Principia EthicaFirst published in 1903, this volume revolutionized philosophy and forever altered the direction of ethical studies. A philosopher’s philosopher, G. E. Moore was the idol of the Bloomsbury group, and Lytton Strachey declared that 'Principia Ethica' marked the rebirth of the Age of Reason. This work clarifies some of moral philosophy’s most common confusions and redefines the science’s terminology. Six chapters explore - the subject matter of ethics, naturalistic ethics, hedonism, metaphysical ethics, ethics in relation to conduct, and the ideal. Moore's simplicity of style and precise use of everyday language exercised an enormous influence on the development of analytic philosophy, and they contribute to the continuing resonance of his compelling arguments. |
Contents
THE SUBJECTMATTER OF ETHICS | 1 |
3 The subjects of the judgments of a scientific Ethics are not like those of some studies particular things | 3 |
6 and the answer to this question is that it is indefinable | 6 |
for if by definition be meant the analysis of an object of thought only complex objects can be defined | 7 |
8 and of the three senses in which definition can be used this is the most important | 8 |
10 Good then denotes one uniqe simple object of thought among innumerable others but this object has very commonly been identified with some ot... | 9 |
11 and which reduces what is used as a fundamental principle of Ethics either to a tautology or to a statement about the meaning of a word | 10 |
12 The nature of this fallacy is easily recognised | 12 |
68 Metaphysics as dealing with a supersensible reality may have a bearing upon practical Ethics 1 if its supersensible reality is conceived as somethin... | 115 |
it only remains to discuss certain confusions which seem to have lent it plausibility | 118 |
in the former sense fiction has a more important bearing upon Ethics than Metaphysics can have | 121 |
72 But a more important source of confusion seems to lie in the supposition that to be good is identical with the possession of some supersensible pro... | 122 |
73 One cause of this supposition seems to be the logical prejudice that all propositions are of the most familiar typethat in which subject and predicate... | 123 |
in particular they are obviously to be distinguished | 125 |
75 1 from Natural Laws with which one of Kants most famous doctrines confuses them | 126 |
76 and 2 from Commands with which they are confused both by Kant and by others | 127 |
13 and if it were avoided it would be plain that the only alternatives to the admission that good is indefinable are either that it is complex or that there... | 15 |
14 The naturalistic fallacy illustrated by Bentham and the importance of avoiding it pointed out | 17 |
a thing may be asserted either to be good itself or to be causally related to something else which is itself goodto be good as a means | 21 |
16 Our investigations of the latter kind of relation cannot hope to establish more than that a certain kind of action will generally be followed by the b... | 22 |
17 but a relation of the former kind if true at all will be true of all cases All ordinary ethical judgments assert causal relations but they are commonly t... | 23 |
18 The investigation of intrinsic values is complicated by the fact that the value of a whole may be different from the sum of the values of its parts | 27 |
19 in which case the part has to the whole a relation which exhibits an equally important difference from and resemblance to that of means to end | 29 |
20 The term organic whole might well be used to denote that a whole has this property since of the two other properties which it is commonly used t... | 30 |
21 one that of reciprocal causal dependence between parts has no necessary relation to this one | 31 |
22 and the other upon which most stress has been laid can be true of no whole whatsoever being a selfcontradictory conception due to confusion | 33 |
23 Summary of chapter | 36 |
NATURALISTIC ETHICS | 37 |
and the second group may be subdivided into two others a theories which declare some natural object other than pleasure to be sole good b Hedonis... | 38 |
26 Definition of what is meant by Naturalism | 39 |
27 The common argument that things are good because they are natural may involve either 1 the false proposition that the normal as such is good | 41 |
28 or 2 false proposition that the necessary as such is good | 44 |
29 But a systematised appeal to Nature is now most prevalent in connection with the term Evolution An examination of Mr Herbert Spencers Ethics ... | 45 |
30 Darwins scientific theory of natural selection which has mainly caused the modern vogue of the term Evolution must be carefully distinguished fr... | 47 |
31 Mr Spencers connection of Evolution with Ethics seems to shew the influence of the naturalistic fallacy | 48 |
32 but Mr Spencer is vague as to the ethical relations of pleasure and evolution and his Naturalism may be Naturalistic Hedonism | 49 |
33 A discussion of the third chapter of the Data of Ethics serves to illustrate these two points and to shew that Mr Spencer is in utter confusion with re... | 51 |
34 Three possible views as to the relation of Evolution to Ethics are distinguished from the naturalistic view to which it is proposed to confine the na... | 54 |
35 Summary of chapter | 58 |
HEDONISM | 59 |
this doctrine has always been held by Hedonists and used by them as a fundamental ethical principle although it has commonly been confused with o... | 61 |
