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abstract action actual afferent nerves agens animals apprehended argument Aristotle asserted association associationist attention Bain belief body brain cause cerebral character cognition colour complete conceived conception condition consciousness consequently Descartes distinct doctrine elements emotions energy excited existence experience external fact faculty feelings Felida force G. H. Lewes Herbert Spencer human ideas imagination immediate impressions impulse innate innate ideas instinct intel intellectual judgment knowledge latter logical material memory mental activity merely Metaphysics mind Moderate Realism Monism moral movement muscular Natural Theology nature notion noumenon object observation operations organism original pain Pantheism particular perception phenomena philosophers physical physiological pleasure possessed present principle Psychology quod rational Rational Psychology reality reason reflex action reflexion relations representation retina scholastic sensations sense sensibility sensuous sentient soul space species spiritual stimulus substance term theory things thought tion truth universal volition whilst writers
Page 476 - I am certain there is no such principle in me. But, setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement.
Page 517 - Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, except in so far as it may be compelled by impressed forces to change that state.
Page 444 - If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no "mind-stuff...
Page 496 - ... the passage from the current to the needle, if not demonstrable, is thinkable, and that we entertain no doubt as to the final mechanical solution of the problem. But the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought, and a definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously ; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process...
Page 443 - natural language;" and these emotions themselves, being so strongly characterised both from within and without, may be called the standard emotions. Our natural way of thinking about these standard emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My...
Page 379 - I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact...
Page 344 - It is that which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public; it is that which every man you meet puts on the show of; it is that which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions, over the face of the earth, make it their business and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon mankind ; namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good.
Page 236 - I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse.
Page 476 - The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity.