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Corruption and Government:

Causes, Consequences, and Reform
Front Cover
1 Review
Cambridge University Press, Jun 28, 1999 - Political Science - 266 pages
Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon. Developing countries and those making a transition from socialism are particularly at risk. This book suggests how high levels of corruption limit investment and growth and lead to ineffective government. Corruption creates economic inefficiencies and inequities, but reforms are possible to reduce the material benefits from payoffs. Corruption is not just an economic problem, however; it is also intertwined with politics. Reform may require changes in both constitutional structures and the underlying relationship of the market and the state. Effective reform cannot occur unless both the international community and domestic political leaders support change.
  

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Review: Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform

User Review  - Kw Estes - Goodreads

Filled with ideas about corruption, many of which are indeterminate. In that sense, might serve as a decent source from which to draw research questions. Also, makes for a decent primer on the subject Read full review

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Contents

Introduction The Costs of Corruption
1
Corruption as an Economic Problem
7
The Economic Impact of Corruption
9
Payments that Equate Supply and Demand
10
Bribes as Incentive Payments for Bureaucrats
15
Bribes to Reduce Costs
18
Organized Crime and Corruption
23
Conclusions
25
Bilateral Monopolies and MafiaDominated States
121
Competitive Bribery
124
Conclusions
125
Democracy and Corruption Incentives and Reforms
127
Buying Political Influence and Buying Votes
132
Conclusions
142
Controlling Political Power
143
Checks and Balances in the Legislative Process
144

Corruption of HighLevel Officials
27
Privatization
35
Conclusions
38
Reducing Incentives and Increasing Costs
39
Establishing a Credible Privatization Process
42
Reform of Public Programs
44
Competitive Pressures in Administration
49
The Deterrent Effect of Anticorruption Laws
52
Procurement Reform
59
Conclusions
68
Reform of the Civil Service
69
Pay Reform
71
Conflicts of Interest
75
Carrots and Sticks
78
Corruption in Hierarchies
82
The Rediscovery of Contract
84
Conclusions
87
Corruption as a Cultural Problem
89
Bribes Patronage and Gift Giving
91
Bribes Gifts Prices and Tips
92
The Similarity of Bribes and Gifts
96
Patronage Gift Giving and Economic Development
104
Conclusions
110
Corruption as a Political Problem
111
Corruption and Politics
113
Kleptocracy
114
Accountable Implementation
146
Exit and Voice
149
Independent Judicial and Prosecutorial Institutions
151
Openness and Accountability
162
Conclusions
174
Achieving Reform
175
The Role of the International Community
177
Controlling Corruption in Development Projects
179
Supporting Reform
182
Limiting Corruption in International Business
185
Controlling Money Laundering and International Criminal Enterprise
190
New International Institutions
193
Policy Fads and Policy Reforms
196
Domestic Conditions for Reform
198
Political Structure and Reform
199
Scandal and Crisis as Catalysts
209
Natural Resource Wealth and Foreign Aid
213
Demands for Reform
215
Sustaining Reform
219
Conclusions
222
Conclusions
225
References
230
Name Index
253
Subject Index
259
Copyright

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About the author (1999)

Susan Rose-Ackerman is the Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science) at Yale University. She has also taught at the University of Pennsylvania and Columbia University. She has held Guggenheim and Fulbright Fellowships and has been a Research Fellow at the World Bank, the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Stanford, CA), the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria), and Collegium Budapest. Professor Rose-Ackerman is the author of Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 1999, with subsequent translations into nine languages), Controlling Environmental Policy and The Nonprofit Enterprise in Market Economies. She is one of the editors of Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition and Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition. Both these books as well as From Elections to Democracy are products of the project, Honesty and Trust in Post-Socialist Transition, jointly organized by the author and J nos Kornai at Collegium Budapest. Professor Rose-Ackerman has also published widely in law, economics and policy journals. Her research interests include comparative regulatory law and policy, the political economy of corruption, public policy and administrative law, and law and economics.

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