38 The method pursued in this chapter will consist in exposing the reasons commonly offered for the truth of Hedonism and in bringing out the reas... | 63 |
40 yet he gives a proof of the first proposition which consists in 1 the fallacious confusion of desirable with desired | 66 |
41 2 an attempt to shew that nothing but pleasure is desired | 67 |
42 The theory that nothing but pleasure is desired seems largely due to a confusion between the cause and the object of desire pleasure is certainly no... | 68 |
43 Mill attempts to reconcile his doctrine that pleasure is the sole object of desire with his admission that other things are desired by the absured decla... | 71 |
44 Summary of Mills argument and of my criticism | 72 |
45 We must now proceed to consider the principle of Hedonism as an Intuition as which it has been clearly recognised by Prof Sidgwick alone That i... | 74 |
46 In thus beginning to consider what things are good in themselves we leave the refutation of Naturalism behind and enter on the second division of... | 76 |
47 Mills doctrine that some pleasures are superior in quality to others implies both 1 that judgments of ends must be intuitions | 77 |
48 and 2 that pleasure is not the sole good | 79 |
50 The passages in the Methods of Ethics to which I shall now invite attention are to be found in I IX 4 and in III xiv 45 | 81 |
51 He then goes on to the far more important proposition that no part of Human Existence except pleasure is desirable | 85 |
52 But pleasure must be distinguished from consciousness of pleasure and 1 it is plain that when so distinguished pleasure is not the sole good | 87 |
53 and 2 it may be made equally plain that consciousness of pleasure is not the sole good if we are equally careful to distinguish it from its usual acco... | 90 |
54 Of Prof Sidgwicks two arguments for the contrary view the second is equally compatible with the supposition that pleasure is a mere criterion of ... | 91 |
55 and in his first the appeal to reflective intuition he fails to put the question clearly 1 in that he does not recognise the principle of organic unities | 92 |
hedonistic judgements of ends are flagrantly paradoxical | 94 |
57 I conclude then that a reflective intuition if proper precautions are taken will agree with Common Sense that it is absurd to regard mere conscious... | 95 |
58 It remains to consider Egoism and Utilitarianism It is important to distinguish the former as the doctrine that my own pleasure is sole good from th... | 96 |
it fails to perceive that when I declare a thing to be my own good I must be declaring it to be good absolutely or else not good at all | 97 |
60 This confusion is further brought out by an examination of Prof Sidgwicks contrary view | 99 |
61 and it is shewn that in consequence of this confusion his representation of the relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence as the profoun... | 102 |
62 The same confusion is involved in the attempt to infer Utilitarianism from Psychological Hedonism as commonly held eg by Mill | 104 |
63 Egoism proper seems also to owe its plausibility to its confusion with Egoism as a doctrine of means | 105 |
65 Summary of chapter | 108 |
METAPHYSICAL ETHICS | 110 |
77 This latter confusion is one of the sources of the prevalent modern doctrine that being good is identical with being willed but the prevalence of thi... | 128 |
that the proper method for Ethics is to discover what is implied in Will or Feeling just as according to Kant the proper method for Metaphysics was to... | 129 |
81 and once this analogy between Volition and Cognition is accepted the view that ethical propositions have an essential reference to Will and Feelin... | 133 |
82 The argument of the last three is recapitulated and it is pointed out 1 that Volition and Feeling are not analogous to Cognition 2 that even if they ... | 135 |
83 2 If being good and being willed are not identical then the latter could only be a criterion of the former and in order to shew that it was so we sho... | 137 |
84 The fact that the metaphysical writers who like Green attempt to base Ethics on Volition do not even attempt this independent investigation shews ... | 138 |
85 Summary of chapter | 139 |
ETHICS IN RELATION TO CONDUCT | 142 |
87 and 2 What things are good in themselves? to which we gave one answer in deciding that pleasure was not the only thing good in itself | 144 |
namely answers to the question What conduct is a means to good results? or What ought we to do? This is the question of Practical Ethics and its ans... | 146 |
90 and the rest of the chapter will deal with certain conclusions upon which light is thrown by this fact Of which the first is 1 that Intuitionism is mist... | 148 |
to discover what is our duty in this strict sense is impossible It may however be possible to shew which among the actions which we are likely to perf... | 149 |
92 The distinction made in the last is further explained and it is insisted that all that Ethics has done or can do is not to determine absolute duties but t... | 150 |
93 3 Even this latter task is immensly difficult and no adequate proof that the total results of one action are superior to those of another has ever been... | 152 |
94 and b even to decide that of any two actions one has a better total result than the other in the immediate future is very difficult and it is very impro... | 154 |
95 But c most of the actions most universally approved by Common Sense may perhaps be shewn to be generally better as means than any probable ... | 155 |
