Economic Analysis of LawThis text for students of law and economics concentrates on the progress of scholarship in the field. Concrete applications are emphasized over abstract theory in the book. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 56
Page 107
... breach of contract . To compel completion of the contract ( or costly negotiations to discharge the promisor ) would ... breach was in a sense involuntary . It was com- mitted only to avert a larger loss . The promisor would have been ...
... breach of contract . To compel completion of the contract ( or costly negotiations to discharge the promisor ) would ... breach was in a sense involuntary . It was com- mitted only to avert a larger loss . The promisor would have been ...
Page 108
... breaches . This raises the question of whether the problem of overdeterring breaches of contract by heavy penalties could not be solved more easily by redefining the legal concept of breach of contract so that only inefficient ...
... breaches . This raises the question of whether the problem of overdeterring breaches of contract by heavy penalties could not be solved more easily by redefining the legal concept of breach of contract so that only inefficient ...
Page 115
... breach , though the buyer cannot avoid the breach itself . The rule of Hadley v . Baxendale thus resembles the rule of tort law ( not universally adopted ) that an accident victim will not be allowed to recover damages that he could ...
... breach , though the buyer cannot avoid the breach itself . The rule of Hadley v . Baxendale thus resembles the rule of tort law ( not universally adopted ) that an accident victim will not be allowed to recover damages that he could ...
Contents
THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC REASONING | 3 |
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW | 19 |
PROPERTY | 29 |
Copyright | |
42 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
accident costs activity agency antitrust average benefits bilateral monopoly breach buyer capital cartel Chapter Coase Theorem common law compensation competition consumers contract corporation costly courts crime criminal damages defendant demand deterrence discussed doctrine earnings economic analysis economist effect efficient elasticity employer enforcement example expected federal firm firm's higher impose incentive income increase infra injurer interest investment labor land Law & Econ less litigation loss lower marginal cost monopolist monopoly price monopoly profits monopsony natural monopoly negligence opportunity cost optimal output owner parents parties percent plaintiff pollution Posner predatory pricing prevent price discrimination probability problem profits property rights punishment purchase railroad reason reduce regulation require result revenue risk risk averse rule sell seller shareholders social costs strict liability substitute Suppose supra theory tion tort transaction costs union utility victim wage wealth widgets workers