All the Power in the WorldThis bold and original work of philosophy presents an exciting new picture of concrete reality. Peter Unger provocatively breaks with what he terms the conservatism of present-day philosophy, and returns to central themes from Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Russell. Wiping the slate clean, Unger works, from the ground up, to formulate a new metaphysic capable of accommodating our distinctly human perspective. He proposes a world with inherently powerful particulars of two basic sorts: one mental but not physical, the other physical but not mental. Whether of one sort or the other, each individual possesses powers for determining his or her own course, as well as powers for interaction with other individuals. It is only a purely mental particular--an immaterial soul, like yourself--that is ever fit for real choosing, or for conscious experiencing. Rigorously reasoning that the only satisfactory metaphysic is one that situates the physical alongside the non-physical, Unger carefully explains the genesis of, and continual interaction of, the two sides of our deeply dualistic world. Written in an accessible and entertaining style, while advancing philosophical scholarship, All the Power in the World takes readers on a philosophical journey into the nature of reality. In this riveting intellectual adventure, Unger reveals the need for an entirely novel approach to the nature of physical reality--and shows how this approach can lead to wholly unexpected possibilities, including disembodied human existence for billions of years. All the Power in the World returns philosophy to its most ambitious roots in its fearless attempt to answer profoundly difficult human questions about ourselves and our world. |
Contents
The Mystery of the Physical | 3 |
1 A Brief Exposition of the Scientiphical Metaphysic | 6 |
2 Three Kinds of Basic Property and the Denial of Qualities | 9 |
3 The Denial of Qualities Particles in Space and Spaces in a Plenum | 20 |
4 When Limited by the Denial How to Conceive a Particles Propensities? | 25 |
5 Can Particles Rotate but Not Plenumate Bubbles? | 29 |
6 Simple Attempts at Clear Conception May Highlight Our Mystery | 31 |
A Humanly Realistic Philosophy | 36 |
9 Objective Probabilities Random Happenings and Real Choices | 330 |
10 Can Inhering in a Field Help Us Have Real Choice? | 332 |
11 Can an Infinitely Deep Hierarchy of Physical Powers Help Us Have Real Choice? | 333 |
12 Radically Emergent Beings with a Radically Emergent Power to Choose | 335 |
13 PhysicalandMental Complexes with a Radically Emergent Power to Choose | 341 |
How Much a Side Issue? | 343 |
15 Are Physically Effective Choosing Souls Compatible with Physical Conservation Laws? | 347 |
16 Are Physically Effective Choosing Souls Compatible with Other Physical Principles? | 352 |
2 We Are Differentially Responsive Individuals | 40 |
3 Against Descartes We Are Intermittently Conscious Individuals | 45 |
4 Our Realistic Response to Descartes Raises a Problem of Our Unconscious Quality | 48 |
5 Against Humes Restriction Human Understanding Transcends Human Experience | 49 |
6 We Are Experientially Varying Individuals | 53 |
7 We Are Not Bundles of Experiences Thoughts or Perceptions | 55 |
8 We Substantial Individuals Are More Basic Than Our Thoughts and Experiences | 58 |
9 As We Communicate with Each Other We Are Reciprocal Interaction Partners | 63 |
10 There Is Perplexity Concerning How We Commonly Communicate | 66 |
11 Much of the World Interacts with Us but Doesnt Communicate with Us | 68 |
12 We Often Choose What to Think About and Even What to Communicate | 71 |
Demystifying the Physical | 74 |
