Airport Security: Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, September 20, 2001 |
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access controls access to secure Administrator Garvey agency air marshals aircraft airline industry airplane airport security American aviation industry aviation security aviation system background checks baggage believe billion Chairman cockpit door Committee Computer Security CONGRESS THE LIBRARY dangerous objects detection economic employees Federal Air Marshal flight going happen hearing hijackers implement improve issue Jane Garvey last week law enforcement officers LIBRARY CONGRESS LIBRARY OF CONGRE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS look national security NGRESS passengers percent personnel pilots plane President problem question Reagan National Airport recommendations requirements safety screeners screening checkpoint Secretary MINETA secure areas security measures security screening security system Senator ALLEN Senator BOXER Senator BREAUX Senator Hutchison Senator MCCAIN Senator ROCKEFELLER Senator Wyden September 11th sure talking teams terrorist terrorist attacks Thank things threat tion Transportation turnover U.S. SENATOR weapons WOERTH World Trade Center
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Page 61 - ACI-NA represents local regional and state governing bodies that own and operate commercial airports in the United States and Canada.
Page 53 - Each year, weapons were discovered to have passed through one checkpoint and have later been found during screening for a subsequent flight. FAA monitors the performance of screeners by periodically testing their ability to detect potentially dangerous objects carried by FAA special agents posing as passengers. In 1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the objects during FAA tests. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the objects during the same type of test. Test data for the 1991 to...
Page 53 - ... vigilance. As a result, screeners are being placed on the job who do not have the necessary aptitudes, nor the adequate knowledge to effectively perform the work, and who then find the duties tedious and dull. We reported in June 2000 that FAA was implementing a number of actions to improve screeners
Page 53 - Furthermore, the recent tests show that as tests become more realistic and more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners' ability to detect dangerous objects declines even further. As we reported last year, there is no single reason why screeners fail to identify dangerous objects.
Page 52 - FAA's computer security. FAA has worked to address these recommendations, but most of them have yet to be completed. For example, it is making progress in obtaining background checks on contractors and accrediting facilities and systems as secure. However, it will take time to complete these efforts. WEAKNESSES IN AIRPORT ACCESS CONTROLS Control of access to aircraft, airfields, and certain airport facilities is another component of aviation security. Among the access controls in place are requirements...
Page 53 - information on FAA tests results is now designated as sensitive security information and cannot be publicly released. Consequently, we cannot discuss the actual detection rates for the 1991-99 period. 'Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners
Page 52 - Air carriers can use their own employees to conduct screening activities, but mostly air carriers hire security companies to do the screening. Currently, multiple carriers and screening companies are responsible for screening at some of the nation's larger airports. Concerns have long existed over screeners' ability to detect and prevent dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Each year, weapons were discovered to have passed through one checkpoint and have later been found during screening...
Page 50 - ... and walk unescorted to aircraft departure gates. The agents, who had been issued tickets and boarding passes, could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft.
Page 50 - General has also documented numerous problems with airport access controls, and in one series of tests, the Inspector General's staff successfully gained access to secure areas 68 percent of the time. As we reported in June 2000, tests of screeners revealed significant weaknesses as measured in their ability to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the potentially dangerous objects used by FAA in its tests. At that...
Page 55 - ... each country were not available to us, it is difficult to measure the impact of these different practices on improving screeners' performance. Nevertheless, there are indications that for least one country, practices may help to improve screeners