if any of these are to be proved useful in all societies this can only be done by shewing their causal relation to things good or evil in themselves whic... | 158 |
97 It is plain that rules of class 1 may also be justified by the existence of such temporary conditions as justify those of class 2 and among such tempo... | 159 |
there seems reason for thinking that with regard to 𝑎 where the generally useful rule is also generally observed he should always conform to it but th... | 162 |
100 and that 𝐵 in all other cases rules of action should not be followed at all but the individual should consider what positive goods he in his particul... | 164 |
when we ask Is this really expedient? we are asking precisely the same question as when we ask Is this my duty? viz Is this a means to the best possibl... | 167 |
but the term interested does also refer to a distinct ethical predicatethat an action is to my interest asserts only that it will have the best possible effects ... | 170 |
they are not necessarily more than dispositions to perform actions generally good as means and of these for the most part only those classed as duties ... | 171 |
105 and if we consider the intrinsic value of such exercise it will appear 1 that in most cases it has no value and 2 that even the cases where it has som... | 174 |
the value of this feeling has been peculiarly emphasized by Christian Ethics but it certainly is not as Kant would lead us to think either the sole thing ... | 178 |
109 Summary of chapter | 180 |
THE IDEAL | 183 |
111 but a correct answer to this question is an essential step towards a correct view as to what is ideal in senses 1 and 2 | 184 |
112 In order to obtain a correct answer to the question What is good in itself? we must consider what value things would have if they existed absolut... | 187 |
113 and if we use this method it is obvious that personal affection and aesthetic enjoyments include by far the greatest goods with which we are acqu... | 188 |
115 and 2 that a cognition of really beautiful qualities is equally essential and has equally little value by itself | 190 |
116 But 3 granted that the appropriate combination of these two elements is always a considerable good and may be a very great one we may ask wh... | 192 |
117 I think that this question should be answered in the affirmative but in order to ensure that this judgment is correct we must carefully distinguish it | 194 |
119 if however we attempt to avoid being biassed by these two facts it still seems that mere true belief may be a condition essential to great value | 197 |
emotions directed towards real objects may thus even if the object be inferior claim equality with the highest imaginative pleasures | 198 |
it need only be here remarked 1 that by calling them beautiful we mean that they have this relation to a good whole and 2 that they are for the most p... | 200 |
122 With regard to II Personal Affection the object is here not merely beautiful but also good in itself it appears however that the appreciation of wh... | 203 |
there is only a bare possibility that they are not included in it | 205 |
124 It remains to consider positive evils and mixed goods I Evils may be divided into three classes namely | 207 |
125 1 evils which consist in the love or admiration or enjoyment of what is evil or ugly | 208 |
126 2 evils which consist in the hatred or contempt of what is good or beautiful | 211 |
this appears to be the only thing either greatly good or greatly evil which does not involve both a cognition and an emotion directed towards its obje... | 212 |
the converse is often true | 213 |
1the difference between 2 and the sum of the values of the parts In view of this distinction it then appears | 214 |
130 1 That the mere combination of two or more evils is never positively good on the whole although it may certainly have great intrinsic value as a ... | 216 |
132 but there seems no reason to think that where the evil object exists the total state of things is ever positively good on the whole although the exist... | 219 |
133 Hence 1 no actually existing evil is necessary to the Ideal 2 the contemplation of imaginary evils is necessary to it and 3 where evils already exist... | 220 |
134 Concluding remarks | 222 |
135 Summary of chapter | 224 |
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Common terms and phrases
absolutely action admit answer arguments assert beautiful object best possible better called Casuistry causal certainly chapter cognition commonly conclusions conduct confusion consciousness of pleasure consider consists contemplation contradiction defined definition denote desire discussion disposition distinction distinguish doctrine duty effects Egoism emotion ethical judgments ethical proposition evil or ugly Evolution existence fact false greatest happiness Hedonism hedonistic hold ideal identical imply important indefinable instance intrinsic value intuition Intuitionism J. S. Mill kind means meant merely metaphysicians Metaphysics Mill Mill's moral natural law natural object naturalistic fallacy necessary obvious organic unities pain particular plain port wine positive possess practical Ethics predicate principle produce Prof proof prove Psychological Hedonism question Rational Egoism reason recognised reference regard relation rules seems sense shew shewn Sidgwick Socrates sole Spencer Summum Bonum supersensible reality supposed theory thing truth universal Utilitarianism virtue whole word