2 Spatially Extensible Qualities and Intelligible Propensities | 76 |
3 Spatially Extensible Qualities Are Perfectly Pervasive Properties | 82 |
4 Intelligible Physical Reality and a Principle of Constrained Contingency | 87 |
A Problem | 90 |
A Solution | 91 |
7 Mutually Isolated Concrete Worlds and Distinct Eons of the Actual World | 93 |
8 Mightnt the Recognized Physical Properties Just Be Spatially Extensible Qualities? | 98 |
9 The Identity Theory of Qualities and Dispositions | 100 |
10 A Limited Identity Theory? | 106 |
11 Can There Be Spatially Extensible Yellow Entities That Arent Ever Propensitied? | 109 |
12 Can an Extensible Blue Body Be Attracted by Concreta That Arent BlueAttractors? | 111 |
13 Can an Extensible Blue Body Be Perceived to Be Extensible Blue? | 112 |
14 We Consider an Antinomy of Spatially Extensible Quality | 117 |
By Contrast with Hume | 123 |
By Contrast with Lewis | 133 |
17 What May We Learn from Our Demystification of the Physical? | 136 |
18 Remarks on Whats Been Done and on Whats to Come | 141 |
A Cornucopia of Quality | 145 |
2 Our Power to Experience Promotes Our Conceiving Concrete Individuals | 150 |
3 Our Power to Experience Visually Promotes Our Conceiving Concrete Spatial Things | 153 |
4 Might Our Idea of Spatially Extensible Color Be Our Most Central Concept of Color? | 157 |
5 Our Power to Experience Auditorally Cant Promote Such Full Spatial Conceiving | 159 |
6 Might an Extensible Red Object Be Qualitatively Like an Experiential Red Subject? | 162 |
7 The Great Range of Color for Spatially Extended Concreta | 167 |
8 Contrasting Quality Families and a Sketchy Speculation | 169 |
A Neglected Distinction | 171 |
10 Is This Neglected Distinction Philosophically Significant? | 173 |
11 Conscious Perceiving as an Aid to Fuller Conceiving | 177 |
12 Full Conceiving of Concreta Is both Experiential and Intellectual | 179 |
13 Extrapolating from the Highly Experiential in Conceiving Spatial Individuals | 181 |
14 Conceiving Concrete All Qualitied Uniformly but Propensitied Quite Variously | 184 |
15 Are Felt Bodily Qualities Well Suited to Conceiving Nonmental Individuals? | 191 |
16 How Well Do We Conceive Insensate Bodies as Pervaded with Tactile Qualities? | 193 |
17 Extensible Qualities Experiential Qualities and Powers to Affect Experientially | 196 |
18 Why Our Idea of Spatially Extensible Color May Be Our Most Central Idea of Color | 199 |
19 We Focus on Substantive Metaphysics Not Natural Languages or Conceptual Relations | 206 |
A Plenitude of Power | 211 |
2 Powerdirected Powers Propensities with Respect to Propensities | 213 |
3 Powerdirected Powers May Distinctively Distinguish among Other Powers | 216 |
4 Propensity Possibility Accident and Probability | 226 |
5 Powerdirected Powers and Probabilistic Propensities of Very Low Degree | 229 |
6 Powers Are Nonconditional Including Powers to Acquire and Lose Other Powers | 232 |
7 Standard Scientific Thinking and Generalistically directed Propensities | 239 |
8 Individualisticallydirected Propensities | 242 |
9 Individualisticallydirected Propensities and Cartesian Dualism | 246 |
10 Individualistic Propensities and the Intellectual Aspect of Our Conceiving | 248 |
A Special Case of Individualisticallydirected Propensities | 254 |
12 A Humans Selfdirected Propensities with Respect to Her Own Experiencing | 255 |
13 Can There Be Any Concrete Entities That Arent Ever Propensitied? | 259 |
14 Scientiphicalism Selfdirected Propensity and Experiential Awareness | 263 |
15 Temporal Monotony and Temporal Change | 266 |
16 Propensity for Monotony and Propensity for Change | 268 |
17 Possibility Accident Probability and Selfdirected Propensity | 277 |
