Aviation Security and Transition: Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, July 25, 2002

Front Cover
 

Selected pages

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

Popular passages

Page 77 - for the opportunity to present this testimony. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr.
Page 31 - our special agents used counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports, bypassing security checkpoints and walking unescorted to aircraft departure gates. The agents, who had been issued tickets and boarding passes, could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft.
Page 84 - Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to responding to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Stephens follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD
Page 4 - STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, US SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you for holding this hearing,
Page 75 - passengers are enduring long lines at the security screening checkpoint. These lines are made longer by the screening of pilots, flight attendants and other individuals in positions of trust, who are often screened several times a day. The lack of equipment for positively identifying these individuals wastes limited screening resources and further inconveniences the traveling public.
Page 35 - Our model is designed to help agency leaders effectively lead and manage their people and integrate human capital considerations into daily decision making and the program results they seek to achieve. In
Page 75 - the Universal Access System (UAS). Two million taxpayer dollars were spent on those tests involving two major airlines and four large airports. For all practical purposes, those funds were wasted. Although the FAA completed successful tests of the UAS and standards were finalized for the system in 1998, there
Page 75 - no implementation by any airline of the system, per stated congressional intent. This failure came as a result of an FAA policy to leave UAS implementation to the sole discretion of the carriers. Although magnetic stripe technology was used as the basis for UAS tests, there are now several advanced, mature technologies that could be used to positively identify authorized personnel.
Page 36 - Long-term attention to cost and accountability controls for acquisition and related business processes will be critical both to ensuring TSA's success and to maintaining its integrity and accountability.

Bibliographic information