if he had confessed. His payoff is minus two. It is in the interest of each to confess no matter what the other does, but it is in their collective interest to hold out.There is no satisfactory solution to the paradox of this game. Its simplicity is misleading. What seems rational from your own point of view, turns out to be detrimental in the end. This book is an account of many experiments in which Prisoner's Dilemma was played. Analyzing the results, one can learn how people are motivated to trust or distrust their partners, to keep faith or to betray, to be guided by joint or selfish interest. The method represents an important step toward building a bridge between psychology which is based on hard data and reproducible experiments and psychology which is concerned with internal conflict. |
Contents
In Search of an Index | 33 |
Effects of Mixing Games and Concealing the Matrix | 50 |
Effects of Interaction | 56 |
The Contingent Propensities | 67 |
The Time Courses | 87 |
General Remarks | 105 |
Markov Chain Models | 114 |
Equilibrium Models with Adjustable Parameters | 129 |
Comparing Populations | 185 |
Summary of Results | 198 |
Concluding Remarks | 204 |
Instructions Given to Subjects Playing Prisoners Dilemma in the Pure Matrix Condition | 228 |
Estimates of Significance Games Compared | 230 |
Estimates of Significance Populations Compared | 235 |
Effect of Initial Response | 237 |
Glossary of Symbols | 240 |
Stochastic Learning Models | 135 |
Classical Dynamic Models | 141 |
Testing the Models | 153 |
Simulation | 174 |
Notes | 248 |
256 | |
Other editions - View all
Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation Anatol Rapoport,Albert M. Chammah Limited preview - 1965 |
Common terms and phrases
assumed average behavior Block Matrix C₁ and C₂ CC response CC runs choose column conditional probabilities cooperative choices DD runs depend derived dition dynamic equations example experimental experiments Figure fraction frequency of cooperative Game IV game theory Game XII given Horizontal Hypothesis indices initial interaction effects lock-in effect Markov chain martyr runs mathematical models Mixed No Matrix mixed pairs mixed strategy noncooperative observed outcome paired players parabola parameters payoff matrix payoffs playing Prisoner's Dilemma population of paired Prisoner's Dilemma game product moment correlation protocol psychological Pure Matrix Condition Pure No Matrix question r₁ r₂ rank order rational represented respect Responses 1-15 rote learning saddle point second player sequence seven games shown simpletons simulated situation sponses state-conditioned propensities stochastic learning model stochastic process strategy subjects Table tacit collusion tend Tic-tac-toe tion tit-for-tat unilateral responses values variables Vertical x₁ zero