Milestones in strategic arms control 1945-2000...DIANE Publishing |
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Other editions - View all
Milestones in Strategic Arms Control, 1945-2000, United States Air Force ... James Smith,Gwendolyn Hall No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
ABM Treaty ACDA agreed Air Force Air Force’s Air Staff American arms control arms limitations arms-control agreements arms-control negotiations arms-control policy arms-control process arsenal ballistic missiles capability Carter chief of staff Cold Cold War compliance Control and Disarmament conventional cruise missiles deployed deployment détente deterrence DOD Annual Report efforts Eisenhower focus Garthoff Gorbachev heavy bombers heavy ICBMs Ibid implementation included interview involved issues Joint Chiefs Joint Staff Kartchner Kissinger launchers LeMay ment military MIRV missile defense national security Nixon nuclear forces Nuclear Strategy nuclear weapons offensive period political position President proposal Reagan Administration role Russians Secretary of Defense Senate Shultz SLBMs Soviet Union stability START II Strategic Air Command strategic arms control Strategic Arms Reduction Strategic Defense Initiative strategic nuclear summit talks Test Ban threat tion unilateral United USAF USSR verification Vladivostok warheads Washington
Popular passages
Page 206 - not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode.
Page 211 - Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty,
Page 9 - is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world. That is why Great Britain and the United States, who have the secret of its production, do not intend to reveal the secret until means have been found to control the bomb so as to protect ourselves and the rest of the world from the danger of total destruction.
Page 100 - was an Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This was
Page 56 - adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting Allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.
Page 206 - an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.
Page 5 - I desire no sort of participation by the Air Service of the United States in a plan . . . which has as its object promiscuous bombing upon industry, commerce, or populations in enemy countries disassociated from obvious military needs to be served by such action.
Page 143 - Never give in, never give in, never, never, never, never; in nothing great or small, large or petty, never give in.
Page 260 - different groups pulling in different directions produce a result, or better a resultant—a mixture of conflicting preferences and unequal power of various individuals—distinct from what any person or group intended.
Page 152 - sides . . . agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
References to this book
Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament Jeffrey Arthur Larsen,James M. Smith Limited preview - 2005 |