18 Basic Concrete Propensity for Annihilation and Propensity for Continuation | 278 |
The Basis of Stable Monotony | 286 |
A Good LongTerm Investment for Substantial Dualists? | 291 |
21 The Confused Idea of a Worlds Default Setting | 295 |
22 Time without Change | 298 |
23 Do Our Reciprocal Propensity Partners Present a Cosmic Miracle? | 300 |
Is Free Will Compatible with Scientiphicalism? | 309 |
1 A Few Points about Real Choice | 313 |
Not an Urgent Issue | 316 |
3 A Widely Disturbing Argument Presents a More Urgent Issue | 318 |
4 Real Choice Free Will Is Incompatible with Inevitabilism Determinism | 319 |
5 Is Real Choice Incompatible with the Denial of Inevitabilism? | 320 |
6 Our Scientiphical Metaphysic and the Currently Dominant Conception of Ourselves | 323 |
7 Simple Physical Entities and Their Basic Properties | 325 |
8 Reciprocal Propensities and Physical Laws | 327 |
17 Radically Selfdirected Power | 354 |
18 An Exemption from Natural Law Is Required for Real Choice | 356 |
19 The Real Reason Why an Exemption from Natural Law Is Required for Real Choice | 358 |
20 Apparent Scientiphical Incompatibilisms and Further Philosophical Explorations | 360 |
Why We Really May Be Immaterial Souls | 362 |
1 Recalling the Problem of the Many | 366 |
2 A Couple of Comments on That Comparatively Uninteresting Problem | 371 |
3 The Experiential Problem of the Many | 376 |
4 How the Singularity of Experiencing May Favor Substantial Dualism | 381 |
5 Many Overlapping Experiencers but Only One of Them Now Experiencing? | 383 |
6 Some Cases of Singular Causal Resolution | 385 |
7 An Immaterial Experiencers Causally Resolved Singularity Is a Relevant Singularity | 392 |
8 These Are Metaphysical Matters Transcending All Purely Semantic Issues | 394 |
On Complex Complexes | 397 |
10 Problems of Propensitively Redundant Propensitive Contributors | 402 |
11 Our Experiential Problem Doesnt Presuppose Any Suspicious Identifications | 407 |
12 The Problem of Too Many Real Choosers | 414 |
13 Wholly Immaterial Souls Favored over Emergentist PhysicalandMental Complexes | 418 |
14 A Singular Physical Manifestation of Many Choosers Powers to Choose? | 420 |
15 Do These Problems Favor Substantial Dualism over Its Most Salient Alternatives? | 424 |
16 Some Less Salient Options to a QuasiCartesian Substantial Dualism | 427 |
17 Arent Immaterial Souls Really Just Eliminable Middlemen? | 437 |
18 Wholly Immaterial Souls Are Generated Abruptly Not Gradually | 440 |
19 Our Own Souls and the Wholly Immaterial Souls of Nonhuman Animals | 446 |
20 Metaphysically Material Ruminations about Extraordinarily Different Gestations | 448 |
Might All Souls Be Equally Powerful Individuals? | 451 |
22 Bodily Flexibility as Regards Individualistically directed Soulful Propensity | 456 |
23 Taking Stock and Moving On | 461 |
Beyond Discriminative Vagueness Safe from Nihilistic Sorites | 465 |
Why We May Become Disembodied But To No Avail | 470 |
1 Why We May Become Disembodied Souls with the Deaths of Our Brains and Bodies | 471 |
2 Even While You May Be an Immaterial Soul Are You Really an Existential OTHERON? | 473 |
3 Immaterial OTHERONS Are Just as Problematic as Material OTHERONS | 477 |
4 Metaphysical Asymmetries and Further Forms of Substantial Dualism | 482 |
5 Some Questions about Disembodiment and about Reincarnation | 485 |
6 Prospects for Disembodiment | 486 |
7 Even If We Disembodied Souls Last for Eons What Are Our Prospects for Experiencing? | 490 |
8 What Are Our Prospects for Reincarnation? | 496 |
9 The Question of Disembodied Souls and the Question of an Almighty Creator | 501 |
10 Why Our LongTerm Prospects May Be Very Bleak Prospects | 508 |
The Problem of Our Unconscious Quality | 511 |
1 Physical Objects Aptly Qualitied Experiencers Differently Qualitied Just as Aptly | 512 |
2 Every Individual Is Qualitied Including You and Me | 513 |
3 We Reconsider the Problem of Our Unconscious Quality | 514 |
4 We Notice How Descartes Heroically Denies This Problem | 518 |
5 A QuasiHumean Substantial Dualist May Heroically Deny the Problem | 520 |
6 A Compositist Substantial Dualist May Similarly Deny the Problem | 521 |
7 Will Unconscious Experiential Quality Provide a Less Heroic Dualistic Answer? | 523 |
8 How Fully May Dualists Offer a Speculative Answer to the Problem? | 526 |
How Rich is Concrete Reality? | 528 |
1 Sameness and Difference of Concrete Individuals | 529 |
2 Conceiving Nonspatial Simultaneous Souls Always Precisely Alike | 532 |
Even If Just Modestly Grasped It Might Be True | 536 |
Even If Just Modestly Grasped It Also Might Be True | 537 |
5 Substantial Individuals and Our Conceptions as to Such Concrete Particulars | 540 |
6 We Prepare an Analogy between the Properly Spatial and the Relevantly Spacelike | 542 |
An Analogical Speculation | 545 |
An Apparent Alternative | 548 |
9 An Hypothesized Dimension Far More Like Space Than Like Time | 550 |
10 Our Fullest Conceptions of Spatial Bodies | 554 |
11 An Analogical Conception of Nonspatial Souls | 557 |
12 Our Hypothesis Allows More Fully Conceivable Substantial Dualist Views | 560 |
Integrated and Nonintegrated Dimensions | 563 |
14 How Might We Nonspatial Souls Precede Even Our Initial Physical Embodiment? | 567 |
15 Do Immaterial Souls Ever Change Propensitively? | 576 |
A Constitutional View of Souls | 581 |
17 Drawbacks of This Constitutional View | 585 |
18 Fusional Dualism | 587 |
19 Our Hypothesized Dualism and the Mental Problems of the Many | 589 |
20 Our Hypothesized Dualism and the Problem of Our Unconscious Quality | 592 |
21 Recalling and Addressing the Question of Nicely Matched Propensity Partners | 594 |
22 Our Hypothesized Dualism and the Question of Nicely Matched Propensity Partners | 601 |
23 Does Our Hypothesized Dualism Make My Current Quality Too Inaccessible? | 606 |
24 Two Cartesian Arguments for Some Spacelikely Substantial Dualism | 610 |
25 Is Realitys Temporal Aspect Uniquely Distinctive? | 616 |
26 Why Are Our Concrete Conceptions of Such Limited Variety? | 618 |
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Common terms and phrases
basic physical Bertrand Russell billions Blue Sphere brain causal causal closure central Chapter choose conceive conception concerning concrete reality concretum conscious consider contrast course Cube Descartes discussion Dualist Views electrons elementary particles Emergentism Emergentist Eons exist experiencing experiential quality Extensibly Qualitied fully happen Humanly Realistic Philosophy Hume Humean Hypothesis idea imagine immaterial soul individual Individualistically-directed interaction Large Red least legons manifestation matter mind nicely nonphysical nonspatial souls object ontologically Opaque overlapping Particles pensitied perfectly perhaps pervaded philosophical physical complexes physical entities physical Propensities physical reality physical things physically derivative Plenum power to experience present pretty Problem Propen Propensitied with respect Propensitive Propensity for Monotony properties quarks question real choice Red Sphere relevantly riencing salient Scientiphical Metaphysic Section Shape Small Blue sonal soul sort space spacelike spatial bodies Spatially Extensible Quality Spherical Substantial Dualism suggest suppose temporal terribly there's thought Transparent Red visual what's Yellow